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Abstract
Severe brain injury is a leading cause of death and disability. Following severe brain injury
diagnosis is difficult and errors frequently occur. Recent findings in clinical neuroscience
may offer a solution. Neuroimaging has been used to detect preserved cognitive function and
awareness in some patients clinically diagnosed as being in a vegetative state. Remarkably,
neuroimaging has also been used to communicate with some vegetative patients through a
series of yes/no questions. Some have speculated that, one day, this method may allow
severely brain-injured patients to make medical decisions. Yet, skepticism is rife, due in part
to the inherent difficulty of assessing decision-making capacity through neuroimaging
communication. In this thesis, I provide the first systematic analysis of this problem. I
present and defend a strategy for assessing decision-making capacity in brain-injured patients
who can only communicate through neuroimaging.
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Preface
I. The Case of Mr. R.
Mr. R. was involved in a motor vehicle accident in December, 1999, which resulted in severe
brain injury. Upon admission to the hospital, Mr. R. was unable to open his eyes or produce
sound, and showed little reaction to painful stimuli. Neuroimaging showed herniation,
bleeding, and contusions in his left parietal and temporal lobes. Mr. R. stayed in the intensive
care unit for 1 month, and was then transferred to a specialized, long-term care facility. A
year after his injury, Mr. R. was discharged into the care of his family.
Mr. R. was diagnosed as being in a vegetative state. He had regular periods of wakefulness,
yet showed no behavioral evidence of awareness. Between 1999 and 2011, Mr. R. was
assessed regularly by neurologists. Between 2012 and 2013, 20 bedside assessments were
performed by clinical staff. All examinations consistently failed to reveal evidence of
awareness. Mr. R.’s diagnosis did not improve throughout this time and it was believed his
condition was permanent.
In February 2012, Mr. R. was enrolled in a study at the University of Western Ontario, in
which functional neuroimaging was used to assess preserved cognition and awareness.
Neuroimaging demonstrated that, despite satisfying all of the behavioral criteria of the
vegetative state, Mr. R. was aware of his surroundings. Investigators adapted neuroimaging
to allow Mr. R. to respond to a series of yes/no questions. Mr. R. was able to correctly
identify his own name, the name of his support worker (whom he had met following injury),
and the date. Additionally, Mr. R. was asked whether he was in physical pain, to which he
answered no.
Mr. R.’s case touches on a number of important issues in philosophy of science, philosophy
of mind, and medical ethics. Perhaps the most provocative philosophical issue raised is how
this method of communication relates to medical decision-making. If we can communicate
with Mr. R., is it ethically permissible to allow him to participate in medical decisions?
To date, medical ethicists have responded to this problem with skepticism. Communication
limitations make it difficult to evaluate a patient’s state of mind, which can lead to
viii

misinterpretation and even harm. Yet, there has been no systematic analysis of this problem
in the medical ethics literature and no one has persuasively argued why patients like Mr. R.
should—or should not—be allowed to participate in medical decisions.
In this thesis, I aim to resolve this problem by determining whether patients like Mr. R. have
decision-making capacity. Working within the received framework, I present a strategy for
assessing decision-making capacity in such patients. I argue that successful completion of the
tasks involved in this strategy warrants the attribution of decision-making capacity to patients
like Mr. R. for some low- to medium-stakes medical decisions. My argument is as follows:

A) In order to provide informed consent to medical treatment, a patient must have
decision-making capacity.
B) Due to extensive brain injury, decision-making capacity in patients like Mr. R. cannot
be presumed; it must be assessed.
C) Standard methods for assessing decision- making capacity cannot be applied to
patients like Mr. R. because of limitations in communication.
D) If standard methods cannot be applied, it is permissible to modify the rules of
assessment.
E) The rules of assessment can be modified by adopting a 3-step strategy:
Step 1: Evaluate cognitive functions and their relation to capacity.
Step 2: Deploy a vignette approach tailored to neuroimaging communication.
Step 3: Adopt a supported decision-making model.
F) The 3-step strategy does not produce evidence as strong as the standard method.
Thus, only low- to medium-stakes decision-making should be permitted.
Conclusion A): Provided the rules of assessment are modified, decision-making capacity for
some low- to medium-stakes medical decisions is demonstrable through neuroimaging.
Conclusion B): Provided a patient satisfies this strategy, it is permissible, in principle, to
allow her to participate in some low- to medium-stakes decisions through neuroimaging.
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II. Chapter Outlines
This is an interdisciplinary thesis, yet, the central problem and arguments explored herein are
primarily philosophical. Communication with patients like Mr. R., while remarkable, is not
an end in itself. Rather, communication is a means to an end, namely, improving the life of a
patient. Future scientific advancements will help realize this end, yet, philosophy can help
explain why this end matters and how we can achieve it in an ethically responsible manner.
A prescriptive account of how the science should evolve requires such philosophical
insight.This thesis contains 6 chapters. Chapters 1 and 3 are predominantly scientific.
Chapters 2 and 6 are predominantly philosophical. Chapters 4 and 5 are a combination of the
two.
Chapter 1: Neuroimaging after severe brain injury
In chapter 1, I review current clinical and scientific approaches to assessment, diagnosis, and
neuroimaging after severe brain injury. I briefly review and respond to criticism of this
research. I provide a comprehensive overview of neuroimaging communication. I document
relevant information about the patients that have been involved in research, including patient
histories, methods of communication, and the questions that have been posed. This chapter is
intended to serve as the scientific backdrop for analysis of decision-making capacity.
Chapter 2: Decision-making capacity
In chapter 2, I provide an exegesis of the doctrine of informed consent, the received theory of
decision-making capacity, and the standard method for evaluating decision-making capacity
in clinical populations. I explain why this method of assessment cannot be applied in
neuroimaging communication and review arguments that suggest it is ethically problematic
to allow severely brain-injured patients to participate in medical decisions. I respond to these
arguments to motivate the assessment strategy proposed in the following chapters.
Chapter 3: What cognitive functions are preserved following severe brain injury?
In chapter 3, I provide a systematic task analysis of the various neuroimaging methods used
in the Owen Lab at the University of Western Ontario. I argue that satisfaction of each task
recruits a number of cognitive functions. I specify which cognitive functions are required to
x

execute which tasks. I argue that such information can shed light on the preserved cognitive
profile of a patient before she is eligible for neuroimaging communication.
Chapter 4: Cognitive functions and decision-making capacity
In chapter 4, I provide a functional analysis of decision-making capacity and review recent
findings that demonstrate that particular cognitive functions are differentially important to
decision-making capacity. I argue that, from a coarse-grained perspective, certain cognitive
functions are conceptually related to decision-making capacity and that these functions are
recruited in tasks deployed in the Owen Lab. I also argue that, from a fine-grained
perspective, neuropsychological research suggests a predictive relationship between
cognitive functions and decision-making capacity. These relationships give reason to believe
that the cognitive functions involved in decision-making capacity may be intact if a patient
satisfies the neuroimaging tasks deployed by the Owen Lab. I argue that investigation of
cognitive functions is a heuristic for informing practical judgments as to which patients may
retain decision- making capacity, but that further evaluation is needed.
Chapter 5: The vignette approach
In chapter 5, I describe the vignette approach. The vignette approach is a practical test of
decision-making capacity tailored to neuroimaging communication. A practical test is
required because decision-making capacity is decision-specific, and cannot be attributed to
patients by the mere evaluation of cognitive functions. The vignette approach discloses
medical information to patients in a highly refined snap-shot, or vignette. A series of
questions are posed to probe decision-making capacity. I argue that this approach is ideal for
neuroimaging communication because it takes into account the technical limitations of
neuroimaging, as well as the cognitive limitations of this patient population.
Chapter 6: Supported decision-making and severe brain injury
In chapter 6, I propose a model of supported decision-making. I revisit criticisms raised
against the use of neuroimaging communication in medical decision-making. I then introduce
the supported decision-making model, medical trusteeship, as a way to respond to these
worries. I argue that medical trusteeship is a useful framework for thinking about how
severely brain-injured patients can reasonably participate in decision-making.
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III. A Note on Terminology
This thesis contains technical terms that cut across disciplinary boundaries. I have taken care
to ensure consistency in terminology. Two key terms are identified here.
Capacity and competence: Capacity is an ethical condition of medical decision-making,
while competence is a legal condition. The medical ethics and legal literatures sometimes use
these terms interchangeably. Yet, their distinction is important for this thesis. This thesis
provides an ethical argument, not a legal argument. The term, “decision- making capacity”
has been used throughout, yet the term “competence” appears in some block quotations.
Cognition: The term “cognition”, and related terms, including “cognitive function” and
“cognitive profile”, are used throughout this thesis. I do not defend a particular theory of
cognition. I employ these term as they are commonly used in the scientific literature.

IV. The Owen Lab and The Neuroethics Research Group
This thesis is the product of a unique collaboration between the Rotman Institute of
Philosophy and The Owen Lab. In 2011, Adrian M. Owen relocated his lab from Cambridge
University to Western to take up the Canada Excellence Research Chair in Neuroscience and
Imaging. In 2012, Charles Weijer, Canada Research Chair in Bioethics, and Professor Owen
began discussions on collaborative projects. A working group was formed and CIHR funding
was secured (2014-2018). The research program is entitled, “The Ethics of Neuroimaging
After Serious Brain Injury”. Central contributors to the program include, Tommaso Bruni
(Western), Damian Cruse (Birmingham), Davinia Fernández-Espejo (Birmingham), Teneille
Gofton (London Health Science Centre), Laura Gonzalez-Lara (Western), Mackenzie
Graham (Western), Andrea Lazosky (London Health Science Centre), Adrian M. Owen
(Western), Lorina Naci (Western), Loretta Norton (Western), Andrew Peterson (Western),
Kathy Speechly (Western), Fiona Webster (Toronto), Charles Weijer (Western), and Bryan
Young (Western).
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Chapter 1

1

Neuroimaging after severe brain injury

In this chapter, I review current clinical and scientific approaches in the assessment,
diagnosis, and neuroimaging of severely brain-injured patients. I briefly review and
respond to objections raised against this research. I provide a comprehensive overview of
neuroimaging techniques used to communicate with severely brain-injured patients. I
document relevant information about the patients that have been involved in research,
including patient histories, methods of communication, and the questions that have been
posed. This chapter is intended to serve as the scientific backdrop for philosophical
analysis of decision-making capacity.

1.1 Acquired brain injury
Acquired brain injury is a leading cause of death and disability (Greenwald et al., 2003;
Thurman et al., 1999). There are approximately 50,000 cases of brain injury per year in
Canada and 1.4 million in the United States. Conservative estimates suggest an acquired
brain injury rate of 250-300 per 100,000 inhabitants in developed Western nations
(Campbell, 2000).
Acquired brain injury has both traumatic and non-traumatic etiologies. Traumatic brain
injury can result from motor vehicle accidents, falls, or assaults. Non-traumatic brain
injury can result from stroke, encephalitis, anoxia, or brain tumors (Tokutomi et al., 2008;
Mosenthal et al., 2002; Rapoport and Feinstein, 2000). Epidemiological data indicate that
age is an important distinguishing factor. In 2003-2004, the Canadian Institutes of Health
estimated that 50% of all traumatic brain injury in Canadians aged 39 and younger was
caused by motor vehicle accidents while more than 68% of traumatic brain injuries in
Canadians aged 60 and older was due to falls. Brain injury is particularly high in males
aged 15 to 24 and is often associated with risk-taking behaviors (Greenwald et al., 2003).
Non-traumatic brain injury, meanwhile, appears to be most prevalent in individuals aged
40 and older.
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Traumatic brain injury is classified as mild, moderate, or severe. Sports-related head
trauma is a common source of mild to moderate brain injury. These injuries result in
disorientation, confusion, or a state of transient unconsciousness lasting no longer than 1
hour (Multi-Society Task Force, 1994). By contrast, severe brain injury is life altering
and may result in protracted unconsciousness. Severe brain injury requires immediate and
intensive medical intervention and may lead to significant cognitive or physical
disability.
Improvements in critical care have prolonged the lives of individuals who sustain severe
brain injury, including those who are comatose (see table 1). Coma is characterized by
unarousable unawareness with median duration of approximately two weeks (Young,
2009). The pathophysiology of coma is damage to the cortex, underlying white matter, or
bilateral thalamus (Giacino et al., 2014). Damage to the ascending reticular activating
system prevents comatose patients from breathing on their own (Young, 2009). Artificial
hydration, nutrition, and ventilation are required. Intensive care for severely brain-injured
patients can include therapeutic hypothermia to slow or prevent neuronal damage
(Nikolov et al., 2003).
Predicting outcome in comatose patients is extremely difficult. Clinical exams, structural
neuroimaging, biomarkers, and electrophysiological testing are the main source of
prognostic information. In non-traumatic etiologies, poor outcome is indicated by absent
brainstem reflexes, prolonged and recurrent epileptic seizures, specific biomarkers, or
lack of response to electrical stimulation of the somatosensory nerves (Wijdicks et al.,
2006). In traumatic etiologies, poor outcome is predicted by herniation in regions
associated with the brainstem and particular abnormalities of the brain structure (Lingsma
et al., 2010).
Following a period of coma some patients may enter into a vegetative state (also known
as unresponsive wakefulness syndrome). Clinically, this transition coincides with
recovery of spontaneous respiration (Demertzi et al., 2013). Mechanical ventilation can
be safely removed; however, artificial hydration and nutrition are still required.
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Table 1: Stages of recovery following severe brain injury
Condition
Coma

Vegetative
state

Minimally
conscious
state

Clinical features
No sleep/wake cycles

Clinical care
Intensive care unit.

No awareness

Artificial ventilation,
hydration and nutrition.

General prognosis
Recovery or death within 2 to
4 weeks.

Semi-regular
sleep/wake cycles

Long-term care or family
home.

Outcome dependent on
etiology.
Outcome dependent on
etiology.

Absence of awareness

Artificial hydration and
nutrition.
Long-term care or family
home.

Outcome dependent on
etiology.

Regular sleep/wake
cycles.
Intermittent awareness

May require artificial
hydration and nutrition.

Behaviorally, the vegetative state is characterized by dissociation between wakefulness
and awareness. Vegetative patients will exhibit sleep/wake cycles yet evidence no
concomitant awareness of visual, auditory, or tactile stimuli. The vegetative state is often
referred to as “wakeful unresponsiveness” (Multi-Society Task Force, 1994; Plum and
Posner, 1982).
It is difficult to predict recovery from the vegetative state (Beaumont and Kenealy, 2005).
However, epidemiological data strongly suggest that patients with non-traumatic brain
injury are unlikely to recover if they remain vegetative for longer than 3 months, while
patients with traumatic brain injury are unlikely to recover if they remain vegetative for
more than 12 months (Multi-Society Task Force, 1994).
A number of vegetative patients may enter into a minimally conscious state (Giacino et
al., 2002). The minimally conscious state is characterized by sleep/wake cycles and
intermittent behavioral evidence of awareness. Distinguishing features of the minimally
conscious state include inconsistent command following, purposeful yet minimal
language use, visual pursuit, object recognition, and localization of painful stimuli. The
pathophysiology of the minimally conscious state is diffuse axonal injury with variable
thalamic involvement. The severity of damage to the thalamus and specific corticothalamic connections is usually greater in vegetative than minimally conscious patients.
This may explain why vegetative and minimally conscious patients differ in cognitive
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processing and behavior (Giacino et al., 2014).

1.1.1

Clinical assessment of severe brain injury

Patients with severe brain injury are assessed using clinical exams, structural
neuroimaging, and electrophysiology. Clinical exams administered at the bedside
evaluate a patient’s wakefulness and awareness. Wakefulness is operationalized by
behavioral or electrophysiological evidence of arousal, including periodic eye-opening
and sleep/wake rhythms. Awareness is operationalized by sustained, reproducible,
purposeful and voluntary behaviors, evidence of language comprehension or expression
(Giacino et al., 2014; 2002; Owen, 2013; Young, 2009; Laureys, Owen, Schiff, 2004;
Multi-Society Task Force, 1994).
A variety of neurobehavioral scales are available to assess wakefulness and awareness. A
recent comprehensive review by the Brain-Injury Interdisciplinary Special Interest Group
and The Disorders of Consciousness Task Force describes 13 different scales (Seel et al.,
2010). Each scale is based on the premise that awareness can be inferred from behavior.
These scales are designed to elicit agent directed behaviors, such as command following,
response to painful stimuli, or functional communication. These behaviors, it is reasoned,
require awareness (Owen, 2013; Laureys, Owen, Schiff, 2004). The attribution of
awareness to such patients thus makes an “evidentiary detour” through behaviors that
could not be performed without awareness (Bayne and Hohwy, 2014).
Three commonly used scales are the Glasgow Coma Scale (Teasdale and Jennett, 1974),
the JFK Coma Recovery Scale (Giacino et al., 2004), and the Wessex Head Injury Matrix
(Shiel et al., 2000) (See table 2). The Glasgow Coma Scale is applied to patients upon
admission to a hospital and is divided into three subscales: eye response, verbal response,
and motor response. Each subscale is scored individually. Eye response scores range
from 1 to 4 (from no eye opening to spontaneous or stimulus-driven eye opening). Verbal
response scores range from 1 to 5 (from no verbalization to subject-oriented
conversation). Motor response scores range from 1 to 6 (from no spontaneous movement
to reproducible command following). A maximum aggregate score of 15 indicates normal
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Table 2: Behavioral scales used to assess severe brain injury
Scale

Behaviors assessed

Glasgow Coma
Scale
JFK Coma
Recovery
Scale
Wessex Head
Injury Matrix

Eye, verbal, motor/brain stem
reflexes
Auditory, visual, motor,
oromotor, communication,
arousal
Basic behaviors, communication,
attention, orientation, memory

Time to
complete
5 min.

Common application

25 min.

Assess emergence from coma

30-120
min.

Admission to hospital

Research
Patients at referral facilities
Research

wakefulness and awareness. Aggregate scores less than or equal to 8 indicate significant
neurological impairment (Teasdale and Jennett, 1974).
More detailed scales are used as a patient becomes medically stable. The JFK Coma
Recovery Scale consists of six subscales: auditory function, visual function, motor
function, oromotor function, functional communication, and arousal (Giacino et al.,
2004). Each subscale is tested through three to five unique behavioral interventions. An
aggregate score of 23 is consistent with normal wakefulness and awareness. An aggregate
score less than or equal to 7, with no evidence of functional communication or object use,
is consistent with coma or the vegetative state. Relatively high scores in any one of four
subscales, or minimal yet reproducible communication are consistent with the minimally
conscious state. The JFK Coma Recovery Scale is broadly considered the most sensitive
and reliable scale for assessing awareness following severe brain injury (Stender et al.,
2014).
More comprehensive scales, such as the Wessex Head Injury Matrix, are used to assess
patients at specialized rehabilitation centers (Shiel et al., 2000). The Wessex Head Injury
Matrix was developed through extensive clinical observation of patients recovering from
severe brain injury. Initial development of the scale identified 145 behaviors
characteristic of functional recovery. The Wessex Head Injury Matrix is not widely used
in clinical practice due to the time needed to complete the exam—between 30 and 120
minutes—and the special training required.
Neurobehavioral scales are the standard method for assessing preserved awareness
following severe brain injury. Yet, scale implementation and interpretation depend on the
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subjective appraisal of individual examiners and utilization is highly variable across
medical facilities. As a result, a recurring trend of inconsistent diagnoses is observed and
documented in the literature.1
In 1993, Childs and colleagues studied 49 patients admitted to a rehabilitation facility
over a 5-year period. All 49 patients were classified as comatose or vegetative yet the
diagnostic methods varied widely, employed different terminologies and different
observation times. Childs and colleagues applied a standard reassessment method to this
group of patients and found that 18 (37%) of them demonstrated behavioral evidence of
awareness (Childs et al., 1993).
In 1996, Andrews and colleagues conducted a similar study of 40 patients diagnosed as
vegetative upon admission to a rehabilitation facility. Andrews and colleagues discovered
that 17 (43%) of these patients demonstrated evidence of awareness through volitional
eye movement or a touch sensitive buzzer. They concluded that bedside examinations
that rely on eye blinking as the primary indication of awareness are poor for assessing
severe brain injury (Andrews et al., 1996). They note that:
Many patients who are misdiagnosed as being in the vegetative state are blind or
have a severe visual [disability]; thus lack of eye blinking to threat or lack of
visual tracking are not reliable signs for diagnosing the vegetative state. (Andrews
et al., 1996:13)
Importantly, the forgoing studies were conducted prior to development of standardized
neurobehavioral scales and the introduction of the “minimally conscious state” as a
diagnostic category. The JFK Coma Recovery Scale and Wessex Head Injury Matrix
were developed in the early 2000’s, while the “minimally conscious state” was

These findings are often referred to as “misdiagnosis rates”. Yet, there is confusion in the
literature regarding what “misdiagnosis” means and what a misdiagnosis is relative to. There are
at least two kinds of misdiagnoses in this context. First, a misdiagnosis can occur because
behavior is misinterpreted. Second, a misdiagnosis can occur because the scale used is
insensitive, in principle, to the relevant kinds of evidence of awareness.
1
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introduced in 2002 (Giacino et al., 2002). This may explain some of the diagnostic
inconsistency observed. Nonetheless, a recent multi-center validation study of the JFK
Coma Recovery Scale revealed similar results. In this study, investigators followed 103
severely brain-injured patients at multiple rehabilitation centers. Diagnoses made by
consensus among medical staff were compared with the results of the JFK Coma
Recovery Scale. Of 44 patients diagnosed as vegetative by medical staff, 18 (41%) were
reclassified as minimally conscious when assessed with the JFK Coma Recovery Scale
(Schnakers et al., 2009).
These findings demonstrate a number of important facts. First, the use of multiple
neurobehavioral scales can engender heterogeneity of diagnosis between clinicians or
medical facilities. Standardizing neurobehavioral scales would therefore reduce
inconsistency. Second, reliance on particular behaviors, such as eye blinking, may be
inappropriate in patients with motor disabilities secondary to brain injury. Indeed, a
patient may be aware even if she is unable to demonstrate these behaviors. Finally, recent
data suggest that clinical consensus likely underestimates awareness in some severely
brain-injured patients. Consensus diagnoses must therefore be interpreted with caution.

1.2 fMRI and EEG assessment of severe brain injury
Technical advances in neuroscience have provided new avenues for exploring residual
cognitive function and awareness in severely brain-injured patients. These methods
reveal information that may be diagnostically and prognostically relevant when
neurobehavioral evaluation is uncertain. Two modalities used are functional magnetic
resonance imaging (fMRI) and electroencephalography (EEG).
fMRI is a non-invasive brain imaging technique that measures changes in blood flow and
oxygenation in the brain (Belliveau et al., 1990; Ogawa et al., 1990). fMRI scanners
expose participants to a magnetic field that alters the properties of hemoglobin, the
primary oxygen-carrying molecule in blood. Hemoglobin contains iron atoms that
express different magnetic properties when blood is oxygenated or deoxygenated
(Aguirre, 2014). fMRI scanners detect these changes and identify where, and to
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what extent, hemoglobin is deoxygenating in the brain.2 fMRI data are organized in 3dimensional coordinate maps individuated into small units called voxels. Analytic
methods are applied to data to compare estimations of hemoglobin de-oxygenation for
statistical significance. fMRI generates brain images with high spatial but low temporal
resolution. The method is relatively expensive and non-portable. fMRI units with high
spatial resolution are found primarily in research institutes.
A second instrument is EEG. EEG is a non-invasive technique that records electrical
activity on the surface of the brain (Luck and Kappenman, 2011). This activity has
characteristic changes in amplitude and latency that are represented in EEG waveforms.
A waveform often investigated in severely brain-injured patients is the P-300 wave (cf.
Chennu et al., 2013; Faugeras et al., 2011). The P-300 wave has a positive deflection and
occurs approximately 250 to 500 milliseconds after a stimulus is introduced. Research in
healthy participants demonstrates the P-300 wave is elicited through odd-ball tasks. An
odd-ball task exposes participants to a standard visual or auditory stimulus with short,
random exposures to a distinct stimulus (e.g., a different auditory tone). Investigators
hypothesize the P-300 wave is associated with alterations in attention (Chennu et al.,
2013). Similarly, EEG may also be used to estimate diffuse polarization or depolarization
of electrical fields on the brain’s surface. This may reveal activation of broad cortical
structures, such as the motor cortices. EEG has high temporal but low spatial resolution,
particularly for sub-cortical brain structures (Luck and Kappenman, 2011). EEG is
relatively inexpensive, portable, and widely used in neuro-critical care (Young, 2009).
A subset of fMRI and EEG-based techniques, called active paradigms (Laureys and
Schiff, 2012), has been used to demonstrate awareness in patients clinically diagnosed as
being in a vegetative state. An active paradigm requires the participant to perform a
mental action (e.g., visualize an object, count, or sing to oneself). These paradigms, like
neurobehavioral scales, are motivated by the view that agent directed behavior provides
evidence of awareness. Yet, unlike neurobehavioral scales, overt behavioral response to a
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Called a Blood Oxygenation Level Dependent (BOLD) signal.
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Figure 1: Mental imagery activation patterns

Legend: SMA=Supplementary Motor Area; PMC= Pre-Motor Cortex; PPC= Posterior Parietal
Cortex; PPA=Parahippocampal Gyrus. Image from Owen and colleagues (2006).

command is replaced with willful modulation of brain activity.
In the first-ever demonstration of this technique with fMRI, investigators assessed 36
healthy volunteers to determine if they could reliably follow commands with mental
imagery (Boly et al., 2007). First, investigators assessed what type of mental imagery
induced the greatest change in brain activity at the single subject level. While lying in the
scanner, two participant subgroups were instructed to imagine two different tasks. The
first group (n=12) was instructed to imagine either moving from room to room in their
home or singing “jingle bells”. The second group (n=12) was instructed to imagine either
playing tennis or visualizing familiar faces.
Participants were instructed to engage in mental imagery for 30-second intervals,
repeated 7 times, and to relax on command. Standardized auditory stimuli, such as “play
tennis” and “relax”, were used for task presentation. Analysis revealed spatial navigation
imagery (imagining moving from room to room in one’s home) and motor imagery
(imagining playing tennis) produced the strongest BOLD signal at the single subject
level. Imagining moving from room to room in one’s home (e.g., spatial navigation)
reliably produced activity in the pre-motor cortex, the posterior parietal cortex, and the
parahippocampal gyrus. Imagining playing tennis (e.g., motor imagery) reliably produced
activity in the supplementary motor area (see figure 1).
Investigators then tested a second group of healthy participants (n=12) to determine if
neuroimaging evidence of spatial navigation or motor imagery could be distinguished
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Figure 1: Mental imagery task design
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Legend: Mental imagery task design (motor imagery trial). X-axis is in seconds. Red line
represents characteristic BOLD signal during task performance.

through blinded discrimination. While lying in the scanner, participants were instructed
to imagine spatial navigation or motor imagery tasks for 30-second blocks, repeated 7
times (see figure 2). The sequence of task presentation was randomly selected by the
neuroimaging computer system. This resulted in a distinct mental imagery sequence for
each participant. A team of blinded experts assessed the post-scan data. In each and every
case, the team accurately discriminated between rest, spatial navigation, and motor
imagery tasks (Boly et al., 2007). According to the study authors, these findings suggest
that fMRI mental imagery could be used as “a supplementary tool in clinical situations to
diagnose some patients who are aware but unable to produce an overt motor output…”
(Boly et al., 2007:989).
Investigators applied this technique to a severely brain-injured patient who was
consistently diagnosed as vegetative over a 5-month period (Owen et al., 2006). Despite
the patient’s inability to demonstrate voluntary behavioral responses, investigators
discovered that the patient could willfully follow commands by modulating her brain
activity. fMRI signals were statistically robust, task-appropriate, reproducible, and
sustained for discrete 30-second periods (see figure 3). In the five days of assessment
leading up to fMRI scan, the Wessex Head Injury Matrix was administered to the patient
at different times of the day and in different postures. Each assessment was consistent
with the vegetative state. 11.5 months after injury (6 months post-scanning), the patient
remained behaviorally unresponsive. Painful stimuli only elicited minimal and transient
dilation of the left pupil, and no behavioral response to command following was observed
(Owen et al., 2006: supplement).
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Figure 2: Patient brain activation during mental imagery

Legend: SMA=Supplementary Motor Area; PMC= Pre-Motor Cortex; PPC= Posterior Parietal
Cortex; PPA=Parahippocampal Gyrus. Image from Owen and colleagues (2006)

remained behaviorally unresponsive. Painful stimuli only elicited minimal and transient
dilation of the left pupil, and no behavioral response to command following was observed
(Owen et al., 2006: supplement).
Following publication of these findings, additional studies confirmed the efficacy of
mental imagery in large, heterogeneous patient cohorts (Stender et al., 2014, Monti et al.,
2010), and extended it to EEG (Cruse et al., 2012). These findings make a compelling
case for the inclusion of functional neuroimaging and EEG in standard diagnostic
protocols (Owen, 2013; Coleman et al., 2009). As previously noted, neurobehavioral
scales may lead to inconsistencies in diagnosis (Schnakers et al., 2009, Andrews et al.,
1996, Childs et al., 1993). fMRI and EEG can therefore complement neurobehavioral
evaluation when diagnosis is unclear.

1.2.1

Criticisms of mental imagery

The mental imagery task has numerous critics (Klein, 2015; Nachev and Hacker, 2010;
Nachev and Husain, 2007; Greenberg, 2007). Broadly, these critics maintain that positive
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results in vegetative patients do not provide persuasive evidence of awareness and are
better explained by automatic brain activity. The supplementary motor area can
automatically activate if participants are subliminally exposed to stimuli incidentally
related to action (Nachev and Hacker, 2010; Nachev et al., 2008). Both epileptic patients
and healthy participants have shown evidence of unconscious emotional or semantic
processing during subliminal exposure to emotionally charged words or task descriptions
(Naccache et al., 2005). Thus, the words contained in auditory instructions may elicit
automatic brain activity that could be mistaken for voluntary mental imagery.
Proponents of the mental imagery task have responded to this criticism by systematically
ruling out factors that might contribute to automatic responses. For example, the mental
imagery task is organized in repeating 30-second blocks of mental imagery and rest.
While it is possible that automatic brain activity could occur in response to task
presentation, it is likely to be transient (Monti et al., 2010: supplement; Owen et al.,
2007). In one study, healthy participants were tested to determine if relevant brain
activity could be elicited automatically for 30-second intervals. Participants were
presented with sentences containing the words “tennis” or “house” without receiving
prior task instructions. fMRI results were modeled for 30-second response intervals.
Owen and colleagues had hypothesized that significant and sustained activation would be
observed if brain activity was merely automatic. However, no such activity in the
supplementary motor area, the parahippocampal gyrus, or any other relevant brain region
was observed (Owen et al., 2007:1221c).
A second, related, criticism is that, while it may be apparent that patients are capable of
following commands through mental imagery, the associated brain activity is not due to
an endogenous intention (Klein, 2015). An endogenous intention is formed as a result of
the agent’s own volition, while exogenously driven behavior is believed to result from
stimuli independent of this volition. Proponents of this view claim that neural modulation
elicited by the mental imagery task is exogenously driven. They argue further that certain
conditions that inhibit the formation of endogenous intentions, such as akinetic mutism,
explain the clinical presentation of these patients better than a presumption of covert
awareness.
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One response to this brand of criticism hinges on an anatomical model that explains the
dissociation between imagined and performed movements. Proponents of this critique
presume a condition like akinetic mutism best explains the observed phenomena. Yet, a
recent study by Fernández-Espejo and colleagues (2015) proposes, and subsequently
confirms, a neural model that explains the clinical presentation of these patients without
raising worries about endogenous intention formation. White matter tracts that project
from the thalamus to the motor cortex are uniquely damaged in patients that appear
vegetative but are covertly aware. This accounts for the clinical presentation of these
patients and their ability to perform mental imagery without invoking a distinction
between endogenous intention formation and exogenously driven brain activity.
The mental imagery task design combined with a neural model that explains the clinical
presentation of these patients suggests that the probability of an automatic, exogenously
driven response to the task is low. In order for brain activity to be automatic and still
satisfy the mental imagery task, the activity would have to occur in the correct brain
region, at precisely the right time in the experiment, and be sustained for repeated 30second intervals (Owen, 2013; Owen et al., 2006). The fact that patients can perform this
task on command, and likely have focal lesions that dissociate imagined from performed
movement, provides reason to believe that these patients, despite their clinical
presentation are, in fact, aware.

1.3 Communication through neuroimaging
The reliability of fMRI and EEG-based active paradigms has paved the way for attempts
to communicate with severely brain-injured patients. To date, several fMRI studies have
identified a minority of patients capable of functional communication.
In the first reported demonstration of neuroimaging communication (Owen and Coleman,
2008), investigators sought to determine whether a single healthy participant could
accurately convey responses to yes/no questions. Prior to scanning, the participant
provided a team of blinded investigators with a set of names (e.g., Terry, Chris, Steve)
and familial relations (e.g., father, brother, brother-in-law). The participant was asked a
series of yes/no questions, such as “Is your father’s name Terry?” and “Is your brother’s
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Figure 3: Communication task designs
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Legend: A=Monti et al., 2010; Fernández-Espejo and Owen, 2013. B,C= Bardin et al., 2011. D=
Naci and Owen, 2013. X-axis is in seconds. Red line represents characteristic BOLD signal
during task performance.

name Chris?” To answer “yes”, the participant was instructed to imagine playing tennis
for 30-second blocks. To answer “no”, the participant was instructed to relax. Activity in
the supplementary motor area, the brain region associated with motor imagery, was
observed in real-time with fMRI. Decoded answers were compared to participant reports
to assess accuracy. All answers were subsequently confirmed as correct (Owen and
Coleman, 2008).
In 2010, this technique was refined in an experiment involving 16 healthy participants
(Monti et al., 2010). The study involved a localizer scan and a communication scan. In
the localizer scan, participants were instructed to perform mental imagery. The data
obtained allowed investigators to create brain activity maps that indicate where, and to
what degree, BOLD changes occur during communication. In the communication scan,
participants were instructed to answer yes/no questions through mental imagery. Prior to
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the neuroimaging session, participants were asked a yes/no question, such as “Do you
have any brothers?” While lying in the scanner, participants were prompted with the
neutral word “answer” to begin mental imagery and “relax” to cue rest (see figure 4, A).
Blinded investigators assessed the neuroimaging data. Answers decoded from the
communication scans were compared with participant reports. Real-time fMRI data for
all trials were decoded with 100% accuracy. To rigorously quantify these findings,
investigators used a Relative Similarity Metric, which estimates the geometric distance
between activated brain regions observed in the localizer scan versus the communication
scan (Monti et al., 2010: supplement). Scans with high similarity suggest the activation of
near identical brain regions. Using this method, participant answers were again decoded
with 100% accuracy. This approach outlined a rigorous method for quantifying the
communication scans at the single-subject level.
This task design (see figure 4, A) has subsequently been applied to two severely braininjured patients. In 2010, Monti and colleagues reported communication with a patient
who had been consistently diagnosed as vegetative for 5 years (see table 3, patient 1)
(Monti et al., 2010). While lying in the scanner, the patient was asked 6 yes/no
autobiographical questions. Questions ranged from “Do you have any brothers?” to “Is
your father’s name Alexander?” The neutral words “answer” and “relax” were used to
cue repeated 30-second blocks of mental imagery for each question. The total scanning
session lasted approximately 1 hour.
Blinded investigators decoded the neuroimaging data. Visual inspection identified
answers to 5 of 6 questions. Calculation of relative similarity confirmed these findings.
Post-scan analysis of answer 6 revealed insufficient data to confirm a “yes” or “no”
response with high confidence. Investigators hypothesized this was due to patient fatigue
(Naci et al., 2012). Of the initial 5 answers, all were successfully decoded and
subsequently verified by the patient’s family.
In 2013, Fernández-Espejo and Owen (2013) applied this task design (see figure 4, A) to
a patient who had been consistently diagnosed as vegetative for more than 12 years (see
table 3, patient 3). This patient was assessed on several occasions and underwent multiple
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communication scans. In total, this patient responded correctly to 12 yes/no questions.
These ranged from simple autobiographical to complex questions, including “Is the year
1999?” and “Are you in a hospital?” Investigators also posed several questions regarding
clinical well-being, including “Are you in pain?”, to which the patient responded “No”.
In 2011, Bardin and colleagues reported an alternative task design (see figure 4, B, C).
This design was divided into increasingly complex steps. The first step involved mental
imagery. 7 healthy participants and 6 severely brain-injured patients (5=MCS, 1=LIS)
were instructed to imagine swimming for 30-second blocks. As with the tennis imagery
task, swimming imagery was hypothesized to produce activity in the supplementary
motor area. Relevant brain activity was observed in all healthy participants and 3 of 6
brain-injured patients (2=MCS, 1=LIS).
In the second step, swimming imagery was adapted for communication. Participants were
presented with an auditory question, such as “Do you prefer preparing dinner yourself or
dinning out?” Participants were instructed to imagine swimming when presented with
their preference. The auditory cues, “preparing dinner yourself” and “dinning out”, were
presented in 12-second blocks. Brain activity time-locked to a specific option was
interpreted as communication of that preference. Of the 7 healthy participants tested, all
produced brain activity that was subsequently decoded correctly.
A similar task design (see figure 4, B) was then tested in a sample of 4 brain-injured
patients (3=MCS, 1=LIS). Patients were asked their mothers’ name. Bardin and
colleagues phrased these questions as conditional propositions, for example, “If your
mother’s name is Norma, imagine swimming.” Bardin and colleagues argued this
phrasing decreased cognitive demand on patients; the task instructions were embedded in
the task presentation and the task itself only required patients to engage in motor
imagery. Post-scan analysis, however, revealed no statistically significant brain activity
in any of the 4 patients. These findings were unexpected, as 2 of the 4 patients
demonstrated “the ability to communicate fluently [through head movement or verbally],
and were able to indicate post hoc that they attempted to perform the task” (Bardin et al.,
2011:778).
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The final step applied a multiple-choice task design (see figure 4, C), the reliability of
which was previously demonstrated in healthy participants with mean decoding accuracy
of 94.9% (Sorger et al., 2009). Prior to the scan, healthy participants and 4 brain-injured
patients (3=MCS; 1=LIS) were presented with a playing card from a deck containing all
face cards (ace, king, queen, jack) in all four suits (spade, heart, club, diamond). Healthy
participants were instructed to record the face and suit of the card on a questionnaire
before and after the scanning session. Patients were visually presented with the card on
multiple occasions in the days leading up to their scans. While lying in the scanner, each
participant was presented with a series of four auditory prompts regarding possible card
faces or suits. These prompts were phrased as conditional propositions, for example, “If
your card is a diamond, imagine swimming now”. Brain activity consistent with motor
imagery time-locked to a 12-second response block was interpreted as a positive response
to one of the 4 choices.
The answers provided by all of the healthy participants were correctly decoded, yet none
of the patient responses were correct. Bardin and colleagues reported that these results
were unexpected. On the day of the multiple-choice scan, one patient correctly identified
her card (the ace of spades) with downward eye movements. Bardin and colleagues
hypothesized that, given the patient’s ability to perform the task outside the scanner, the
fMRI task design may have contributed to incorrect responses. Indeed, the short, 12second response intervals could have exacerbated a delayed reaction to task presentation.
In 2013, Naci and colleagues reported a novel communication design that utilizes
selective attention (Naci et al., 2013). Previous studies have demonstrated that selective
attention can significantly enhance the neural representation of sounds (Bidet-Caulet et
al., 2007). Thus, it is possible that modulation of attention may serve as a proxy for
spatial navigation or motor imagery in patients that have difficulty performing the mental
imagery task. To test this hypothesis, Naci and colleagues assessed 15 healthy
participants with fMRI while they performed a counting task. Participants were instructed
to count the number of times they heard the term “yes” or “no” in a stream of numerical
auditory distraction stimuli (e.g., “Yes, 1, 7, Yes, 5, 3, 0, 1, Yes, 9, Yes…”). Response
sets were organized in 22-second blocks with 10-second relaxation periods. Post-scan
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analysis revealed significant activation in the attention network—incorporating the
bilateral inferior parietal, superior temporal, pre-motor, and inferior prefrontal gyri. Using
these data, Naci and colleagues calculated brain activity maps to determine where, and to
what extent, the attention network would activate during selective attention at the single
subject level.
This design was then adapted for communication (see figure 4, D). Participants were
asked such questions as “Do you have any brothers or sisters?” or “Are you over 21 years
old?” Following the question, a series of “no” terms was presented interspersed with
auditory distraction stimuli for a 21.5-second block with a 10-second rest period. The
question was then repeated. A similar series of “yes” terms interspersed with auditory
distraction stimuli was presented for a 22.5-second block with a 10-second rest period.
Each question set required 69.7 seconds to complete and was repeated on average 5
times, for an approximate total scanning time of 6 minutes per question. 3 Of all responses
to yes/no questions conveyed through selective attention, 90% were decoded with high
confidence. 5.6 minutes of scanning time per question was sufficient to accurately decode
answers in 92% of participants (Naci et al., 2013: 9390).
This method was then tested in a sample of 3 severely brain-injured patients (2=MCS;
1=VS) (Naci and Owen, 2013). All patients successfully completed the counting task,
suggesting they were aware of the auditory stimulus and instructions. 2 of the patients
(1=MCS; 1=VS) were then tested for communication. The two patients (table 3, patients
2 and 3) each underwent 4 communication scans. The first patient—a 25-year-old male
whose clinical diagnosis had fluctuated between vegetative and minimally conscious for
5.5 years—correctly responded to the questions “Is your name Steven?” and “Are you in
a super market?” The second patient—a 38-year-old male who had been clinically
diagnosed as vegetative for 12 years—correctly answered 4 questions in two independent
scanning sessions.

3

This time interval is important for determining how many questions can be asked of a patient in
a single scanning session. I return to this in chapter 5.
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Table 3: Patient characteristics
Age/
sex

Diagnosis

Time
since
injury

Task

Correctly answered questions

1 29 M

CRS-R and
SMART
confirmed
VS

60.8 m

Mental
imagery

Is your father’s name Thomas?
Is your father’s name Alexander?
Do you have any brothers?
Do you have any sisters?

2 25 M

CRS-R
confirmed
VS

67 m

Selective
attention

Is your name John?*
Is your name Mike?
Are you in a supermarket?
Are you in a hospital?

3 38 M

CRS-R
confirmed
VS

146 m

Mental
imagery

Is a banana yellow?
Is your name John?*
Is your name Mike?
Is the year 1999?
Is the year 2012?
Is your support worker’s name Bob?
Is your support worker’s name Sarah?
Is your support worker’s name Julia?
Do you like watching ice hockey on TV?
Are you in pain?

Scan 1:
147 m

Selective
attention

Is your name John?*
Is your name Mike?
Are you in a supermarket?
Are you in a hospital?

Scan 2:
152 m

Legend: CRS-R= JFK Coma Recovery Scale-Revised. SMART= Sensory Modality Assessment
Technique. VS= Vegetative State. Time intervals are in months. *=Name has been changed for
confidentiality.

1.3.1

Patient characteristics

A review of the literature indicates that communication through neuroimaging has been
attempted with at least 7 severely brain-injured patients (Monti et al., 2010= 1 VS; Bardin
et al., 2011= 3 MCS, 1 LIS; Fernández-Espejo and Owen, 2013 = 1 VS*; Naci and
Owen, 2013 = 1 MCS, 1 VS*; *same patient). 3 of these patients have correctly
responded to at least 2 yes/no questions. The most successful task designs have used
longer response intervals, ranging from 22 to 30 seconds, and longer rest periods, ranging
from 10 to 30 seconds (see figure 4, A, D).
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All patients who successfully completed a communication scan sustained a traumatic
brain injury due to a motor vehicle accident. The average time between injury and
communication scan for these patients was approximately 93 months (7.7 years) with a
range of 60.8m to 152m. No patient showed signs of awareness or functional
communication during repeated bedside examinations prior to scans (Naci and Owen,
2013: supplement; Fernández-Espejo and Owen, 2013: supplement; Monti et al., 2010:
supplement). The most extensive evidence of neuroimaging communication was
demonstrated by patient 3. This patient correctly responded to more than 10 questions,
across 3 distinct scanning sessions, using two different task designs. Only a subset of
questions was posed during any particular scanning session. The patient did not respond
to questions on every occasion and, in some cases, did not produce any significant brain
activity. Investigators hypothesized this may have been due to a “lack of attention or
motivation on that particular day” (Fernández-Espejo and Owen, 2013: 804). However,
there is no evidence the patient ever responded with a factually incorrect answer.

1.4 Conclusion
In this chapter, I have reviewed the relevant scientific literature related to fMRI and
EEG-based active paradigms used to assess awareness in severely brain injured patients.
Such techniques provide information ancillary to neurobehavioral scales, which can
enhance diagnostic accuracy in patients whose clinical presentation is unclear. Further,
fMRI-based active paradigms have been adapted for communication in a minority of
severely brain-injured patients. To date, there is no study that determines the proportion
of severely brain-injured patients who are capable of neuroimaging communication.
Nonetheless, the frequency of patients reported in the literature is nontrivial. These
patients raise difficult ethical questions regarding the appropriate application of
neuroimaging communication following severe brain injury.
In the following chapters, I focus on one such ethical problem, namely, whether it is
permissible to allow these patients to participate in medical decision-making. I present
and defend a strategy for assessing decision-making capacity through neuroimaging
communication, which in turn, provides the ethical grounds for allowing some severely
brain-injured patients to make some low- to medium-stakes medical decisions.

21

Chapter 2

2

Decision-making capacity

A key component of informed consent is decision- making capacity. Given that some
severely brain-injured patients cannot verbally consent to treatment, might clinicians be
justified in using neuroimaging communication to elicit consent? In this chapter, I outline
the standard view that decision-making capacity is required for informed consent, and
describe the most broadly used instrument for assessing decision-making capacity in
clinical practice. In outlining the features of decision- making capacity, I refer to the
foundational texts in the literature.4 I identify three concerns raised in the medical ethics
literature regarding the use of neuroimaging communication as an alternative means of
assessing decision-making capacity and obtaining informed consent. I address these
concerns and argue that it is not impossible, merely difficult, to assess decision-making
capacity through neuroimaging communication. The purpose of this chapter is to
motivate the strategy proposed in chapters 3 through 6.

2.1 The doctrine of informed consent
Patients have the right to exercise self-determination in medical decision making
(President’s Commission, 1982: 44). This right derives from the principle of autonomy
and is intimately associated with liberal notions of self-governance (Francis, 2009:201).
In defining autonomy, Beauchamp and Childress assert that patients “have unconditional
worth…the capacity to determine [their] own moral destiny…the right to choose…[and]
the right to accept or decline information” (Beauchamp and Childress, 2012: 63). The
President’s Commission on Bioethics adopts a similar stance, stating that patients have
the intrinsic ability to “form, revise, and pursue personal plans in life” (President’s
Commission, 1982: 44).

4

I acknowledge that, in the current literature, there is disagreement over this foundational
account. Nonetheless, the purpose of this thesis is not to develop an alternative theory of
decision-making capacity. Rather, I ask whether decision-making capacity—as traditionally
construed—can be assessed in severely brain-injured patients who can only communicate through
neuroimaging. For a detailed account of decision-making capacity, see Charland (2015).
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Self-determination is central to the doctrine of informed consent (Faden and Beauchamp,
1986; President’s Commission, 1982). This doctrine derives from both English and U.S.
common law relating to battery and negligence. Battery includes “harmful or offensive
non-consensual touching” in contexts such as surgery (President’s Commission, 1982:
18-19), while negligence results from a failure to perform a dutiful action, or the careless
performance of an action that leads to harm (Faden and Beauchamp, 1986: 27). Laws
preventing battery and negligence reflect the view that health care providers have a
fiduciary relationship with patients, which entails a range of duties, including a duty to
respect self-determination.
Fiduciary relationships are characterized by structural inequality. One party in the
relationship has more power or control than the other. This inequality engenders
dependence and vulnerability (Miller and Weijer, 2006). Clinicians, by virtue of their
knowledge, expertise and authority to prescribe, have power over sick and vulnerable
patients. Patients therefore place their trust in clinicians to treat them competently.
Violation of trust, whether through battery, negligence or failure to respect patient selfdetermination, undermines the fiduciary relationship.
Informed consent consists of three components: disclosure, voluntariness and decisionmaking capacity (cf. Faden and Beauchamp, 1986). Disclosure requires that clinicians
reveal all relevant information to the patient, including treatment options, the risks and
benefits of those options, and alternative therapies (cf. President’s Commission, 1982:
42). Voluntariness requires that the patient be free from coercion, external manipulation,
or interference (cf. President’s Commission, 1982: 45). Decision- making capacity
requires that the patient be capable of understanding the medical information presented to
her, and rationally deliberating upon it to come to a decision. Each of these components
must be satisfied for informed consent to be valid.
The doctrine of informed consent is also intended to balance the interests of patients with
the duties of clinicians (Glass, 1997: 7). Clinicians have fiduciary duties to protect
patients and obtain their consent. Patients, meanwhile, have interests in their own liberty
and welfare. Clinician duties and patient interests will often align. However, in certain
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instances a patient’s decision to ignore medical advice may challenge the clinician’s duty
to protect. When the patient chooses to ignore the clinician's advice her decision-making
capacity may be called into question. If the patient ignores the clinician's advice but
possesses decision-making capacity the clinician must respect the patient's choice. If the
patient does not possess decision- making capacity, she must be protected through the
appointment of a surrogate decision maker.

2.2 What is decision-making capacity?
Decision- making capacity is the ability of a specific individual to make a specific
medical decision, at a specific point in time, and under specific conditions. This view is
widely expressed in the philosophical, legal, and neuropsychological literatures (Dunn et
al., 2006; Grisso and Appelbaum, 1998; Buchanan and Brock 1990; President’s
Commission, 1982; Freedman, 1981).
Decision- making capacity is mediated by a number of psychological abilities (Berg et al.,
1996). These include: understanding, appreciation, reasoning, values, and
communication.5 In what follows I review the philosophical discussion of these abilities
in the work of Buchanan and Brock (1990) and in the President’s Commission Report
(1982). I then review an operationalized model deployed in the MacArthur Competency
Assessment Tool for Treatment (MacCAT-T) (Grisso and Appelbaum, 1998).

2.2.1

Understanding

Understanding is the ability to receive and retain relevant medical information
(President’s Commission, 1982: 58) and is based on a range of cognitive attributes. One
must be able to comprehend language, grasp sophisticated concepts related to disease and
treatment options, and recall information for application in future medical decisions
(Buchanan and Brock, 1990: 23-24).

I introduce these as “psychological abilities” here. However, throughout the rest of this thesis, I
refer them as “subcomponents of decision-making capacity”.
5
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There are differing views on how much understanding is needed in order to provide
consent. One view is that the patient must be fully informed. Being fully informed means
the patient has exhaustive understanding of the medical information provided to her. But
this suggests that the patient would need to know just as much as her clinician in order to
provide consent. This requirement is unfeasible for patients lacking medical training.
Moreover, patients often fail to comprehend medical terms (Chapman et al., 2003) and
are unable to accurately recall the content of a consent interview (Robinson and Merav,
1976).
An alternative view considers what sort of information is truly essential for consent
(Freedman, 1975). Ultimately, it is desired that patients make responsible medical
decisions. How much medical information is imparted to the patient, and the extent of her
understanding, are thus a function of the ability to make decisions responsibly
(Freedman, 1975: 34-35). For example, the extent of information provided, and the
understanding required to consent to a novel chemotherapy treatment for stage-4 breast
cancer will be considerably greater than the information provided and the understanding
required for the use of a routinely prescribed antibiotic. This difference is due to the
extent of understanding required to hold a patient responsible for her consent or refusal of
therapy. Understanding need only extend to information relevant to responsible medical
decision-making. Understanding does not require a “mini-course in medical science” nor
a “lengthy polysyllabic discourse on all possible complications” (Cobbs v. Grant, 1972:
502 P. 2d 1, 11).

2.2.2

Appreciation

Appreciation is the ability to imagine what future states will be like based on consent or
refusal of treatment (Buchanan and Brock, 1990:24). If a patient is faced with a medical
decision, she should be able to reasonably foresee the consequences of her medical
decision.
A defining feature of appreciation is the ability to recognize how medical information
relates to one’s own situation. This is referred to as clinical insight (Owen et al.,
2009:92). A variety of circumstances may diminish clinical insight. A patient may remain
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unaware of her illness due to a causal connection between illness and lack of awareness
(Owen et al., 2009:95). Some stroke survivors, for example, suffer from a unique
monothematic delusion called somatoparaphrenia, which results in denial of ownership of
bodily limbs (Feinberg et al., 2010; Feinberg, 2010). Remarkably, this delusion cannot be
corrected through proof or explanation. The deficiency of appreciation in these patients is
a false belief.
Discussions of understanding and appreciation often overlap (Buchanan and Brock, 1990:
23-24; President’s Commission, 1982: 56-57). However, appreciation differs from
understanding in important ways. While both abilities involve general retention of
medical information, appreciation requires the patient to recognize that the information
relates to her own situation and to imagine what future states will be like given her
treatment options (Glass, 1997: 12). Indeed, it is possible for a patient to fully understand
the medical information while, at the same time, failing to appreciate that she is the
subject of the medical decision. Understanding, therefore, does not entail appreciation.
Appreciation must be demonstrated independently.

2.2.3

Reasoning

Reasoning is the ability to consider the potential outcomes of a medical decision and to
assess how those decisions will affect goals and life plans. This ability requires one to
consider probabilities, assign those probabilities to various outcomes, and weigh the
importance of outcomes based on personal values (Buchanan and Brock, 1990: 24-25;
President’s Commission, 1982: 59-60).
Reasoning is distinguished from understanding and appreciation in that it captures the
process by which a patient comes to make a medical decision. Deficiencies in
appreciation may generate false beliefs, yet a patient can still reason appropriately with
this information. Likewise, a patient may hold true beliefs about her medical situation but
fail to reason appropriately. Reasoning is thus a function of the way a patient uses
information. Failure to use information in a way that promotes one’s goals and life plans
will call a patient’s reasoning into question.
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It is often assumed that medical decisions are irrational if they contradict
recommendations of clinical staff (Ganzini et al., 2004: 264). Evaluation of reasoning
allows clinicians to determine if a patient has arrived at the decision through a logical
process or through delusion. If the patient can explain her decision in a way that is
consistent with her own goals and life plans, even if that explanation is inconsistent with
medical recommendations, then the patient retains decision-making capacity. This
reinforces the view that the possession of decision-making capacity is a function of the
process by which a patient comes to her decision (Grisso and Appelbaum, 1998:53;
President’s Commission, 1982:55).

2.2.4

Values

A fourth component of decision-making capacity is the possession of a reasonably stable
set of values. A set of values identifies the patient’s conception of the good (Buchanan
and Brock, 1990: 25) and provides a framework according to which subjective weight
may be assigned to particular treatment outcomes (President’s Commission, 1982: 57).
Such values needn’t be entirely consistent. It is not expected that a patient will have her
entire life plan and goals determined in detail. All that is required is a set of values that is
sufficiently stable to allow the patient to make a decision, follow through with it, and
accept responsibility for it (President’s Commission, 1982: 58).
Discussion of patient values is often folded into analysis of reasoning. One explanation
for this is that patient values are not, strictly speaking, psychological abilities. As we
shall see, standard neuropsychological instruments designed to assess decision- making
capacity do not contain explicit probes for values (cf. Dunn et al., 2006). Instead,
assessment of patient values is subsumed under the evaluation of reasoning. This is done
under the assumption that patient values are operationalized through an explanation of the
medical decision. In order for a patient to reason adequately, she must explain why the
decision is best for her. Tacit or explicit reference to one’s own values typically occurs in
such explanations.
Some, however, have questioned this approach, motivated by the concern that standard
methods of assessment do not account for harmful shifts in patient values. On this view,
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it is plausible that an individual may satisfy all of the conditions of decision-making
capacity yet still be incapable because her values are unreasonable. In a study conducted
by Tan and colleagues (2006), it was demonstrated that a group of anorexia nervosa
patients could describe their condition with considerable insight and clarity. On standard
assessment, these patients had decision-making capacity. Yet, closer examination
demonstrated their decisions were ultimately motivated by distorted values, depression,
and beliefs about the role of anorexic behaviors in alleviating mood alterations. This
suggests that values can play a pivotal, yet often unseen role in a patient’s decisionmaking process. There is a need to more accurately assess the how values, particularly
“pathological values”, contribute to medical decision-making (Charland, 2001). Such an
approach would highlight the rationale behind a patient’s decision more accurately than
standard methods of assessment.

2.2.5

Communication

Communication is the ability to indicate, verbally or otherwise, that one has made a
decision (Buchanan and Brock, 1990:23-24). If a patient lacks the ability to
communicate, due to a neurodegenerative disease, for example, she will most likely be
deemed incapable. A surrogate decision maker will be appointed in such cases.

2.3 Determining decision-making capacity
Clinically, decision-making capacity is determined by three factors: the patient’s medical
condition; the patient’s process of deliberation; and, the demands placed on the patient by
her medical situation (Grisso and Appelbaum, 1998: 31). Various neuropsychological
instruments have been developed to assess the second of these factors. The MacAuthur
Competence Assessment Tool for Treatment (MacCAT-T) is considered the most
authoritative and rigorous instrument for assessing decision-making capacity in medical
practice (Dunn et al., 2006).
The MacCAT-T is a structured interview, lasting between 15 and 20 minutes, which
evaluates a patient’s deliberation against an operational model of decision-making
capacity (see table 4) (Grisso and Appelbaum, 1998: 103). This model includes four
subcomponents: understanding, appreciation, reasoning, and expressing a choice (Grisso
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Table 4: Operational model of decision-making capacity
Subcomponent

Operational features

Question probes

Understanding

Ability to describe the disorder, treatments,
and risks and benefits in one's own words .

“Explain in your own words…”
“Tell me what will happen if we
don’t treat the problem…”

Appreciation

Reasoning

Expressing a
choice

Ability to acknowledge the disclosed
disorder, symptoms, and treatment
outcomes are about one’s own medical
situation.

“Do you believe you have these
symptoms?”

Ability to foresee the consequences of
treatment, compare consequences,
acknowledge their influence on daily life,
and provide a choice that is consistent with
one’s own values.

“Why do you think this treatment is
better than others?”

Ability to express a medical choice,
verbally or non-verbally.

“Do you believe the treatment will
be of benefit to you?”

“What are some ways that this
treatment might influence your
activities at home?”

“What is your decision?”

and Appelbaum, 1998: 31). The operationalization of these subcomponents is broadly
consistent with the theory of capacity advanced by Buchanan and Brock (1990) and the
President’s Commission Report (1982). Moreover, the model is also consonant with legal
competence (Appelbaum, 2007).
The MacCAT-T begins with a structured disclosure of the patient’s medical condition
and treatment options. This follows the first component of the doctrine of informed
consent. Disclosure includes identifying the patient’s disorder, its expected course and
potential outcome, different therapies, and the risks and benefits of these therapies
(Grisso and Appelbaum, 1998: 103).
A series of questions probing the patient’s understanding are posed during disclosure.
Understanding is operationalized as the patient’s ability to describe, in her own words,
the medical disorder, proffered treatment, and risks and benefits of treatment (Grisso and
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Appelbaum, 1998: 105). The patient’s understanding is rated across three domains:
understanding the disorder; understanding the treatment; and understanding the risks and
benefits (see table 5). High ratings indicate the patient can paraphrase the medical
information and provide a reasonably accurate indication of the potential risks and
benefits of each treatment (Grisso and Appelbaum, 1989:183). Low ratings indicate the
patient is unable to recollect or accurately describe the treatment options and their
consequences (Grisso and Appelbaum, 1989:183-184). If there is a perceived deficiency
in the patient’s understanding, the clinician is encouraged to repeat the evaluation.
The clinician will also ask questions that probe the patient’s appreciation. Appreciation is
operationalized as the patient’s ability to acknowledge that the disclosed disorder,
symptoms, and treatment options relate to her. Evaluation of appreciation is based on the
patient’s explanation of her beliefs. Appreciation is rated across two scoring domains:
appreciation of the disorder and appreciation of the treatments (see table 5). High ratings
indicate the patient acknowledges all described symptoms and the potential benefits of
treatment, or disagrees with the proffered diagnosis or treatment for non-delusional
reasons, such as, “another doctor told me something else” (Grisso and Appelbaum,
1989:184-185). Low ratings indicate that the patient holds false, distorted, or delusional
beliefs about her condition and treatment options (Grisso and Appelbaum, 1998: 106).
Following disclosure, the patient is asked to express a preliminary choice. The patient’s
reasoning is evaluated with respect to this choice. Reasoning is operationalized as the
ability to compare treatments and explain why the choice made is the right one (Grisso
and Appelbaum, 1998: 106). Reasoning is rated across four subdomains: consequential
reasoning; comparative reasoning; generating consequences reasoning; and logical
consistency (see table 5). High ratings indicate the patient sufficiently compares the
proffered treatments, reasonably foresees their consequences, and offers reasons for her
decision that are logically consistent (Grisso and Appelbaum, 1998: 189-190). Low
ratings indicate the patient is unable to compare treatments, unable to foresee
consequences, and provides reasons that are logically inconsistent (Grisso and
Appelbaum, 1998: 189-190).
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Table 5: Rating guidelines for MacCAT-T
Element

Scoring
domains

Rating

Understanding

Understanding
of disorder

2- Recalls and offers clear description of disorder
1- Recalls some features of disorder
0- Does not recall, provides inaccurate description, or distorts
meaning

Understanding
of treatment

2- Recalls and offers clear description of treatment
1- Recalls some features of treatment
0- Does not recall, provides inaccurate description, or distorts
meaning

Understanding
of risks/benefits

2- Recalls and offers clear description of risks/benefits
1- Recalls some features of risks/benefits
0- Does not recall, provides inaccurate description, or distorts
meaning

Appreciation of
disorder

2- Acknowledges being subject of disorder/symptoms
1- Acknowledges being subject of disorder but not all symptoms
0- Does not acknowledge being subject of disorder or believes
symptoms are not related to disorder

Appreciation of
treatment

2- Acknowledges, with sufficient explanation, that treatment may
or may not have benefit
1- Acknowledges, with no explanation, that treatment may or may
not have benefit
0- Acknowledges that treatment may or may not have benefit
based on false beliefs

Consequential
reasoning

2- Identifies at least two consequences
1- Identifies no more than one consequence
0- Identifies no consequences

Comparative
reasoning

2- Identifies at least one difference in consequences
1- Identifies at least one difference between treatments
0- No comparison between treatments

Generating
consequences
reasoning

2- Identifies at least two everyday consequences of treatment
1- Identifies one everyday consequence of treatment
0- No everyday consequences identified

Logical
consistency

2- Choice follows logically from reasons
1- Not clear whether choice follows logically
0- Choice does not follow from reasons

Expressing a
choice

2- States one choice
1- States more than one choice/ambivalent
0- No choice stated

Appreciation

Reasoning

Communication
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Finally, the patient is instructed to express a choice. Expressing a choice is
operationalized as the ability to communicate a decision, verbally or otherwise, or to
communicate the preference that a surrogate or clinician should choose instead.
Expressing a choice is rated in one scoring domain (see table 5). High ratings indicate the
patient expresses exactly one choice. Low ratings indicate the patient expresses more
than one choice, does not make a choice, or vacillates (Grisso and Appelbaum, 1998:
190).
Aggregate scores are compared against normative data from both healthy and clinical
populations (Grisso and Appelbaum, 1998: 122, 124). The MacCAT-T provides no cutoff
score for any of the four subcomponents (Grisso and Appelbaum, 1998: 120-121).
Rather, these scores are subjected to the clinician’s judgment to determine whether the
patient’s performance justifies the attribution of decision-making capacity for the medical
decision in question (Grisso and Appelbaum, 1998: 190). Nevertheless, decision- making
capacity cannot be reduced to these subcomponents. Instead, it is the function of these
subcomponents balanced with the patient’s medical situation and the stakes of the clinical
decision that determines whether it is permissible to attribute decision-making capacity to
the patient. I return to this point in greater detail several times throughout this thesis.

2.4 Decision-making capacity as a threshold concept
Descriptive claims about decision-making capacity differ from claims about whether
decision-making capacity ought to be attributed to a particular patient. Questions over
decision-making authority may elicit conflict between the duties of clinical staff and the
liberty interests of patients. Resolving such conflicts cannot be achieved merely through
administration of the MacCAT-T (Grisso and Appelbaum, 1989: 33). Rather, it requires a
normative judgment regarding who possesses decision-making authority for particular
medical decisions (Buchanan and Brock, 1990:47).
Decision- making capacity has three normative features. First, it is decision-specific. This
means the evaluation of decision- making capacity is restricted to one and only one
decision. Second, it is a threshold concept. This means that the attribution of decisionmaking capacity does not admit of degrees. From a normative perspective, one either has
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or does not have decision-making capacity—there is no grey area.6 Finally, the threshold
of decision-making capacity required for each medical decision will vary.
There are at least three views regarding how to set the threshold of decision-making
capacity for any medical decision. First, the threshold can be fixed and minimal
(Buchanan and Brock, 1990: 49, 59). On this view, a patient has decision-making
authority if she is simply aware of her medical situation and can either follow a health
care provider’s recommendation (Drane, 1985: 18) or freely make a choice regarding
treatment (Buchanan and Brock, 1990: 59). This view maximally ensures patient selfdetermination but fails to discriminate between capable and incapable patients. It may
remain unclear whether patient decisions are based on reasoned deliberation or not. A
fixed minimal threshold of decision-making capacity may expose patients to harm.
Second, the threshold of decision-making capacity can be set according to the outcome of
a medical decision. This view holds that patients ought to be respected if they
demonstrate decision-making capacity and their decisions are not seriously irrational
(Culver and Gert, 1990; Buchanan and Brock, 1990: 65). A decision is seriously
irrational if the patient “knows or should know that its foreseeable results are that she will
suffer…death, pain, disabilities, or loss of freedom, or loss of pleasure, or be at increased
risk of suffering any of these, and she has no adequate reason for her action or decision”
(Culver and Gert, 1990: 630).
There are both benefits and drawbacks to this view. On one hand, a patient is maximally
protected if health care providers are allowed to intervene in cases in which otherwise
capable patients refuse safe and effective treatment for life-threatening conditions (Culver
and Gert, 1990:624). Yet, removal of decision-making authority from a capable patient
on the basis of apparent irrationality violates autonomy. If this view were adopted, then
“the principle that the voluntary and informed treatment decisions of a [capable] patient
must be respected [would be rejected] in favor of the principle that… treatment choices
can be set aside on paternalistic grounds if sufficiently irrational” (Buchanan and Brock,

6

Note, however, that this view is critiqued in chapter 6.
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1990: 69). Determination of serious irrationality is highly subjective. Foreseeable
negative outcomes are indeed important for evaluating patient decisions. But revoking
decision-making authority on subjective grounds of irrationality is, in turn, a violation of
the doctrine of informed consent.
A third alternative is to set the threshold of decision-making capacity according to the
stakes of a medical decision (Buchanan and Brock, 1990:50-52; Drane, 1985: 18). Some
medical decisions may lead to significant harm if there is deficient understanding or
appreciation. Moreover, the importance a patient places on self-determination may vary
with the decision being made. If a decision outcome poses substantial risk, where risk is
"a function of the severity of expected harm and the probability of its occurrence”, then
the threshold of required decision-making capacity will be high (Buchanan and Brock,
1990:55). If the decision outcome poses risks that are roughly comparable to alternatives,
then the threshold for that decision will be moderate. Finally, if the decision outcome
poses less risk than alternatives, the threshold of required decision-making capacity will
be low (Buchanan and Brock, 1990:53).
This view is attractive for a number of reasons. First, it is the standard approach for
evaluating thresholds of decision-making capacity in much of North America and
Western Europe (Buchanan and Brock, 1990:61). Second, this view is endorsed by
research groups responsible for policy development, such as the President’s Commissio n
(Appelbaum, 2007:1836). Third, this view restricts the threshold of decision-making
capacity to one and only one medical decision. It is not required that a patient satisfy a
high threshold of decision- making capacity for all medical decisions (Buchanan and
Brock, 1990: 63). Finally, this approach is consistent with the doctrine of informed
consent. Rather than allocating decision-making authority entirely to patients or
clinicians, this approach aims to balance the competing interests of both parties
(Buchanan and Brock, 1990: 61).
One complication of this approach is how it deals with cases involving asymmetrical
treatment outcomes. Treatment outcomes are asymmetrical in a minority of medical
decisions when consent carries different risks than refusal of therapy. In some cases,
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consent may carry low risk while refusal carries high risk. This may result from the
recommendation of an otherwise routine and harmless therapy for a life-threatening
condition. In other cases, consent may carry higher risk than refusal. For example, in an
oncology study investigating multiple interventions for advanced breast cancer, the
internal review board judged that consent to research participation posed greater risk than
refusal (Skrutkowski et al., 1998). This suggests that each medical decision may require
multiple thresholds of decision-making capacity. The number of thresholds will depend
on the extent of possible outcomes and the difference in risk that each outcome poses
(Buchanan and Brock, 1990: 56-57).
The problem with this approach is that it may lead to interpreting decision- making
capacity as a feature of the treatment choice rather than as a dispositional property of the
patient (Freedman, 1975). If medical decisions have asymmetrical outcomes, and
differing thresholds of capacity are needed to consent to or refuse therapy, it may be
argued that patient decisions are open to review and revision.
One way to reconcile this problem is to interpret asymmetry of risk as a practical
mechanism for triggering formal capacity assessment (Buchanan and Brock, 1990: 56).
Legally, patients are presumed to have decision-making capacity until they demonstrate
otherwise. Refusal of routine and harmless treatment for a life-threatening condition is a
type of behavior that calls decision-making capacity into question. This does not mean
the patient lacks decision-making capacity. Rather, it suggests the clinician needs more
information about the patient’s rationale. Additionally, it should also be noted that not all
medical decisions lead to asymmetrical outcomes. For example, many daily medical
decisions do not lead to significant asymmetries in risk. Indeed, in some cases, a clinician
may provide a variety of treatment choices that carry the same risk. In these cases,
multiple thresholds are not required and the problem of asymmetrical outcomes is
resolved. As we shall see (in chapter 5) this approach will be instrumental for allowing
severely brain-injured patients to participate in medical decisions.
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2.5 Decision-making capacity and neuroimaging
The principle of autonomy requires clinicians to respect patient self-determination if a
patient has decision-making capacity. Efforts must be made to assess decision-making
capacity before removing decision-making authority from the patient. The decisionmaking capacity of individuals with cognitive or communicative impairment is difficult
to determine. Yet, national law (ADA, 1990; Canadian Charter, 1982) and international
policy (United Nations, 2007) suggest that individuals with cognitive or communication
impairments should not be stripped of access to goods and services, including decisionmaking authority, merely by virtue of their disability.7
To date, the medical ethics literature has demonstrated a great degree of skepticism
regarding the possibility of evaluating decision-making capacity and eliciting informed
consent using neuroimaging communication (cf. Glannon, 2014; Jox, 2013; Hardcastle
and Stewart, 2013; Mackenzie, 2013; Rich, 2013; Fisher and Appelbaum, 2010; Fins and
Schiff, 2010). Three objections are commonly made: first, that severely brain-injured
patients lack decision- making capacity by virtue of their injury; second, that decisionmaking capacity cannot be adequately evaluated through neuroima ging communication;
and third, that the validity of consent elicited through neuroimaging communication is
questionable due to possible misinterpretation of patient responses. Each of these
criticisms is addressed in the following section. I revisit these criticisms at several points
throughout this thesis.

2.5.1

Do all severely brain-injured patients lack decision-making
capacity?

In a recent review by an influential research group at Weill Cornell Medical School, it
was claimed that “research and treatment in patients [with severe brain injury] is
complicated by the lack of decision-making capacity” (Giacino et al., 2014: 109). This
presumption is not surprising. After all, severe brain injury likely diminishes cognitive
function. But does it follow that all severely brain-injured patients lack decision-making

7

I return to the issue in Chapter 6.
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capacity? Or that severely brain-injured patients lack decision-making capacity for all
medical decisions?
There is a long history of treating certain patient populations as though they lack
decision-making capacity for all medical decisions without formal evaluation. Persons
with dementia or psychosis, for example, are commonly believed to lack decision-making
capacity globally (Ganzini et al., 2004: 266). This presumption is based on the view that
the nature of these conditions entails an inability to make rational decisions. But this view
is false for a number of reasons.
Assumptions regarding a patient’s decision-making capacity should not be made without
appropriate evidence. The principle of autonomy holds that efforts must be made to
respect patient self-determination when it is believed decision-making capacity may be
present. When such efforts are made, some patient populations historically treated as
incapable of making decisions (e.g., patients with dementia or schizophrenia) have been
found to be capable of doing so (cf. Etchells et al., 1999).
By the same token, severely brain-injured patients should not be assumed to be globally
incapable. During recovery, such patients may become capable of making certain
decisions (cf. Ganzini et al., 2004:265). Two recent longitudinal studies investigating the
recovery of decision-making capacity after traumatic brain injury found that recovery can
occur 6 months or more post-injury (Triebel et al., 2014; 2012). In one study,
approximately 50% of participants with severe traumatic brain injury showed marked
improvement across all domains of decision-making capacity relative to assessment in
the acute stage of injury (Triebel et al., 2014: 2299). This suggests that, while not all
patients fully recover decision-making capacity after brain injury, some do. Lack of
decision-making capacity, thus, is only contingently related to a patient’s condition.
Regular evaluation during recovery can help clinicians uphold their duty to respect
patient self-determination.
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2.5.2

Can decision-making capacity be assessed through
neuroimaging?

A second objection is that it is impossible to assess decision-making capacity through
neuroimaging communication (Glannon, 2014; Jox, 2013; Hardcastle and Stewart, 2013;
Rich, 2013; Mackenzie, 2013; Fisher and Appelbaum, 2010). This concern is motivated
by three technical obstacles associated with neuroimaging communication, namely, limits
on communication, limits on the number of questions posed, and limits on accessibility. I
briefly review these technical obstacles below and I return to them in greater detail in
chapter 5.

2.5.2.1

Limits on communication

One obstacle associated with neuroimaging communication is that it only permits
participants to answer yes/no or multiple-choice questions.8 This raises concerns about
the inability to communicate complex information in capacity assessments. For example,
Glannon argues that, while “emotionally laden decisions about [medical treatment]
reflect a person’s values and attitudes…It is questionable whether these values and
attitudes can be expressed by simple ‘Yes’ or ‘No’ responses” (Glannon, 2014: 2).
The limited communication inherent in neuroimaging is a relevant concern. Yet, this is
based on the presumption that communication beyond “yes” or “no” responses is
necessary to evaluate decision-making capacity. The MacCAT-T interview and similar
instruments are indeed the most authoritative tools for assessing decision-making
capacity (Dunn et al., 2006). However, there is no stipulation in the legal or philosophical
literature that obligates clinicians to conduct a semi-structured interview in order to make
such a determination. Indeed, in their guidelines for conducting the MacCAT-T, Grisso
and Appelbuam admit the permissibility of deviating from standard rules of assessment.
They state that:

8

Note that, to date, no patient has successfully responded to multiple-choice questions through
neuroimaging communication.
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Patients who are on respirators or impaired by strokes may still be able to
communicate using hand signals, letter boards, eye blinks, and the like. When
evaluators are dealing with such patients, the evaluators usually will need to
frame their questions in a “yes-no” or multiple-choice format. This is relatively
easy for assessment of ability to express a choice itself. Determining how well
patients understand information can also be successfully addressed by multiplechoice questions. Assessing appreciation and reasoning, however, are more
difficult in this context. When results of such an evaluation are significantly
incomplete, the usual rules for determining whether a patient has [decisionmaking capacity] may have to be slightly modified. (Grisso and Appelbaum,
1998: 86)
Generally speaking, assessment techniques need to be adapted to accommodate patients
with communication impairments. A greater degree of flexibility in the rules for
determining decision-making capacity would allow for assessment of such patients. Yet,
there is little empirical literature on this topic and only a handful of case studies have
reported strategies for overcoming communication impairments (Jayes and Palmer, 2014;
Neumann and Kotchoubey, 2004; McMillan, 1997). These strategies use a combination
of yes/no questions, multiple-choice questions, and communication aids, including
pictures and spelling boards. In one of the most dramatic case studies to date, McMillan
(1997) reported the assessment of decision-making capacity in a severely brain-injured
patient with the aid of a hand-held buzzer (McMillan and Herbert, 2004; 2000; Shiel and
Wilson, 1998).
Certain subcomponents of decision-making capacity, such as communication and
understanding, might reasonably be assessed through neuroimaging communication.
However, more sophisticated subcomponents of decision-making capacity are more
elusive. Reasoning, for example, requires the patient to explain why a particular medical
decision is right for her (Grisso and Appelbaum, 1998:187-190), but the limitations of
neuroimaging communication prevent a patient from providing such explanations.
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In such cases, it may be feasible to appeal to alternative evidence. In a recent study
investigating logical processing skills, a patient clinically diagnosed as vegetative
successfully completed a 3-minute grammatical transformation task through fMRI
(Hampshire et al., 2013). This suggests that specific cognitive functions related to logical
processing remained intact. Ancillary information of this kind can be brought to bear on
the evaluation of decision-making capacity and, in certain circumstances, may help build
a case for attributing decision-making authority to a patient for some medical decisions.9

2.5.2.2

Limits on the number of questions

A second technical obstacle related to task design is the number of questions that can be
asked in any scanning session. To date, a single patient has correctly answered 5
questions in one hour (Monti et al., 2010). New task designs have, in principle, increased
the number of questions that can be asked, but this quantity is still quite limited (Naci et
al., 2013; Naci and Owen, 2013) and patient fatigue may be a limiting factor. Frontal lobe
damage characteristic of traumatic brain injury may cause deficits in sustained attention
(Coughlan et al., 2005: 252), which may leave a patient unable to answer more than 5
questions regardless of task design.
Intuition suggests that a large number of questions is needed to assess decision-making
capacity. However, there is no consensus as to how many questions are sufficient (cf.
Dunn et al., 2006). In borderline cases, the number of questions will not necessarily affect
the determination of decision-making capacity. Rather, clinicians will assess the content
of patient answers (Coughlan et al., 2005: 252). This suggests that the number of
questions is not central to the determination of decision- making capacity. Provided that
questions elicit the right information, it is possible that the number of questions could be
relatively small.

9

I return to this topic in chapters 3 and 4.
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2.5.2.3

Limits to accessibility

A third technical obstacle is the logistical difficulty of using neuroimaging
communication on an ongoing basis. Neuroimaging communication is technically
complicated, expensive, and time-consuming. It requires transport to an imaging unit,
which may be unfeasible if patients are not located in adjacent facilities. These logistical
features, according to Fisher and Appelbaum, make “the determination of proxy
answers…time consuming; and opportunities for follow up questions [are] limited”
(Fisher and Appelbaum, 2010: 380).
Limits on accessibility may also be problematic for patients with ongoing changes in
decision-making capacity. Mackenzie argues that, “during neurorehabilitation and
recovery…patients’ states of consciousness are likely to alter and fluctuate” (Mackenzie,
2013). In one recent study examining recovery of consciousness following severe brain
injury, investigators observed that patient arousal fluctuated significantly over a 6.5-hour
period (Candelieri et al., 2011). Similarly, Hardcastle and Stewart argue that “depression,
anxiety, fear, euphoria, even sleep disturbances” can change on a daily basis (Hardcastle
and Stewart, 2013). These changes may cause alterations in decision- making capacity. It
may be argued that capacity should be assessed on an ongoing basis to account for these
changes (Appelbaum, 2007). However, the logistical difficulties associated with
neuroimaging communication prohibit ongoing evaluation.
The logistics of neuroimaging raise broader concerns regarding accessibility, yet they do
not affect the plausibility of assessing decision- making capacity. Ongoing assessment is
ideal but it is not necessary in order to evaluate decision-making capacity for a specific
decision. We can imagine, for example, a healthy, capable individual expressing a
medical decision and subsequently suffering an incapacitating brain injury. The
individual’s decision- making capacity has surely fluctuated, but it does not follow that
clinicians are no longer obligated to respect the medical decision made before this
fluctuation occurred.
It may be argued that some medical decisions have long-term consequences that need to
be processed by the patient on an ongoing basis. For example, consent to cancer
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treatment may require a series of ongoing medical decisions, including surgery,
chemotherapy, radiation therapy, and recurrent invasive diagnostics. In these situations,
consent is distributed across the entire treatment regime. If a capable patient expresses the
decision to no longer participate in treatment, her decision must be respected. Fluctuating
capacity creates obstacles for such long-term treatment regimes. Safeguards must be put
in place to protect patients with fluctuating capacity when participating in long-term
treatments. As neuroimaging technology evolves, there may be opportunity for more
accessible communication strategies that enable long-term capacity assessment (Fisher
and Appelbaum, 2010: 380). Yet, for routine medical decisions, limited access is not a
clear reason to exclude assessment of decision-making capacity through neuroimaging
communication or other assistive technologies.

2.5.3

Misinterpretation of patient answers

A final criticism is the potential danger of misinterpreting a patient’s answers. In their
discussion of the use of neuroimaging communication to specify a “Do Not Resuscitate”
status for a brain-injured patient, Fins and Schiff argue that:
[t]here is a risk of reading too much into these one sided interviews…Whether the
yes/no box is a primitive one or a sophisticated fMRI, the response seems unlikely
to meet the ‘clear and convincing’ evidentiary standard for informed consent
(Fins and Schiff, 2010: 22).
At best, they argue, neuroimaging communication can only be used for decision-making
by assent (Fins and Schiff, 2010: 23).
While Fins and Schiff raise a difficult obstacle for neuroimaging communication, it is
important to note that the clear and convincing evidentiary standard is only used for endof-life decisions in some states. It is therefore misleading to presume that patients must
satisfy this evidentiary standard in all states and for all medical decisions. Indeed, some
medical decisions with significantly lower stakes will have a more lenient evidentiary
standard. This is consistent with the view that the threshold of capacity required to make
a medical decision is contingent on the risks and benefits of the treatment outcome.
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Nonetheless, all assistive communication technologies are vulnerable to
misinterpretation. But this does not mean that their use is necessarily problematic.
Indeed, the same concerns apply to forms of communication that do not require assistive
technologies. For example, patients who require an interpreter because they do not speak
the same language as their health care provider may be subject to misinterpretation. Like
assistive communication technologies, it does not follow that informed consent provided
through an interpreter is necessarily invalid due to the possibility of misinterpretation. It
merely means that precautions must be taken in order to ensure answers are interpreted
correctly.

2.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, I have outlined the standard view that decision-making capacity is
essential to valid informed consent. Decision- making capacity assists health care
providers in mediating cases in which their duty to protect patients conflicts with a
patient’s liberty interests. In cases of uncertainty, neuropsychological tests may be used
to probe decision-making capacity. The judgment of the clinician ultimately determines
whether decision-making capacity is attributed to the patient.
Neuroimaging communication raises difficult challenges for informed consent. A
patient's self-determination must be respected, but this can only be done if it is
demonstrated that she has decision-making capacity. This is problematic for patients who
can only communicate through neuroimaging, and raises a good deal of skepticism in the
medical ethics literature. Yet, detailed analysis of the skeptics’ arguments reveals that, in
principle, they are resolvable. Modifications in the rules of assessment of decisionmaking capacity may allow for evaluation with neuroimaging communication.
Provided that the rules of assessment are modified to accommodate this patient
population, what exactly would the procedure look like? In what follows (chapters 3
through 6), I respond to this question by presenting and defending a strategy for assessing
decision-making capacity through neuroimaging communication. If successful, this
strategy would allow some severely brain-injured patients to participate in the decisionmaking process for some medical decisions.
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Chapter 3

3

What cognitive functions are preserved following severe
brain injury?

Valid informed consent requires decision-making capacity. Neuroimaging
communication poses several obstacles to assessing decision-making capacity in severely
brain-injured patients. These obstacles do not, in principle, preclude the possibility of
assessing decision-making capacity in this patient population but they do make it very
difficult.
Whether patients recover decision-making capacity after severe brain injury is difficult to
determine. However, during recovery, a patient may show signs of decision-making
capacity in the form of preserved cognitive function. The duty to respect patient selfdetermination requires clinicians to seek out decision-making capacity where it exists.
Exploration of cognitive function is therefore motivated by this duty.
A first step in determining whether a severely brain-injured patient retains decisionmaking capacity is to examine his or her preserved cognitive profile. Systematically
reviewing the cognitive functions required for successful neuroimaging and
electroencephalographic task performance, and assessing how these functions bear on
decision-making capacity more generally, may allow investigators to determine if a
patient has the requisite cognitive machinery.
In this chapter, I review the cognitive functions required for successful completion of the
paradigms deployed by the Owen Lab. This chapter prepares readers for chapter 4, in
which I draw connections between these cognitive functions and decision- making
capacity. I provide practical details to highlight the extensive testing that occurs before
neuroimaging communication. The overarching goal of chapters 3 and 4 is to develop a
heuristic for the assessment of decision-making capacity in this patient population. As we
shall see, a great deal of information about preserved cognition is revealed prior to
neuroimaging communication. This information gives reason to believe that elements of
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Table 6: Typical Owen Lab Schedule
Day

Imaging modality

Monday

No imaging

Tuesday

EEG

Wednesday

fMRI, structural MRI,
DTI

Thursday

fMRI

Friday

EEG

Saturday

No Imaging

Imaging




paradigm
Arrival at testing facility
Rest day
Hierarchical speech processing paradigm








Mental imagery paradigm
Hi-resolution structural scan
Resting state scan
Rich stimuli paradigm
Selective attention paradigm
Mental imagery paradigm



Return to long-term care facility

Legend: Electroencephalography = EEG; Functional magnetic resonance imaging = fMRI;
Diffusion tensor imaging = DTI. Shading represents paradigms that are more cognitively taxing
and require transport to neuroimaging unit.

decision-making capacity may be intact in brain-injured patients, and that further
evaluation of high-functioning patients is warranted.

3.1 Owen lab evaluation schedule
Patients referred to the Owen Lab undergo a variety of experimental paradigms. A
paradigm is a combination of different experimental features, including imaging modality
and task design. Neuroimaging and electroencephalography based paradigms are
administered over the course of five days (see table 6). During this period, patients are
housed at the specialized neuro-rehabilitation facility, Parkwood Hospital, in London,
Ontario. Paradigms that involve portable imaging modalities, such as
electroencephalography, are administered at Parkwood Hospital, while structural and
functional neuroimaging is conducted at the Robarts Research Institute at Western
University.
Some paradigms involve tasks that are cognitively demanding or require transportation to
an imaging unit. To ensure that the administration of these paradigms is productive, they
are performed when the patient is known to be most alert. Paradigms conducted at the
bedside, or those that involve tasks that do not require significant cognitive effort, are
performed at other times.
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All paradigms are intended to probe preserved cognitive function or awareness. Previous
studies suggest that preserved cognitive function, such as speech perception, can predict
functional recovery (Coleman et al., 2009). Investigators begin by probing basic
cognitive functions before patients are subjected to more cognitively demanding tasks. If
a patient demonstrates positive performance on a majority of paradigms, particularly
mental imagery, she will return to the Owen Lab for further evaluation, including
neuroimaging communication.

3.2 What cognitive functions are revealed in neuroimaging
and EEG tasks?
Positive findings on different paradigms give reason to believe that some cognitive
functions are retained or recovered following severe brain-injury. The paradigms
developed by the Owen Lab are designed to recruit a variety of cognitive functions
during task performance. A cognitive function is, loosely, a cognitive operation that
allows one to perform a particular task.10 Evaluation of cognitive functions is the focus of
neuropsychology. Tasks deployed in neuropsychology often take the form of a written
test or structured interview. A task called the WAIS-Digit Span, for example, requires a
participant to recall a sequence of numbers in a specified order. A participant’s ability to
recall the sequence suggests that certain cognitive operations are recruited in task
performance. Inferences about the participant’s cognitive functions, such as memory,
auditory processing, or abstract thinking, are made on the basis of the participant’s speed
and accuracy in completing the task (cf. Carroll, 1993).
The cognitive functions revealed by the neuroimaging and EEG-based paradigms
deployed in the Owen Lab can be clustered into four domains (see table 7). A cognitive
domain is a clustering of functions that contributes to the performance of a particular task
or type of task. Philosophically rigorous definitions and classifications of cognitive
functions are difficult to articulate and, in some cases, can lead to disagreement across
disciplinary boundaries (for example, see Anderson, 2015). To avoid confusion, focus is

10

This is not intended to be a philosophically rigorous definition. See preface for notes on
terminology.
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Table 7: Cognitive functions organized by cognitive domain
Cognitive
domain

Cognitive function

Language
functions

Auditory processing

Reaction to sound versus silence

Speech processing

Reaction to speech versus signal
correlated noise

Speech
comprehension

Reaction to highly ambiguous versus
non-ambiguous sentences

Semantic memory

Capacity to remember concepts (e.g.,
tennis, house, numbers, etc.)

Working memory

Capacity to encode and retrieve task
instructions

Episodic memory

Capacity to retrieve memories related
to one’s self

Decision-making

Task compliance

Planning

Visualization and planning of
movements

Selective attention

Sustaining attention to a specific
stimulus

Theory of mind

Attribution of mental states to others

Information
processing

Monitoring and encoding information
and updating beliefs

Abstract thinking

Recognition of logical/spatial
relations between concepts/objects

Reasoning

Reasoning according to a set of rules

Memory
functions

Executive
functions

Basic
reasoning
functions

Description

Key paradigms

Hierarchical speech
processing paradigm
(Coleman et al., 2009;
Davis et al., 2007)

Mental imagery
paradigm (Monti et
al., 2010; Owen et al.,
2006)
Selective attention
paradigm (Naci et al.,
2013; Naci and Owen
2013)
Mental imagery
paradigm (Monti et
al., 2010; Owen et al.,
2006)
Selective attention
paradigm (Naci et al.,
2013; Naci and Owen
2013)
Rich stimuli
paradigm (Naci et al.,
2014)
Grammatical
transformation
paradigm (Kirschner
et al., 2015; Hampshire
et al., 2013)

paid to how cognitive functions are operationalized by specific task designs. This analysis
is coarse-grained and is merely intended to serve as a heuristic for evaluating decisionmaking capacity in a population with significant cognitive and communication
impairments.
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3.2.1

Language functions

Language functions are a cluster of cognitive functions that allow one to distinguish
sound from silence or speech, and to comprehend speech. Preserved language functions
are essential to positive performance on many cognitively demanding neuroimaging tasks
(cf. Owen and Coleman, 2008: 132). Mental imagery, for example, requires
understanding of task instructions. Task-appropriate brain activity in paradigms in which
participants are passively exposed to speech requires the capacity to distinguish sound
from speech. Basic language functions thus form a foundation for more cognitively
demanding tasks. If a patient’s language functions are limited, it will be difficult for her
to perform cognitively demanding tasks.
It is well known that some patients clinically diagnosed as vegetative remain sensitive to
auditory stimuli. Laureys and colleagues (2000) demonstrated that some vegetative
patients show activation in primary auditory cortices in response to auditory clicks. Perrin
and colleagues (2006) and Staffen and colleagues (2006) also demonstrated that some
vegetative patients show characteristic brain activity in response to hearing their own
name. Finally, Fernández-Espejo and colleagues (2008) have shown that some vegetative
and minimally conscious patients react differently to auditory narratives played forward
and backward. These findings suggest that, in some patients, auditory processing can
remain intact following severe brain injury. However, further information is needed to
determine how auditory processing is related to speech processing and comprehension.
In 2007, Davis and colleagues developed the first neuroimaging paradigm to show the
hierarchical relation of brain regions associated with language. While lying in the
scanner, 12 healthy participants were presented with auditory stimulus sets of increasing
cognitive complexity. The first set contained trials of silence versus noise to test for
auditory processing. The second set contained trials of spoken sentences versus speechspectrum signal correlated noise to test for speech processing. The third set contained
trials of sentences with low-ambiguity words (e.g., “there was beer and cider on the
kitchen shelf”) versus matched sentences with high-ambiguity words (e.g., “there were
dates and pears in the fruit bowl”) to test for speech comprehension.
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Figure 5: Hierarchical speech processing paradigm

Healthy participants were exposed to these stimulus sets under light, moderate or no
sedation. Light sedation was achieved by administering an anesthetic until the
participant’s response to conversation was relaxed and slowed, with slurring or
impairment. Moderate sedation was reached when participants demonstrated no
spontaneous engagement in conversation and responded in a slurred or impaired voice
when their name was shouted. Participants received a post-scan interview once the
sedation had metabolized. The post-scan interview tested the participants’ recollection of
the auditory stimulus.
Results demonstrated that brain activity associated with auditory perception, speech
perception, and speech comprehension was elicited with particular stimuli (see figure 5).
Sound versus silence contrasts elicited reliable activation of brain regions associated with
auditory perception, including primary auditory regions. Speech versus signal-correlated
noise contrasts elicited reliable activation of regions associated with speech perception,
including anterior and posterior regions in the superior and middle temporal gyri, and
inferior frontal and premotor regions. Finally, sentences containing ambiguous terms
contrasted with sentences containing unambiguous terms activated regions associated
with speech comprehension, including the inferior frontal and inferior temporal regions.
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The increase in complexity of the cognitive task also recruited a broader range of activity
throughout the brain.
Language functions were also dissociated under different levels of sedation. Auditory and
speech perception were both preserved under light and moderate sedation. Characteristic
activity in primary auditory regions, and superior and middle temporal gyri was observed.
However, speech comprehension was inhibited under light and moderate sedation and no
characteristic activity was observed in the inferior frontal and temporal regions.
Likewise, post-scan interviews revealed that participants’ recollection of the stimulus was
diminished following light and moderate sedation. These findings suggest that evidence
of passive speech comprehension can only be elicited if a participant is aware, or is not
sedated.
In 2009, Coleman and colleagues reported the use of this paradigm in 14 severely braininjured patients. Two patients had entered into a minimally conscious state, yet remained
profoundly disabled. These two patients showed characteristic activation in appropriate
brain regions to each stimulus contrast. Another 5 patients (3=VS; 2=MCS) showed
characteristic activation when presented with silence versus noise contrasts, and noise
versus speech contrasts. Finally, 3 of the 5 (2=VS; 1=MCS) patients that demonstrated
auditory and speech perception also demonstrated some evidence of speech
comprehension (Coleman et al., 2009).
These findings suggest that some severely brain-injured patients may retain or recover
language functions following injury. Indeed, 2 patients that appeared to be entirely
unresponsive at the bedside showed brain activity consistent with speech comprehension.
Conversely, those patients who did not show evidence of language processing were also
unlikely to perform well on cognitively demanding tasks involving language functions.11
If it is known that a patient is unable to perceive or comprehend spoken instructions, then
she is, by definition, unable to follow spoken commands. Preserved language functions

11

Note that this presumes confounding factors, such as deafness, did not undermine performance.
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thus serve as a threshold for further evaluation of a patient’s cognitive profile, including
the ability to communicate.

3.2.2

Memory functions

Memory functions are a cluster of cognitive functions that allow one to encode new
information, deploy concepts, and recall autobiographical facts. Individual memory is
broken into procedural and declarative types. Procedural memory involves the
application of previous knowledge in the execution of tasks, such as riding a bicycle.
Declarative memory, on the other hand, involves consciously accessing concepts or
autobiographical facts, such as remembering what happened at your college graduation.
Two types of declarative memory are semantic memory and episodic memory. These
types are reviewed below. Readers should note that, while semantic and episodic memory
are presented here as distinct memory functions, declarative memories often have both
semantic and episodic aspects. It is therefore difficult to determine experimentally if a
declarative memory is purely semantic or episodic. As we shall see, this is important for
determining which cognitive functions may be preserved following brain injury.
Much can be inferred about preserved memory functions in severely brain-injured
patients based on performance in task-driven paradigms (see figure 6). One memory
function recruited in mental imagery, working memory, is the capacity to process
information and make it readily available for immediate application in complex cognitive
operations (Baddeley, 1992). Working memory is generally understood as a feature of
executive processing (or attention) and a gateway to the consolidation of information in
long-term memory (Engle, 2002). Working memory is involved in mental imagery task
performance through the encoding and retrieval of the task instructions. Participants must
encode the task and auditory cue for later task execution. They may be told, for example:
“When you hear the word ‘imagine’, imagine moving from room to room in your home
making note of details and the location of furniture.” Participants must then recall the
content of the task instructions over the course of five 30-second task intervals.
This design is unique in that it requires the participant to associate the task instructions
with the cue word “imagine”. If the participant is unable to initially encode the task
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Figure 6: Memory functions recruited in mental imagery

Spatial Navigation
Mental Imagery

Recruitment of semantic
memory and working
memory in execution of
task instruction, “Imagine”.

“Relax”

Recruitment of episodic
memory in spatial
navigation.

“Imagine”

“Imagine moving
from room to room
in your home; note
details and the
location of the
furniture…”

Recruitment of semantic
and working memory in
encoding and
comprehension of task
instructions.

Silent Rest

Recruitment of semantic
memory and working
memory in execution of
task instruction, “Relax”.

instructions, or is unable to retrieve the content of the task instructions upon presentation
of the cue word, she is unlikely to complete the task.
Another memory function recruited by mental imagery is semantic memory. Semantic
memory is a highly structured internal lexicon that is essential for understanding
language or concepts (Tulving, 1972: 386). Semantic memory is involved in mental
imagery task performance through a participant’s ability to understand the content of the
task instructions. For example, a participant must understand what it means to “imagine
playing tennis”. This likely involves understanding the meaning of a set of associated
concepts, including racket, ball, and tennis court. Aside from the concepts associated
with the task instructions, participants must also understand the imperative statement
“imagine” and associate its meaning with the task-appropriate mental imagery—either
motor or spatial navigation. Failure to recruit semantic memory will likely inhibit a
participant’s ability to understand the task-instructions, or inhibit a participant’s taskappropriate response to the command “imagine” when cued.
A third memory function recruited in mental imagery is episodic memory. Episodic
memory is knowledge of events, places, or periods of time that are specific to one’s own
history (Conway and Pleydell-Pearce, 2000). Episodic memory is involved in mental

52

imagery through performing a task that incorporates autobiographical facts. For example,
the instructions for spatial navigation mental imagery ask participants to “imagine
moving through your home.” Likewise, execution of the motor imagery task, which
requires participants to “imagine playing tennis” requires some previous experience with
tennis.
It may be argued that episodic memory is not necessary to perform spatial navigation
mental imagery. According to this view, the spatial navigation task does not require one
to imagine a particular episode of walking through one’s home. Indeed, one could
perform this task by imagining navigating through any hypothetical home or walking
through one’s home on any hypothetical day. Semantic memory alone could allow for
this. Yet, this objection also depends on some structural independence between semantic
and episodic memory. As indicated above, this can be difficult to determine because
declarative memories often contain both semantic and episodic aspects. Given this
uncertainty, inferences about preserved episodic memory following severe brain injury
may require patients to communicate details about a particular episode in their lives. As
we shall see, this may be important for assessing a patient’s reasoning in the medical
decision-making.

3.2.3

Executive functions: Response selection, planning, and
selective attention

Executive functions are a cluster of cognitive functions that allow one to make decisions,
plan tasks, and attend to stimuli. Executive functions are essential for completing
cognitively demanding tasks and will often recruit more basic cognitive functions, such
as language and memory, in task execution (Elliot, 2003).
One executive function recruited in mental imagery and selective attention tasks is
response selection. Response selection is the ability to choose between one or more
alternative options. In the mental imagery task, participants are instructed to engage in
motor or spatial navigation imagery for discrete and repeated 30-second intervals (Monti
et al., 2010; Owen et al., 2006). Likewise, in selective attention tasks, a participant must
respond to the instructions by sustaining attention to an auditory stimulus until instructed
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otherwise (Naci et al., 2013). In each case, a participant must actively respond to
complete the task.
Another executive function recruited in cognitively demanding tasks is planning.
Planning is the organization and implementation of thoughts to achieve a desired goal.
The mental imagery task involves planning in the execution of imagined movements.
When instructed to navigate through one’s home, one must decide a point of entry, which
rooms to navigate through, and the general direction or end-point of navigation.
Likewise, when imagining playing tennis, one must plan a series of complex movements
to achieve the imagined goal. The supplementary motor area—the region activated during
motor imagery—has been shown to be involved in the organization and planning of
movement prior to action (Nachev et al., 2008). This suggests that the process of
imagining itself is associated with the ability to plan.
A further executive function recruited in cognitively demanding tasks is selective
attention. Selective attention is the ability to attend to a single stimulus when it is
presented in the context of a variety of competing stimuli, and to sustain attention beyond
the period of reflex response. Novel stimuli are known to elicit attention, but this is often
transitory and a function of “bottom-up” processing. Sustained attention, by contrast,
recruits “top-down” processing of an attention system that detects and selects a stimulus
based on relevance (Sarter and Bruno, 2001; Woldorff et al., 1993: 8722).
The selective attention task developed by Naci and colleagues leverages activation of a
known attention system as evidence of awareness (Naci et al., 2013; Naci and Owen,
2013). Selective attention, Naci and colleagues argue, is known to “significantly enhance
the neural representation of sounds” (Naci et al., 2013: 9385). The selective attention task
not only demonstrates that the participant is able to volitionally recruit this attention
system upon instruction, but also serves to elicit robust neural activity during fMRI
scanning. This latter feature is important, as many brain-injured patients lack the
cognitive resources necessary to produce robust neural activity in neuroimaging and
EEG-based paradigms.
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Figure 7: Scenes from Hitchcock’s “Bang, bang, you’re dead” (1961)

3.2.4

Executive functions: Theory of mind and belief updating

Task-driven paradigms require participants to perform a task. Such tasks recruit particular
executive functions, such as response selection, planning, and selective attention. Yet,
some patients may sustain injuries that degrade the ability to regulate brain systems
involved in task-driven paradigms (Chung et al., 2013; McDowell et al., 1997). For these
patients, an alternative strategy is needed to identify the integrity of executive functions.
One approach to assessing executive functions in patients who lack the ability to respond,
plan, or selectively attend is a naturalistic stimuli paradigm (Naci et al., 2014). This
paradigm measures brain activity as participants are passively exposed to a rich, naturally
occurring stimulus, such as a film or story. Synchronization in brain activity across
participants can be time-locked to specific features of the stimulus. For example, it has
been demonstrated that synchronized brain activity associated with natural vision is
elicited across study participants upon exposure to a highly engaging film (Hasson et al.,
2008a; 2008b).
In 2014, Naci and colleagues extended this technique to determine if synchronized brain
activity associated with particular executive functions could be elicited in severely braininjured patients when exposed to Alfred Hitchcock’s “Bang, bang, you’re dead” (1961)
(see figure 7). The film’s plot involves a young boy, pretending to be a cowboy, who
discovers his uncle’s loaded revolver and mistakes it for a toy. Audience members
become helpless bystanders as the boy ventures forth and pretends to shoot other
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characters. At several points the boy spins the cylinder—as in a game of Russianroulette—takes aim, and pulls the trigger. A series of experiments sought to determine
which features of the film drove brain synchronization across healthy participants, as well
as the extent of synchronization between healthy participants and patients.
The study produced a number of important findings. First, brain regions associated with
executive processing, including fronto-parietal regions, were highly synchronized across
healthy participants while viewing the film. This was contrasted with both resting-state
brain activity and brain activity elicited from a scrambled version of the film. In the two
latter cases, no synchronization was observed, suggesting that the content and structure of
the film’s plot was, in some way, driving brain activity.
Second, synchronization of brain activity in healthy participants was predicted by two
behavioral studies tracking the film’s plot. In the first study, the executive demands of the
film were measured with a go-no-go task in an independent group of healthy participants.
Participants were instructed to push a button each time they heard a number, except for
the number “8”, while viewing the film. In the second study, another independent group
of healthy participants was instructed to rate the “suspense” of the film every 2 seconds
on a scale from “least” to “most suspenseful”. Performance on the go-no-go task was
delayed during executively demanding scenes, such as when the boy aims the loaded
revolver at another character. Likewise, subjective ratings of suspense were highest
during scenes that were executively demanding. Remarkably, these behavioral findings
predicted synchronization of brain activity associated with executive processing.
This synchronization model was then compared against the brain activity of a severely
brain-injured patient viewing the film. This patient satisfied all clinical criteria of the
vegetative state for 134 months, yet his brain activity was highly synchronized with that
of healthy participants when viewing the film. Brain systems associated with executive
processing were active when the film’s protagonist was aiming at another character or
pulling the trigger. By contrast, these brain systems were relaxed during scenes of
mundane plot development. This strong correlation in brain activity suggests that the
patient’s executive functions remained intact (Naci et al., 2014).
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Positive performance on this paradigm requires a number of executive functions distinct
from response selection, planning, and selective attention. These functions are recruited
in the processing and interpretation of the film’s plot and the manifestation of plot-driven
affective states, such as suspense. One executive function recruited is a theory of mind,
which is generally understood as the ability to attribute, interpret, and predict others’
mental states (cf. Gopnik and Wellman, 1992).
A theory of mind is crucial for understanding the film’s plot. First, many of the
executively demanding and suspenseful scenes are driven by discordance between what
the viewer knows and what the characters in the film are believed to know. For example,
while viewers know the revolver is real, the fact that characters do not is central to
generating suspense. Indeed, the qualitative distinction between suspense and surprise
hinges on the fact that viewers are aware that they know more about the revolver than the
film’s characters. If the viewers had the same beliefs about the revolver as the characters,
they would merely be surprised when it fires at the end of the film. By contrast, because
the true nature of the revolver is revealed to viewers at the outset, viewers must reconcile
this knowledge with the characters’ actions as the plot unfolds. Film psychologists
contend that this “initiating event” facilitates discordance between the viewers’
knowledge and the characters’ knowledge (Brewer 1996: 113). Viewers are able to
anticipate counterfactual situations that the film’s characters are unaware of, such as the
revolver firing. This leads to feelings of suspense every time the boy pulls the trigger.
A second way a theory of mind is involved is in the willing suspension of belief (Brewer,
1996: 109). Witnessing Hitchcock’s story as it might unfold in real life would surely
generate suspense. But Hitchcock’s corpus is, of course, fictional. Generating suspense
thus requires the viewer to be an active participant in becoming engrossed in the film’s
plot. Cinematic features—such as the how the story is told, how shots are framed, and
how characters are developed—serve to draw viewers in. Viewers must also be capable
of genuinely taking the point of view of characters as the plot unfolds. This allows
viewers to sympathize with the characters (Zillman, 1994). A good film elicits happiness
when good things happen to the protagonist, and sadness when bad things happen. This
involvement, like an “initiating event”, creates further affective tension; the viewer must
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reconcile her third person knowledge of the plot’s facts with what could happen to the
characters. If one is unable to willingly suspend the belief that Hitchcock’s story is
fictional, it is unclear how the plot would motivate sympathy for the characters, which
ultimately leads to suspense.
A third way a theory of mind is involved is in the viewer’s ability to appreciate the
morally relevant consequences of the boy’s actions. For example, ratings of suspense
were greatest during scenes in which the boy aims at a person (Naci et al., 2014: 14279).
The suspense of these scenes is likely driven by two factors. First, viewers are able to
distinguish between persons and objects. When the boy points the revolver at an object,
there is little consequence if the revolver fires. Persons, on the other hand, can die. A
second factor is that viewers likely appreciate the boy’s relationship with other
characters. For example, the suspense ratings recorded in healthy participants when the
boy is aiming at his mother are greater than when he aims at a stranger. This suggests
that, together with the ability to sympathize with characters’ roles and interpret their
belief states, appreciating the identity of characters, and how they are related to one
another may modulate feelings of suspense and executive demand.
A final executive function recruited is the ability to process and update beliefs based on
an ongoing flow of information. This involves incorporating new information with
background knowledge—particularly semantic memory—to form an initial
understanding of the film’s plot, and to update this knowledge when new information is
disclosed. The Hitchcock film draws on a variety of important concepts from semantic
memory to drive the plot. Among others, one must know what a gun is, how a revolver
works, what make-believe is, and the different types of relationships characters can have
with each other, including being a stranger, friend, or family member.
Elements of semantic memory must then be synthesized with new information contained
in the plot to create narrative tension. The dissonance between a toy and real gun, and
how this bears on the characters’ false beliefs, is central to the suspenseful elements of
Hitchcock’s story. Tracking the beliefs of characters over time and updating one’s own
beliefs about them once the true nature of the revolver is revealed is dependent on one’s
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ability to process an ongoing flow of information. If one is unable to update beliefs in this
way, it is unlikely one will be sensitive to the contextual features of Hitchcock’s story.

3.2.5

Basic reasoning functions

Basic reasoning functions are a cluster of cognitive functions that allow one to think
abstractly and solve problems. Basic reasoning functions are closely related to executive
functions, but can, in certain circumstances, be dissociated. A brain-injured patient, for
example, may be able to perform tasks that recruit executive functions, but be unable to
solve basic problems. Indeed, the dissociation of basic reasoning from other cognitive
functions is well documented in both mild traumatic brain injury (McDonald et al., 2002)
and early stage neurodegenerative diseases, such as dementia (Perneczky et al., 2006).
These cases present ethical challenges, as it is difficult to determine to what extent
reasoning functions are inhibited and how this bears on a patient’s decision-making
capacity.
Mental imagery and selective attention tasks have been modified in recent years for
assessment of basic reasoning functions in severely brain-injured patients. Hampshire and
colleagues (2013) adapted a 3-minute grammatical transformation task for application in
neuroimaging. While lying in the scanner, participants were presented with a series of
auditory propositions specifying a spatial relationship between two objects (e.g., “the face
is preceded by the house” or “the house is not preceded by the face”). Participants were
instructed to “imagine the object that comes in front” for each proposition. Selectively
attending to faces or houses modulates anatomically distinct visual processing areas
(Epstein and Kanwisher, 1998). This allowed investigators to determine which object a
participant was likely imagining despite her inability to provide a self-report.
Remarkably, when applied to a patient previously diagnosed as being in the vegetative
state for over 4 years, nearly all of her responses were correct.
Positive performance on the grammatical transformation task recruits a number of
cognitive functions. As in other task-driven paradigms, grammatical transformation
involves selective attention and response selection. Additionally, one must also be able to
manipulate information in order to solve a problem. This involves encoding new
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information from the stimulus, synthesizing that information with previous knowledge,
and applying rules to derive a solution. This process is no easy feat. Indeed, it recruits a
broad range of cognitive functions, and is dependent upon the ability to manipulate
information in logical space.
Hampshire and colleagues (2012) and Kirschner and colleagues (2015) have developed
several neuroimaging and EEG-based paradigms to probe residual reasoning functions
following brain injury. These paradigms target memory, grammatical reasoning,
deductive reasoning, spatial rotation, and spatial planning (Hampshire et al., 2012). While
these have not yet been applied in severely brain-injured patients, their reliability has
been validated in in healthy participants. Most recently Kirschner and colleagues
demonstrated that it is possible to implement a variety of memory and grammatical
transformation tasks through portable EEG (Kirschner et al., 2015). This gives promise
for future application of complex reasoning tasks in some severely brain-injured patients,
even if transfer to a neuroimaging unit is unfeasible.

3.3 Conclusion
In this chapter, I have provided a systematic task analysis of the central neuroimagingand EEG-based paradigms deployed in the Owen Lab. The purpose of this analysis is to
demonstrate that a variety of cognitive functions are recruited in task performance, and
that evidence of these cognitive functions is revealed prior to neuroimaging
communication.
The evaluation of patients at the Owen Lab is hierarchical. Basic cognitive functions are
assessed prior to attempting more cognitively demanding tasks. Because of this
hierarchical assessment, much is known about a patient’s preserved cognitive profile by
the time she is eligible for neuroimaging communication. The evidence born out of this
evaluation can inform practical judgments regarding the evaluation of decision-making
capacity. Likewise, it may also reduce the evidentiary burden of any practical test of
decision-making capacity applied in neuroimaging communication (this practical test is
developed in chapter 5).
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Chapter 4

4

Cognitive functions and decision-making capacity

In chapter 3, I provided a systematic task analysis of neuroimaging and EEG-based
paradigms deployed in the Owen Lab. This analysis demonstrates that a variety of
cognitive functions are recruited in task performance. As noted, planning, selective
attention, response selection, and ongoing information processing are key to performing
neuroimaging and EEG-based tasks. These functions serve as a foundation for more
cognitively demanding tasks, such as neuroimaging communication.
In this chapter, I map the relationship between cognitive functions and decision-making
capacity. First, I show there is a conceptual relationship between certain cognitive
functions and decision-making capacity. This relationship is derived from a functional
analysis of the four subcomponents of decision-making capacity. A functional analysis is
the process of breaking down a cognitive phenomenon into more basic, functional parts
by analysis of its operational definition. For example, the clinical operationalization of
understanding suggests that memory functions are involved in encoding new medical
information. These cognitive functions are thus embedded in the meaning of
understanding.
Second, I argue that there is a predictive relationship between cognitive functions and
decision-making capacity. As we shall see, particular cognitive functions, such as
working memory and attention, are predictive of decision-making capacity in patients
with psychiatric illness, brain metastases, and traumatic brain injury. Indeed, in these
patients, deficits in cognitive function, as measured through validated psychometrics, are
strongly associated with deficits in decision-making capacity. The presence of certain
cognitive functions may therefore give reason to believe that one or more of the
subcomponents of decision-making capacity—or decision-making capacity, broadly—
remains intact.
The conceptual relationship between cognitive functions and decision- making capacity
outlined in the first half of this chapter is intended to serve as a framework for
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interpreting the empirical literature in the second half. The conceptual relationship is
intended to be coarse-grained in the sense that, broadly speaking, cognitive functions are
embedded in the meaning of the subcomponents of decision-making capacity. By
contrast, the predictive relationship is fine-grained in the sense that it identifies particular
associations between specific psychometric scales and decision-making capacity. The
overarching purpose of this chapter is to specify a conceptual relationship that elucidates
the predictive relationship between cognitive functions and decision-making capacity12 ,
and to modestly show that the cognitive functions involved in the tasks used by the Owen
Lab provide at least provisional evidence that decision-making capacity may be
preserved. As indicated in the previous chapter, this analysis is merely intended to serve
as a heuristic for informing practical judgments about which patients require further
evaluation. The attribution of decision-making capacity will ultimately be determined by
a clinician’s judgment and performance on the practical test introduced in chapter 5.

4.1 Cautionary notes
Before proceeding, readers should be alerted to several important facts. First, the
conceptual relationship developed here is non-standard. It is non-standard in the sense
that entailments from cognitive function to decision-making capacity do not operate in
the standard way. According to a standard view, decision-making capacity might be
entailed from cognitive functions in two ways. First, the presence of certain cognitive
functions might entail the presence of decision-making capacity. Second, the absence of
certain cognitive functions might entail the absence of decision-making capacity.
The former entailment relationship cannot be developed with respect to decision- making
capacity. Certain cognitive functions may be embedded in the operationalization of the
subcomponents of decision-making capacity, but the mere presence of these cognitive
functions does not entail a subcomponent, nor decision-making capacity broadly. This is
because cognitive functions underlying decision-making capacity are normatively

12

Drawing out this conceptual relationship has implications beyond assessment of severely braininjured patients. For example, this can be useful for thinking about decision-making capacity in
legal minors, elderly, and persons with mild cognitive and communicative impairments.
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constrained (cf. Grisso and Appelbaum, 1998). They are normatively constrained in the
sense that the attribution of decision-making capacity is ultimately determined by how
cognitive functions bear on a patient’s decision-making process in a particular medical
context, balanced with the stakes of the medical decision. As reviewed in chapter 2, the
clinician seeks to determine the appropriate balance between these normative features of
decision-making capacity. By contrast, if there is a lack of essential cognitive functions,
such as language processing, then—at least from a coarse-grained perspective—the
patient will also lack decision-making capacity.
A second important fact to note is that any functional analysis of decision-making
capacity is vulnerable to equivocacy. Ultimately what is desired is a clear inferential link
from performance on a neuroimaging task, to cognitive functions, and finally to decisionmaking capacity. But this line of reasoning may be tenuous due to vagueness in the
description of cognitive functions associated with decision-making capacity. It is well
known that terms used in the psychological literature, such as working memory, have
various working definitions (cf. Poldrack et al., 2011). Moreover, the referents of these
terms may not be identical to those picked out by the subcomponents of decision-making
capacity. This raises the worry that a functional analysis of decision-making capacity, or
any attempt to operationally define cognitive functions underlying decision-making
capacity, will be inaccurate.
I return to these concerns in greater detail below. However, in order to motivate this
chapter, it is important to stress the pragmatic benefit to sketching relationships between
cognitive functions and decision-making capacity. By the time a patient is eligible for
neuroimaging communication, much is already known about her cognitive profile; a
patient who is capable of satisfying cognitively demanding tasks likely retains decisionmaking capacity while a patient who is unable to satisfy such tasks likely does not. Focus
on cognitive functions allows investigators to leverage this information when determining
who is eligible for further evaluation. Additionally, it accounts for some degree of
urgency in attempting to enroll such patients in research. For some brain-injured patients,
neuroimaging communication presents the best possible opportunity to participate in
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Table 8: Key cognitive functions associated with decision-making capacity
Subcomponent

Key cognitive functions

Neuroimaging tasks that recruit these
cognitive functions

Understanding

Memory functions

Mental imagery
Selective attention task

Appreciation

Executive functions

Rich stimuli paradigm

Reasoning

Memory functions

Mental imagery

Abstract thinking

Grammatical transformation task

Language functions

Hierarchical speech processing assessment

Communication

Mental imagery

medical decision-making. Building the strongest possible case for participation thus
requires exhausting all possible avenues of evidence.

4.2 Cognitive functions are conceptually related to decisionmaking capacity
To sing, one must be able to perform a number of basic tasks. For example, one must be
able to verbalize language in order to sing lyrics. Additionally, one must also be able to
carry a rhythm and melody, however offbeat and out of tune one’s singing may be. These
claims are not derived from observation. Rather, they are derived from what it means to
sing. Singing is therefore conceptually related to a number of basic tasks.13
The same may be said of decision-making capacity. The standard model of decisionmaking capacity is broken down into four subcomponents: understanding, appreciation,
reasoning, and communication. Each of these subcomponents is conceptually related to
more basic cognitive functions. Functional analyses of the four subcomponents may
therefore determine which more basic cognitive functions form the cognitive building
blocks of decision-making capacity.

13

Singing is not the same as having decision-making capacity. This example is merely used to
illustrate the argument developed in this chapter.

64

In what follows, I provide coarse-grained functional analyses of the four subcomponents
of decision-making capacity. I show that they are related to key cognitive functions
recruited in tasks deployed by the Owen Lab (see table 8). I do not intend for these
functional analyses to be exhaustive, as that would be beyond the scope of this thesis.
Rather, I aim to show that the cognitive functions recruited in tasks deployed by the
Owen Lab provide good reason to believe that decision- making capacity may be intact
and that further evaluation of high-functioning patients is warranted.

4.2.1

Understanding, working memory, and semantic memory

In the medical setting, understanding includes the ability to describe the disclosed
diagnosis, treatments, risks and benefits in one’s own words. The ability to perform this
task recruits a number of basic cognitive functions. Two cognitive functions that are
essential to understanding are working memory and semantic memory. These functions
are involved in the performance of cognitively demanding tasks used by the Owen Lab.
Memory functions are involved in understanding in at least two ways. First,
understanding involves the ability to learn and recall new information related to
diagnoses, treatments, risks and benefits. Working memory—the capacity to encode and
store information such that it is readily available for more complex cognitive operations
(Baddeley, 1992)—is crucial to this process. Working memory is recruited when a patient
listens to the disclosed information and recalls it when instructed to do so.
Now, suppose working memory was not involved in understanding. If this were true, a
patient would not be required to encode and store novel medical information when
making autonomous medical decisions. But this is a counterintuitive view of
understanding. Indeed, if working memory was not involved in understanding, then it is
unclear that patient consent could ever truly be informed. A patient could freely consent
to a medical procedure with deficient knowledge of her own medical condition. This,
however, is inconsistent with standard accounts of understanding.
Another memory function essential to understanding is semantic memory. Roughly
speaking, semantic memory is an internalized conceptual lexicon (Tulving, 1972: 386).
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Medical information is disclosed as a series of facts, and includes such familiar concepts
as hospital, rehabilitation, and injury. Semantic memory allows patients to make sense of
these concepts. Additionally, it also allows patients to interpret concepts and recapitulate
them in their own words.
Now, suppose semantic memory was not involved in understanding. In this case, a patient
would understand even if she didn't have the ability to process familiar concepts. For
example, a patient would understand even if she lacked the ability to process the concepts
contained in the disclosure “you are at risk of cardiac arrest.” This, however, is highly
counterintuitive. Additionally, even if the patient was able to process these concepts, it is
unclear whether she would be able to recapitulate them in her own words. Recall that
semantic memory is related to one’s ability to process the content of language. Without
semantic memory, how would the patient incorporate new medical information, relate it
to her existing knowledge base, or express it in her own words?
As noted in the previous chapter, memory functions are recruited in a number of
cognitively demanding tasks deployed by the Owen Lab. Memory functions are involved
in the encoding and retrieval of task instructions, and in the processing and execution of
instructions. These cognitive functions are also embedded in the operational definition of
understanding. To be sure, it is likely that the extent and kind of memory function varies
between tasks used in the Owen Lab and the ability to understanding medical
information. It would be false to presume that identical memory functions are recruited.
Yet, from a coarse-grained perspective, the memory functions recruited in neuroimaging
and EEG-based tasks give reason to believe that the cognitive machinery essential for
understanding may be preserved.

4.2.2

Appreciation and executive function

Appreciation is the ability to acknowledge that the diagnosis, symptoms, and treatment
options relate to one’s own medical situation, and to acknowledge the consequences of
choosing one treatment over another, or refusing treatment altogether. Like
understanding, appreciation involves working memory and semantic memory. To
appreciate how medical information applies to oneself, one must first encode and recall
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the information disclosed. Appreciation also involves the ability to revise beliefs: one
must process a continuous flow of information, and update beliefs over time.
The ability to monitor and update beliefs over time is essential to appreciation in at least
two ways. First, a patient must appreciate that the symptoms associated with the
described medical disorder are those manifest in her own body. Generally, this might
involve the ability to track interoceptive information—such as pain, fatigue, or changes in
mentation—and update that information as one recovers or deteriorates. Additionally, one
must be able to process counterfactual situations in which one treatment is chosen over
another, or treatment is refused. This requires the ability to anticipate consequences of
particular treatments, or refusal of treatment, and incorporate that information into one’s
knowledge base.
Suppose, now, that appreciation did not involve these executive functions. On this view,
processing a continuous flow of information—whether in recognizing symptoms or
foreseeing consequences—would not be involved in a patient’s appreciation of her
medical situation and could result in holding incompatible beliefs. Indeed, in the notable
case of Northern v. Tennessee Department of Health and Human Services (1972), the
patient, Mary Northern, was unable to process information related to her symptoms and
treatment options. Her leg became gangrenous as a result of a diabetic condition, yet she
was unable to appreciate that she, in fact, had gangrene and, as a consequence, would die
without amputation. This led her to refuse amputation even though she clearly did not
want to die. Her inability to process and update beliefs inhibited her appreciation of what
would happen if she refused treatment.
As noted in the previous chapter, executive functions are recruited in rich stimuli
paradigms. The Hitchcock film stimulus used by Naci and colleagues (2014)
demonstrates the ability to track information, update beliefs, and anticipate
counterfactuals. While tracking a film’s plot is certainly different than appreciating a
medical situation, it is reasonable to presume that similar executive functions underpin
the ability to do both. Indeed, appreciating how disorders and symptoms are related to
oneself or how accepting or refusing treatment could lead to different outcomes requires
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the ability to follow one’s own medical narrative. Like the presence of memory
functions, evidence of executive functions gives reason to believe that features of
decision-making capacity may be preserved.

4.2.3

Reasoning, episodic memory, and abstract thinking

In the medical context, reasoning is the ability to foresee the consequences of a treatment,
compare its consequences to those of other treatments, acknowledge their influence on
daily life, and provide a choice that is consistent with one’s own values. Like
understanding and appreciation, reasoning involves working memory, semantic memory,
and executive functions. To compare the consequences of different medical therapies,
one must first be able to encode and recall information. Likewise, one must be able to
process counterfactuals to acknowledge how a treatment will influence daily life. Apart
from these cognitive functions, reasoning also involves abstract thinking and episodic
memory.
Abstract thinking is the ability to manipulate information in order to solve a problem.
Patients must weigh the relative benefits and harms of various treatments, and choose the
option that best realizes their values. The ability to abstractly manipulate information is
essential to this process. Without abstract thinking, one could not compare possible
treatment outcomes, nor reasonably calculate the probabilities of outcomes that best
realize one’s own values.
Reasoning may also involve aspects of declarative memory, including semantic and
episodic memory. On a strong interpretation of the relationship between declarative
memory and reasoning, episodic and semantic memory would be involved in the process
of making choices that are consistent with one’s own values. One’s values drive medical
choices and are often derived from personal history. For example, Jehovah’s Witnesses
forgo blood transfusions—a common and otherwise safe medical intervention—on the
grounds that these are inconsistent with their beliefs of biblical teachings. Likewise, when
faced with stage-4 breast cancer, some individuals may choose a less aggressive therapy
because they value quality rather than quantity of life. The values that drive these
decisions are rooted in personal history. The determination of decision-making capacity
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often hinges on the ability to make these values explicit. Indeed, when a patient is asked
to justify her medical decision, a clinician will evaluate the source and consistency of the
values that are applied to the decision-making process. Episodic memory may allow an
individual to recall episodes that led to her to adopt particular values that motivate the
medical decision.
A weaker interpretation of the relationship between declarative memory and reasoning
would emphasize semantic rather than episodic aspects. According to this view semantic
memory could play a compensatory role in expressing values if episodic memory is
diminished. Explanations of the values that motivate a medical decision would hinge on
an internalized conceptual framework. The Jehovah’s Witness, for example, would
merely rehearse the rules for refusal of blood transfusions rather than also recognizing
that such rules are derivative from episodes that occurred in her own life. This scenario is
further complicated by the fact that it may be difficult to determine which aspect of
declarative memory—semantic or episodic—is motivating the patient’s explanations of
values. Indeed, from an external vantage point, it is likely that both explanations would
appear the same.
One potential way to identify how semantic and episodic aspects of declarative memory
are involved in reasoning is to distinguish the application of values in decision-making
from the justification of these values. For example, it is possible that a dementia patient
with diminished episodic memory may apply certain values in decision-making in spite
of her disease. Yet, if asked to justify those values, the she is unlikely to be able to appeal
to episodes in personal history. Thus, while a patient may apply values consistently with
the aid of semantic memory, lack of episodic memory may prevent her from adequately
justifying these values. This tension between episodic and semantic memory, and how
they are involved in decision-making capacity, speaks to the importance of identifying
the source and authenticity of a patient’s values.
As noted in the previous chapter, aspects of declarative memory and abstract thinking are
recruited in tasks deployed by the Owen Lab. The mental imagery task itself is a form of
abstract thinking; the tennis match and house are not actually there. Additionally, mental
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imagery can recruit declarative memory. When instructed to imagine moving through
one’s own home, one presumably remembers the layout, position of furniture, or décor.
These memories can have both semantic and episodic features. Other tasks also recruit
abstract thinking. The grammatical transformation task, for example, requires abstract
manipulation of information to solve a problem.
The extent of involvement of these cognitive functions surely varies between tasks
deployed in the Owen Lab and the ability to reason in medical decision-making. Indeed,
the simple satisfaction of tasks in the Owen Lab does not suggest that one can also reason
in medical decisions. Even if episodic memory is recruited in the mental imagery task,
recalling details about one’s own home is different from recalling one’s own values and
using these to justify medical decisions. Nevertheless, without these cognitive functions,
it is arguable that one would neither be able to satisfy tasks deployed by the Owen Lab
nor reason in the medical context. This suggests that patients who do satisfy
neuroimaging or EEG-based tasks that recruit these cognitive functions may also retain
certain elements of decision-making capacity.

4.2.4

Communication and language functions

Communication, in the context of medical decision-making, is the ability to express,
verbally or otherwise, that one has made a choice regarding treatment. This view of
communication is expressive, yet it is important to note that communication may also be
receptive. The receptive qualities of communication are not highlighted in standard
assessment techniques of decision-making capacity because it is presumed that a patient
is able to comprehend language by virtue of her participation in a semi-structured
interview. However, in patients with profound communication impairments, the receptive
qualities of communication cannot be overlooked. Communication, in this case, involves
basic cognitive functions related to receptive and expressive language processing. If one
cannot process language, then one can neither receive relevant medical information nor
express a medical choice.
Language processing and comprehension are demonstrated in hierarchical speech
processing assessment (Coleman et al., 2009; Davis et al., 2007) and task-driven
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paradigms that contain verbal instructions (Naci and Owen, 2013; Monti et al., 2010).
Sensitivity to speech versus signal-correlated noise indicates language processing, while
sensitivity to high- versus low-ambiguity sentences, or the ability to follow instructions,
indicates language comprehension.
It should be stressed that the language functio ns revealed in hierarchical speech
processing assessment or task-driven paradigms that contain verbal instructions do not
indicate global language comprehension. The mere fact that a patient reacts differently to
sentences containing semantically ambiguous words, or can follow the instructions for
mental imagery, does not imply she will understand the nuances of complex medical
information. Nevertheless, if a patient satisfies hierarchical speech processing
assessments and task-driven paradigms, and is then subsequently able to communicate
with neuroimaging, then surely she understands language to the extent that she is capable
of expressing a choice. Simply put, if a patient is eligible for neuroimaging
communication, then her ability to communicate a medical choice is unlikely to be called
into question.

4.3 Cognitive functions are predictive of decision-making
capacity
Functional analyses of the subcomponents of decision-making capacity demonstrate a
conceptual relationship with certain cognitive functions. These include, but are not
limited to, working memory, semantic memory, episodic memory, executive functions,
language processing, and language comprehension. Further reflection also shows that
these cognitive functions, at least on a coarse-grained view, are recruited in many tasks
deployed by the Owen Lab. This gives provisional evidence that the cognitive functions
involved in decision- making capacity may be preserved in patients who successfully
complete these tasks.
Apart from the conceptual relationship between cognitive functions and decision-making
capacity, neuropsychological research also identifies a predictive relationship. This
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Table 9: Psychometric scales correlated with decision-making capacity
Cognitive
domain

Psychometric scale

Key studies

Vocabulary

Vocabulary Subset of WAIS

Gerstenecker et al. (2015)
Dreer et al. (2008)
Taub and Baker (1983)
Taub et al. (1981)

Hopkins Verbal Learning TestRevised
Phonemic verbal fluency test
Memory

Logical Memory I Subset of WAIS
Hopkins Verbal Learning TestRevised

Gerstenecker et al. (2015)
Dreer et al. (2008)
Stroup et al. (2005)
Palmer et al. (2004)
Carpenter et al. (2000)

Arithmetic Working Memory Subset
of WAIS
Rey Auditory Verbal Learning Test
Executive
function

Digit Span Subset of WAIS

Gerstenecker et al. (2015)
Okonkwo et al. (2007)

Digit Symbol Subset of WAIS
Token Test

predictive relationship is founded on correlations between performance on psychometric
scales and one or more of the subcomponents of decision-making capacity (see table 9).
Performance on psychometric scales may therefore be important compensatory
information if standard methods of assessing decision-making capacity cannot be applied.
As noted above, the conceptual relationship developed in the first half of this chapter is
non-standard and coarse grained. It is merely intended to serve as a heuristic to motivate
closer examination of patients whose decision- making capacity may be intact. The
neuropsychological literature reviewed in the second half of this chapter specifies a finegrained relationship. The relationship is fine-grained in the sense that specific cognitive
functions are related to decision-making capacity by virtue of performance on particular
psychometric scales. An important connection between the two halves is that the
conceptual relationship provides a helpful vantage point for interpreting the empirical
literature. Interestingly, while the neuropsychological literature identifies correlations
between certain cognitive functions and decision-making capacity, it does not specify
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why these cognitive functions should be targets of investigation in the first place. The
coarse-grained analysis therefore helps elucidate why these cognitive functions should be
considered relevant in empirical research.
In what follows, I review key findings in the neuropsychological literature. These finding
demonstrate an empirical link between particular, operationally defined cognitive
functions and decision-making capacity.

4.3.1

Vocabulary and decision-making capacity

Vocabulary comprehension is positively associated with decision-making capacity.
Vocabulary comprehension is understood as “semantic knowledge” or the ability to pair
concepts with words (cf. Okonkwo et al., 2007:305). Taub and Baker (1983) and Taub
and colleagues (1981) found that understanding varied in correspondence with the
vocabulary subset of the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale in elderly populations. In the
vocabulary subset, individuals are presented with either pictures or words and asked to
identify or define them. The vocabulary subset is indented to assess vocabulary
knowledge and verbal concept formation. Gerstenecker and colleagues (2015) and Dreer
and colleagues (2008) also found that verbal memory and fluency were highly associated
with understanding in patients with diagnosed brain metastases. Verbal memory was
assessed with the Hopkins Verbal Learning Test-Revised. Patients were presented with
12 words over 3 learning trials. After a 25-munite delay, patients were instructed to recall
the words. Phonemic verbal fluency was assessed by instructing patients to name as many
words as possible that begin with the letters “C,” “F,” or “L” in a one-minute period.
Semantic verbal fluency was assessed by instructing patients to name as many animals as
possible in a one-minute period. In all cases, scores were highly associated with patients’
ability to understand medical diagnoses, treatment options, and the risks and benefits of
treatment.

4.3.2

Memory and decision-making capacity

Dreer and colleagues (2008) reported that short-term verbal memory, as assessed by the
Wechsler Memory Scale-R Logical Memory I, was associated with understanding and
reasoning during acute impairment following traumatic brain injury. The Wechsler
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Memory Scale-R Logical Memory I assesses a patient’s ability to recall a short story.
Participants are read two short stories and are instructed to retell one of the stories
through free recall immediately afterward.
At six-month follow-up, a patient’s ability to reason was associated with auditory
working memory, as assessed with the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale Arithmetic
Working Memory Subset (Dreer et al., 2008). This subset requires participants to solve a
series of verbally disclosed arithmetic problems in a specified period of time. Using the
Rey Auditory Verbal Learning Test, meanwhile, Dreer and colleagues observed that
reasoning was also highly associated with verbal learning and memory. In this test,
participants are given a set of 15 words, repeated over 5 trials, and then instructed to
repeat them. A second, independent set of 15 words is then disclosed. Participants are
instructed to immediately repeat the original set and to do so again after 30 minutes.
In their systematic review of the literature, Palmer and Salva (2007) reported that
appreciation and reasoning were highly associated with memory functions in
schizophrenic patients. They observed that:
Relative to neuropsychological tests of other cognitive abilities, working memory
scores had the highest bivariate correlations with appreciation in three of the five
schizophrenia studies (Stroup et al., 2005; Palmer et al., 2004; Carpenter et al.,
2000), and the highest bivariate correlations with reasoning in two of the five
studies (Stroup et al., 2005; Palmer et al., 2004). (Palmer and Salva 2007:1050)
Based on these and similar findings, it is hypothesized that impaired working memory—
particularly verbal working memory—is a “red flag” for diminished decision-making
capacity following traumatic brain injury (Triebel et al., 2014) and in psychiatric
populations (cf. Palmer and Salva, 2007).

4.3.3

Executive functions and decision-making capacity

Psychometric scales of executive function are also highly correlated with decisionmaking capacity. This is unsurprising because, as noted above, particular subcomponents
of decision-making require synthesis and processing of an ongoing flow of information.
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Indeed, Palmar and Salva observed that, of the non-psychiatric patient studies included in
their systematic review, “measures sensitive to executive functions were frequently
among the strongest correlates of understanding, appreciation, or reasoning.” (Palmer and
Salva, 2007:1050) A similar observation was made by Okonkwo and colleagues (2008).
They also found that:
The convergent evidence from our neurocognitive models, across consent
standards and study groups, suggest that treatment consent capacity…is primarily
subserved by two broad domains of cognitive abilities—memory and executive
function. (Okonkwo et al., 2008: 305)
The specific features of executive function correlated with decision-making capacity in
these studies are attention, concentration, processing speed, and the ability to perform a
task with divided attention. In a study including patients with diagnosed brain metastasis,
Gerstenecker and colleagues (2015) applied the digit span and digit symbol subsets of the
Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale. The digit span subset requires participants to repeat a
set of verbally disclosed numbers forward and backward. The digit symbol subset
requires participants to match a set of number-to-symbol pairs based on a symbol key.
Performance on these scales was highly correlated with a participants’ understanding of
medical information during consent procedures.
In a more sophisticated assessment of executive function, Dreer and colleagues (2008)
applied the Token Test (Renzi and Vignolo, 1962) to a group of traumatic brain injury
patients with varying levels of preserved decision-making capacity. The Token Test
evaluates preserved semantic processing. A series of 20 cards are set out in a grid pattern
on a table in front of the patient; 5 large rectangles; 5 small rectangles; 5 large circles;
and 5 small circles. Each subset of cards is colored white, red, green, yellow, and blue. In
a series of increasingly difficult trials, participants are instructed to turn over cards of a
particular size and color, to place cards of differing size and color on top of or under each
other, and to respond to counterfactual instructions, such as “if there is a black circle,
touch the small green rectangle.” Dreer and colleagues found that “at baseline
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assessment, poorer performance on the…token test…was related to poorer…
performance on appreciation.” (Dreer et al., 2008: 492)

4.3.4

Demographics and decision-making capacity

Finally, certain demographic factors have been shown to be highly predictive of decisionmaking capacity. In their systematic review, Dunn and Jeste (2001:599) found that 6
studies reported significant correlations between diminished understanding and age in
heterogeneous populations, including routine surgical patients, healthy participants, and
patients in long-term care facilities. Older adults tended to perform worse than younger
adults, with a progressive inverse correlation between decision- making capacity and age.
This could be explained by diminished cognition, which naturally accompanies aging.
Additionally, as hypothesized by the authors, changes in decision- making capacity
related to age may also be influenced by education. Dunn and Jeste note that, “despite the
negative association of age with understanding, even older patients derived significant
benefits from education interventions in a number of studies.” (Dunn and Jeste,
2001:599)

4.4 Cognitive functions and judgments of decision-making
capacity
The relationships outlined above give reason to believe that certain cognitive functions
bear a strong relationship to decision-making capacity and, in certain circumstances, may
provide compensatory evidence that decision-making capacity is preserved when
standard methods of evaluation cannot be applied. Nevertheless, the move from cognitive
functions to decision-making capacity faces at least two inferential gaps. A first gap is the
difficulty of moving from cognitive functions to decision-making capacity. As argued
several times throughout this thesis, the mere presence of certain cognitive functions does
not warrant the attribution of decision-making capacity. This is because these cognitive
functions are normatively constrained by a clinician’s judgment. It is the clinician’s
judgment, not the simple presence of relevant cognitive functions that determines
whether a patient is capable of making the decision in question. Yet, even if the presence
of cognitive functions did warrant the attribution of decision-making capacity, there is
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second inferential gap regarding the patient population in question. How do we know that
performance on tasks deployed by the Owen Lab is good evidence of the cognitive
functions relevant to decision-making capacity?
Part of the problem with the second of these inferential gaps is possible vagueness in the
definition of cognitive functions deployed in this thesis. The definitions deployed are
sufficiently vague to allow for coarse-grained associations between neuroimaging and
EEG-based tasks, cognitive functions, and decision-making capacity. Yet, with this
vagueness also comes the risk of equivocacy. Indeed, on a fine-grained analysis, it is
possible that neuroimaging and EEG-based tasks do not recruit the same cognitive
functions measured by psychometric scales.
Consider episodic memory. Suppose that episodic memory is highly associated with
decision-making capacity as measured by a hypothetical episodic memory test. This test
operationalizes episodic memory according to a particular recall task, say, the number of
times a participant uses visceral terms to describe a memory during free recall. On a
coarse-grained analysis, aspects of declarative memory—including semantic and
episodic—appear to be involved in neuroimaging tasks deployed in the Owen Lab. Yet, a
fine-grained analysis teases them apart. Indeed, the recall task described above is not
deployed in neuroimaging tasks used by the Owen Lab, nor do the task designs used in
the Owen Lab resemble, in any way, the features of this test. In fact, as previously noted,
it is unlikely a recall task could be deployed in neuroimaging given the current state of
communication techniques since the task requires the participant to freely recall her
memory. Coarse grained analysis suggests that the episodic memory recruited in both
cases is sufficiently similar to warrant further investigation of decision-making capacity.
Yet, fine-grained analysis demonstrates that these two methods of assessment simply
measure different things.
A straightforward response to this problem is to claim that a coarse-grained analysis of
the relationship between cognitive functions and decision-making capacity is all that is
needed for the overarching argument of this thesis. The purpose of identifying
relationships between cognitive functions and decision- making capacity is to merely
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create a heuristic that motivates further evaluation of high-functioning patients, nothing
more. A coarse-grained analysis does this job successfully while simultaneously avoiding
worries concerning equivocacy.
Another, more sophisticated solution to this problem is to evaluate relevant cognitive
functions directly through neuroimaging. This approach would close the second
inferential gap outlined above by resolving the problem at a fine-grained level. Many of
the tests outlined above require the participant to engage in fluid communication, and
thus are inappropriate for the neuroimaging methods used in the Owen Lab. Yet, there are
several validated psychometric scales that could be deployed in neuroimaging and may
indeed be highly associated with one or more subcomponents of decision-making
capacity. These scales are briefly reviewed at the end of the previous chapter in the
discussion of basic reasoning abilities.
It may be argued that deploying these scales in neuroimaging adds yet another layer of
complexity to assessing decision-making capacity after severe brain injury. After all, if a
patient is capable of engaging in neuroimaging sessions used for extensive testing of
cognitive functions, why not use this time more efficiently by simply communicating
with the patient? This is a reasonable proposition, and ultimately calls for sensible
judgment when determining which patients require sophisticated neuropsychological
assessment. However, as we shall see in chapter 5, there may be a lingering concern that
the evidence of decision-making capacity produced by the strategy developed in this
thesis is incomplete (in the sense that not all subcomponents of decision-making capacity
are represented in the evidence). The application of psychometric scales in neuroimaging
may compensate for incomplete evidence even if it makes evaluation more complicated.
Another concern—as captured by the first inferential gap outlined above—is that the
attribution of decision-making capacity requires a clinician’s judgment of the patient’s
ability to make a specific medical decision, not a decontextualized evaluation of cognitive
functions. Indeed, as Dreer and colleagues argue:
the present findings illuminate contributions of several neurocognitive domains to
decisional capacity in traumatic brain injury. At the same time, judgments of
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capacity should not be founded solely, or even primarily, on neuropsychological
test results. Neuropsychological test data by itself cannot be determinative of
capacity questions, which involve issues of individual autonomy. A capacity
judgment is ultimately a clinical judgment that draws upon a wide variety of
evidence, including the clinician’s interview of the patient and others, formal
capacity measure results…cognitive test results, and the clinician’s experience.
(Dreer et al., 2008: 495)
Thus, even if the second inferential gap is closed by directly measuring relevant cognitive
functions through neuroimaging, this still would not necessarily warrant the attribution of
decision-making capacity.
A solution to this problem will inevitably require a method of assessment that resembles
standard decision-making capacity evaluation. This line of argument will be developed in
chapter 5. In part, this is a concession to the first inferential gap outlined above.
According to all received views of decision-making capacity, there is no way to dispense
with clinician judgment in capacity determinations. Nonetheless, evaluation of cognitive
functions is essential, particularly for the patient population under consideration in this
thesis. The cognition of these patients is currently a black-box. Thus all information
about their cognition can help to build a case about the preservation or recovery of
decision-making capacity.

4.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, I have argued that particular cognitive functions, including memory and
executive functions, bear conceptual and predictive relationships to one or more of the
subcomponents of decision-making capacity. Further, I have argued that these cognitive
functions, at least from a coarse-grained view, are recruited in tasks deployed by the
Owen Lab. This does not provide definitive evidence that the cognitive functions
involved in decision- making capacity are preserved in severely brain-injured patients.
Yet, it is suggestive that the cognitive machinery involved in decision- making capacity
may remain intact in high-functioning patients and that further evaluation is warranted.
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Chapter 5

5

The vignette approach

In chapters 3 and 4, I argued that preservation of particular cognitive functions gives
reason to believe that decision- making capacity, or some aspect thereof, may remain
intact. In patients in whom cognitive functions are apparent, this can inform practical
judgments about further evaluation. In patients in whom cognitive functions are not
apparent, this can inform judgments regarding exclusion from further evaluation.
Investigating cognitive functions is a fruitful strategy for assessing decision-making
capacity in severely brain-injured patients.14 As a heuristic, it motivates the search for
decision-making capacity in populations that may be falsely presumed to be incapable
merely by virtue of disability. Nonetheless, evaluation of cognitive functions is ultimately
insufficient for the attribution of decision-making capacity. A practical test is needed that
evaluates decision-making capacity according to a particular medical decision. In this
chapter, I propose such a practical test adapted to neuroimaging communication. This test
is intended to follow the assessment of cognitive functions.
Standard methods for evaluating decision- making capacity use a semi-structured
interview (see Dunn et al., 2006 for extensive review). Yet, for reasons outlined in
chapters 1 and 2, an interview cannot be used in neuroimaging communication. In
response, I propose a vignette approach. A vignette approach evaluates decision-making
capacity by disclosing medical information in a highly refined snap-shot—or vignette. A
series of questions are asked about the content of the vignette, in order to probe decisionmaking capacity. The vignette approach is attractive because it is efficient. Additionally,
questions coupled with the vignette can be phrased for “yes” or “no” responses. Finally,
this approach intertwines the disclosure of medical information with the evaluation of

14

There are also benefits to this approach beyond evaluating decision-making capacity, such as
specifying a fine-grained analysis of the kind of consciousness that is preserved following severe
brain injury.
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capacity. This has been shown to increase uptake of medical information in individuals
with cognitive deficits.
In what follows, I revisit limitations posed by neuroimaging. I then sketch the conceptual
features of the vignette approach and describe how it may be used to transcend those
limitations. Finally, I raise two problems associated with the vignette approach and
respond to each. I conclude by identifying avenues of empirical research to further refine
the vignette approach for application in neuroimaging communication.

5.1 What are the relevant limitations?
It is instructive to understand the relevant limitations associated with neuroimaging
communication before presenting the vignette approach. These limitations are due both to
the condition of the patient and to the technical constraints of neuroimaging technology.
Outlining these limitations can determine the practical boundaries one must work within
when conceiving a strategy for evaluating decision-making capacity through
neuroimaging communication. Outlining these limitations can also assist in identifying
those that can be resolved through technical innovations and those that cannot.

5.1.1

What kinds of questions can be asked?

The kinds of questions that can be asked are, in part, delimited by the answers that can be
expressed through neuroimaging communication. To date, the most successful instances
of neuroimaging communication have deployed questions with yes/no responses
(Fernández-Espejo and Owen, 2013; Monti et al., 2010). Questions with yes/no responses
are binary questions. A binary question is a question with exactly two responses and a
forced choice. A forced choice means the question must be answered in order to yield an
interpretable response. There are at least three kinds of questions that can be deployed in
neuroimaging communication: factual questions, counterfactual questions, and decision
questions.
A factual question, such as, “are you in a hospital?”, probes a patient’s ability to
understand relevant facts about her medical situation. These questions are important as
they can situate the patient in a medical context. For example, if a patient has a shoulder
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injury that requires physiotherapy, factual questions can probe contingent features of the
patient’s condition (e.g., “do you have a shoulder injury?”) and recommended treatment
(e.g., “does your injury require physiotherapy?”). Both questions can reveal
understanding of the medical situation.
A counterfactual question, meanwhile, contains a counterfactual statement (or conditional
proposition). Counterfactual questions relate to situations that have not yet transpired but
could occur in the future (e.g., “If you do not seek the recommended therapy, will your
injury heal without complication?”). Like factual questions, counterfactual questions
reveal information relevant to decision-making capacity. In particular, they reveal a
patient’s ability to anticipate reasonably foreseeable consequences of a medical decision.
This is essential to appreciation.
Finally, a decision question probes the patient’s preference regarding a particular medical
decision. Unlike factual or counterfactual questions, a decision question is not
independently verifiable; it derives from the patient’s preferences. As such, decision
questions do not shed light on understanding, appreciation, or reasoning. However, they
do satisfy the condition of expressing a choice, which is essential to decision-making
capacity.
One drawback to the kinds of questions (and responses) that can be used in neuroimaging
communication is that they are forced choice questions. Forced choice questions can
inadvertently drive patients to answer questions in a way they do not intend. For example,
patients have to answer “yes” or “no” in order to produce an interpretable response; there
is no option for the patient not to answer. This is due to the inability to verify whether a
patient chooses not to respond, or if the patient became fatigued or did not understand the
question. The fact that the patient must answer in order to provide an interpretable
response leaves no room to maneuver and, in some cases, could inadvertently suppress
the true preferences of the patient.
A second drawback is that binary questions do not allow for nuanced responses. For
example, a nuanced response could involve taking an epistemic attitude toward a
question, such as “I’m inclined to choose option A, but I have some further questions.”
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Additionally, a nuanced response could be the conjunction of two options, such as “I
want treatment A and B, rather than just A, or just B.” Such a response may occur when
the treatment options presented are mutually exclusive, but the patient believes they are
consistent. Questions that yield nuanced responses like these are crucial to determining if
a patient appreciates the consequences of her medical situation or is capable of reasoning
with a consistent set of values. If a patient insists on receiving both treatment options, yet
cannot appreciate they are mutually exclusive, then the patient lacks decision- making
capacity.15

5.1.2

How many questions can be asked?

The number of questions that can be asked in any given communication session is, in
part, delimited by accessibility to the fMRI unit and the scanning time required to elicit
reliable data. On average, scanning sessions last approximately 2 hours, with 1 hour
devoted to scanning, and 1 hour devoted to logistics, such as situating the patient in the
scanner. Patients can become progressively fatigued, which may render them unable to
regulate brain systems involved in neuroimaging communication (I return to this point
below). This can affect the reliability of patient responses and raise reasonable doubts
regarding the accuracy of communication.
To date, two fMRI-based methods have allowed for successful communication with
patients. The first is an adaptation of the mental imagery task (Fernández-Espejo and
Owen, 2013; Monti et al., 2010). In this method, patients are instructed to engage in
motor or spatial navigation imagery to respond to yes/no questions. The second method is
a novel communication task that leverages selective attention (Naci and Owen, 2013). In
this method, patients are instructed to respond to questions by counting the number of
times they hear the word “yes” or “no” as it is presented in a stream of auditory
distraction stimuli.16

15

For example, Mary Northern refused treatment of a life-threatening condition, yet she also
wanted to live (see chapter 4).
16

See chapter 1 for detailed review.

83

The former method has allowed investigators to pose the greatest number of questions in
a single scanning session, i.e., 6 questions in 1 hour (Monti et al., 2010). Yet, there is
reason to believe that more questions could be posed. Naci and colleagues (2013)
reported that the selective attention method requires, roughly, 6 minutes of scanning time
to accurately decode an answer to one question in 92% of participants. Based on these
data, one can predict that a participant could answer 10 questions in a 1-hour session with
a high degree of decoding accuracy.
Of course, it is important to note that this prediction derives from studies of healthy
participants. Whether a patient could produce brain activity sufficiently robust in this
time-frame, or remain reasonably lucid, has yet to be demonstrated empirically.
Nonetheless, the theoretical possibility that 10 questions could be posed in a 1-hour
scanning session provides clear boundaries to work within when conceiving a strategy for
assessing decision-making capacity. With refinement, it is likely that the number of
questions a patient can answer in a single scanning session will eventually exceed 10.
Future innovations may also lead to reliable multiple-choice or other question formats
that increase the extent of communication. 17

5.1.3

How long does it take to analyze neuroimaging data?

Neuroimaging data requires analysis to ensure that patient responses are interpreted
correctly. Analysis is not instantaneous. Ideally, it could take as little as 24 hours, but this
assumes the data are relatively clean (e.g., containing no artifacts due to patient
movement). If the data are not clean, analysis is protracted and may require review by
expert consultants. This is important to highlight, as it shows that neuroimaging
communication—at least, currently—is not real-time communication. Patients are asked
questions, they respond, the fMRI unit records brain activity, and the data are analyzed
after the scanning session is complete.

17

For example, the multiple-choice method developed by Bardin and colleagues (2011) or the
spelling technique developed by Sorger and colleagues (2012).
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It is possible to estimate answers by gross visualization of neural responses represented
on the fMRI control screens. The spatial distinctness of activity generated by motor and
spatial navigation imagery allows for this without necessarily requiring formal data
analysis. Indeed, in previous studies involving healthy participants, blinded experts
accomplished this with ease (Coleman and Owen, 2008). Nonetheless, the fact that
neuroimaging communication could potentially be used to facilitate clinical decisionmaking in severely brain-injured patients suggests that misinterpretation of data could
have harmful consequences. It is therefore prudent to formally analyze data to prevent
misinterpretation, even if this means that communication does not occur in real-time.
The fact that neuroimaging communication does not unfold in real-time also makes it
difficult to customize a line of questioning for a particular patient based on prior
responses. Customization would allow for real-time feedback. For example, if a clinician
were to ask a patient, “what do you think about treatment X?” and the patient responds,
“actually, I’m not sure what treatment X is, could you explain it again?” the clinician
could adjust her line of questioning to account for this unanticipated turn in the interview.
This sort of flexibility—what some have called “fluid” communication—would allow
clinicians to identify mistakes and return to certain questions to probe them more deeply.

5.1.4

What limitations does the patient’s condition pose?

Unlike technical limitations, limitations that result from the patient’s condition cannot be
resolved by future innovations. These limitations include the patient’s ability to focus, to
store information in working memory, and to engage in cognitively taxing tasks before
becoming fatigued. Fluctuations in arousal may also inhibit communication. A patient
might be lucid at certain times during the day, but not at others. Such limitations are
highly variable. They may change throughout a patient’s recovery, and may vary
according to the nature of the patient’s injury.
The limitations that result from the patient’s condition speak to the importance of
adjusting our interaction to enhance their performance on neuroimaging tasks. For
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example, sensitivity to sleep/wake cycles can allow for more effective scheduling of
scanning sessions.18 Likewise, reflecting on more effective means of disclosure of
medical information may help enhance uptake, understanding and appreciation. As we
shall see, the vignette approach can help achieve these goals by interweaving questions
that probe decision- making capacity with disclosure of medical information.

5.2 Bandwidth
A useful metaphor for describing the limitations identified in the preceding is
“bandwidth” (cf. Fins and Schiff, 2010). Very loosely, bandwidth is the rate at which
information is available or consumed. In neuroimaging communication, bandwidth takes
at least five forms. First, bandwidth can refer to the number of questions that one can ask
(e.g., 10). Second, bandwidth can refer to the content of possible responses (e.g., binary
or forced choice). Third, bandwidth can refer to the directional flow of information. In
neuroimaging communication, we can only ask questions of the patient, and information
flow from the patient is narrow. Fourth, bandwidth can refer to the accessibility of
neuroimaging technologies. As noted above, neuroimaging requires the patient to be
transported to a research-grade imaging unit, which is time consuming and costly.
Finally, bandwidth can refer to the extent to which information is readily available. As
noted above, this may be reduced as a result of diminished attention or working memory
and may prevent a patient from providing meaningful responses even if technical
limitations are resolved.

5.3 The vignette approach
The vignette approach is a strategy that may be employed to meet the challenges
described above. The vignette approach presents medical information in a highly refined
snap-shot, or vignette, can be coupled with yes/no questions, and has been shown to be
effective at assessing decision-making capacity in a variety of clinical populations.
Velligna and colleagues (2004) compared the use of a vignette method with standard
clinician assessment of capacity in 80 geriatric patients. Disagreement between findings

18

The Owen Lab schedule accounts for potential changes in patient arousal. See chapter 3.
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revealed by the vignette method and standard assessment occurred in a minority of cases.
When disagreement did occur, standard assessment by clinicians tended to be more
lenient than that provided by the vignette method. This suggests that the vignette method
required a higher burden of proof. Similar vignette methods have also been used to assess
elderly patients (Schmand et al., 1999; Fitten and Waite, 1990), patients with dementia
(Sachs et al., 1984), and early stage Alzheimer’s disease patients (Marson et al., 1995).
Additionally, vignette methods have been used to assess children (Weithorn and
Campbell, 1982) and individuals with congenital cognitive disabilities (Cea and Fisher,
2003). Finally, Grisso and Appelbaum (1991) have used vignette methods to assess
patients with schizophrenia and major depressive disorder. In the two latter cases,
assessment by vignette accurately identified deficiencies in decision-making capacity,
particularly in schizophrenic patients’ ability to understand medical information.
If applied to neuroimaging communication, this approach would require a systematic
method for vignette and question set construction. A set of vignettes could be constructed
prior to interaction with any patient by reflecting on medical decisions commonly faced
by severely brain-injured patients, such as decisions regarding physiotherapy.
Constructing a repository of vignettes and question sets in advance addresses, in part, the
inability to customize questions in real-time. However, in cases in which a vignette is not
yet available, a construction formula can provide guidance. Such a formula should
address at least three components: the content of the vignette; the structure of the
vignette; and the formulation of the question set. I review each of these components
below.

5.3.1

The content of the vignette

The content of the vignette is the specific clinical scenario in which the patient is forced
to choose between two medical options.19 This can be the choice between two alternative
medical therapies, or the choice between accepting rather than refusing a proposed
therapy. In general, the content of vignettes constructed for a repository should

19

It is possible to offer more than two medical options, yet this would require a greater number of
decision questions. This issue is clarified with the presentation of sample vignettes below.
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incorporate the views of those with first-hand experience of the patient population,
including patients’ families, neurologists, and neuro-rehabilitation specialists.
The content of the vignette should be limited to low- to medium-stakes medical
decisions. A low-stakes clinical decision is a choice with a risk-benefit ratio substantially
better than alternatives, while a medium-stakes clinical decision is a choice with a riskbenefit ratio on par with alternatives (Buchanan and Brock, 1990:53). The purpose of
restricting the content of vignettes to low- or medium-stakes decisions is to avoid
concerns that the vignette approach offers weak evidence of decision-making capacity. I
return to this issue in detail below.

5.3.2

The structure of the vignette

The structure of the vignette specifies which content is considered relevant, how
information is arranged, and how information is effectively and efficiently disclosed to
the patient.
The Measuring Understanding of Disclosure (MUD) form, developed by Grisso and
Appelbaum (1991), provides an ideal template for vignette structure. The MUD is a
research instrument used to assess informed consent and employs a vignette composed of
five paragraphs. The content of each paragraph is determined by the ethical requirement
of adequately informing the patient. The first paragraph describes the medical disorder;
the second describes a treatment; the third describes benefits of the treatment; the fourth
describes risks; and the fifth describes an alternative treatment and its respective benefits
and risks (Grisso and Appelbaum, 1991: 379).
The structure of the vignette determines the way in which medical information is
disclosed. A beneficial feature of the MUD is that it is designed for single unit disclosure
(Grisso and Appelbaum, 1991), which divides the vignette into units, and couples each
with specific questions related to the content of the paragraph included in the unit. The
first unit contains information and questions regarding the medical disorder, the second
contains information and questions regarding treatment, and so forth. At the beginning of
disclosure, the entire vignette is presented. The examiner then returns to each unit, reads
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the paragraph aloud, and asks questions relevant to it. Each unit is presented sequentially
until the vignette is complete.
Structuring the vignette according to the MUD template is ideal for neuroimaging
communication in severely brain-injured patients. This allows clinicians to meet technical
limitations posed by neuroimaging communication without significant loss of content.
Moreover, the method is ideal for eliciting evidence of decision-making capacity in
patients with cognitive deficits. The fact that the questions are interwoven in the
disclosure document allows for increased comprehension of medical information. This is
particularly useful for assessing patients that may have problems with memory or
attention (Chung et al., 2013; McDowell et al., 1997).

5.3.3

The questions coupled with the vignette

A series of 10 “yes” or “no” questions can be posed with the vignette. The set of
questions can be divided and coupled with each paragraph during disclosure. 8 questions
can be distributed across all paragraphs to probe understanding and appreciation, and 2
questions can be reserved for the medical choice at the conclusion of the vignette. The
target and formulation of each question will depend on the content of each unit.
Flexibility in question distribution may be required for units that contain important
information. For example, clinicians may choose to allot more questions to a unit
containing substantive information about risks and benefits.
As noted above, factual, counterfactual, and decision questions can be used in
neuroimaging communication. Factual questions probe information relevant to
understanding and abstract thought. These questions can be coupled with units that
disclose information about the medical disorder and treatments. Understanding the
medical disorder and potential treatments involves comprehending medical facts, and this
is essential to decision-making capacity. Counterfactual questions probe information
relevant to consequential reasoning. These questions can be coupled with units that
disclose information about the risks and benefits of treatments, or the consequences of
refusing treatment. These questions generate information relevant to appreciation.
Finally, upon completion of the vignette, the patient will be given a medical choice.
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Decision questions are posed at this stage. Ideally, question sets should be randomized to
prevent all correct answers being “yes” or “no”. This prevents patients with cognitive
deficits that bias responses toward “yes” or “no” from answering all questions correctly.
As with all capacity assessments, the number of questions that must be answered
correctly in order to attribute decision-making capacity to the patient is contingent on
clinician judgment. However, it may be argued that, even if all questions are correctly
answered, a set of 10 is insufficient. After all, very little information can be obtained
from such a small set of questions. A review of the vignette literature, however, suggests
that investigators are divided on this point. Vignette-based studies utilize between 6
(Vellinga et al., 2004) and 13 (Cea and Fisher, 2003) questions to assess decision-making
capacity. Investigators report that the number of questions required is, in part, associated
with the open-endedness of the questions (e.g., fewer questions are asked if they are more
open-ended) or the length of the vignette (e.g., more questions were asked in longer
vignettes). This suggests that the relevant factor is not necessarily how many questions
are asked, but what kind of questions are asked. Provided the right kind of questions are
asked, it is plausible that a high degree of information about decision-making capacity
can be garnered from a small set of questions.

5.3.4

Preparation of the vignette for neuroimaging

Vignettes developed for neuroimaging communication will be shorter than the MUD
template for logistical purposes, but will use the same five-unit structure. The vignette
and questions should be assessed for ease of comprehension. Grundner’s “reading ease”
formula for medical research consent forms (Grundner, 1978; 1986) should be used to
ensure that language is relatively jargon free, and that sentences are short and terse. The
vignette and question set should be calibrated to a 6 th - 8th grade comprehension level (a
standard used in previous construction of vignettes for clinical populations) (Grisso and
Appelbaum, 1991). The vignette should be recorded in the native language of the patient.
Ideally, the rate of spoken language in the recording should be between slow (approx. 2.2
syllables /sec.) and normal (approx. 4.4 syllables/sec.) (Weismer and Hesketh, 1996).
Adjusting the rate of spoken language can facilitate comprehension in patients with
memory deficits.
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5.4 Two sample vignettes
Two sample vignettes have been provided below. These are intended to illustrate what
the content and questions of a vignette might look like. Ideally, vignettes delivered to
patients will pertain to their specific medical situation. Construction of such vignettes can
follow the general formula developed above.
The first vignette involves choosing between two physiotherapy regimes. In one regime,
the patient has physiotherapy twice weekly for two hour sessions with a physiotherapist
named David. In the second regime, the patient has physiotherapy four times weekly for
one-hour sessions with a physiotherapist named Sue. Both therapeutic options are
beneficial and pose little or no potential for harm. Refusal of physiotherapy carries the
risk of pain and stiffness. This medical decision is considered to be low-stakes.
The second vignette involves the decision to participate in research involving the drug
amantadine.20 Amantadine is a drug commonly used to treat patients with traumatic brain
injury. Although the mechanism of action is unclear, several trials (Maythaler et al.,
2002; Schneider et al., 1999), including a placebo-controlled trial (Giacino et al., 2012),
suggest amantadine aids functional recovery. Because little is known about amantadine,
consenting to study participation involves risks and benefits on par with refusal to
consent. This decision is considered to be medium-stakes.

5.4.1

Sample vignette 1: physiotherapy regimes (low-stakes)

Disclosure
Your condition has made it difficult for you to stretch and flex your arms and
legs. You can benefit from physiotherapy. Physiotherapy can help maintain
normal motion and decrease pain. If you do not receive physiotherapy, this may
result in loss of mobility and ongoing pain. There are two physiotherapy options:

20

There are relevant ethical differences between medical therapy and research. The presentation
of both therapeutic and research decisions is meant to illustrate the kinds of decisions that could
plausibly be made through neuroimaging communication.
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The first involves appointments two days per week, for 2 hours, with David. The
second involves appointments four days per week, for 1 hour, with Sue. David
and Sue can come to your home. Receiving physiotherapy twice a week means
fewer appointments, but potential stiffness in between appointments. Receiving
physiotherapy four times a week means more appointments, but potentially less
stiffness. All physiotherapy sessions will likely involve mild to moderate
discomfort and pain. Advil can relieve the pain. Both physiotherapy options will
result in a positive outcome. (12 lines)
Unit 1 (The Disorder)
Your condition has made it difficult for you to stretch and flex your arms and
legs.
1. Is it difficult to stretch your arms? (Understanding)
2. Have you injured your foot? (Understanding)
Unit 2 (Treatment)
You can benefit from physiotherapy. Physiotherapy can help maintain normal
motion and decrease pain. If you do not receive physiotherapy, this may result in
loss of mobility and ongoing pain.
3. Is physiotherapy recommended? (Understanding)
4. If you do not have physiotherapy, will the pain go away? (Appreciation)
Unit 3 (Treatment)
There are two physiotherapy options: the first involves appointments two days per
week, for 2 hours, with David. The second involves appointments four days per
week, for 1 hour, with Sue. David and Sue can come to your home.
5. If you have physiotherapy twice weekly, will it be with David? (Appreciation)
6. Do you have to travel to see the physiotherapist? (Understanding)
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Unit 4 (Risks and benefits)
Receiving physiotherapy twice a week means fewer appointments, but potential
stiffness in between appointments. Receiving physiotherapy four times a week
means more appointments, but potentially less stiffness. All physiotherapy
sessions will likely involve mild to moderate discomfort and pain. Advil can
relieve the pain.
7. If you have physiotherapy more often, will you be more stiff? (Appreciation)
8. Will physiotherapy involve discomfort and pain? (Understanding)
Unit 5 (Summary)
Both physiotherapy options will result in a positive outcome.
9. Would you like physiotherapy twice a week by David? (Choice)
10. Would you like physiotherapy four times a week by Sue? (Choice)

5.4.2

Sample vignette 2: amantadine research (medium-stakes)

Disclosure
Your condition has resulted in disabilities, which makes it difficult for you to
move your arms and legs. Your condition may improve with the drug,
amantadine. The benefits of this drug are currently unknown, but it may help
speed your recovery. We would like you to participate in an amantadine study.
The study involves regular neuro-rehabilitation combined with administration of
amantadine, or a pill with no drug, called a placebo. In rare cases, amantadine can
cause nausea, constipation, and nervousness. The placebo has no negative side
effects. If you choose not to participate, or receive a placebo instead of
amantadine, there are no known risks. There may be benefits to amantadine, but
they are unknown. This study can inform future rehabilitation for patients like
yourself. (10 lines)
Unit 1 (The Disorder)
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Your condition has resulted in disabilities, which makes it difficult for you to
move your arms and legs.
1. Do you have difficulty moving your arms and legs? (Understanding)
2. Do you have a head injury? (Understanding)
Unit 2 (Treatment)
Your condition may improve with the drug, amantadine. The benefits of this drug
are currently unknown, but it may help speed your recovery.
3. If you take amantadine, is it likely your condition will worsen? (Appreciation)
4. Could amantadine improve you condition? (Understanding)
Unit 3 (Treatment)
We would like you to participate in an amantadine study. The study involves
regular neuro-rehabilitation combined with administration of amantadine, or a pill
with no drug, called a placebo.
5. Are you being asked to enroll in a study? (Understanding)
6. If you participate in the study, could you receive a placebo? (Appreciation)
Unit 4 (Risks and benefits)
In rare cases, amantadine can cause nausea, constipation, and nervousness. The
placebo has no negative side effects. If you choose not to participate, or to receive
a placebo instead of amantadine, there are no known risks.
7. Does amantadine have no side effects? (Appreciation)
8. If you participate, might you experience nausea? (Appreciation)
Unit 5 (Summary)
There may be benefits to amantadine, but they are unknown. This study can
inform future rehabilitation for patients like yourself.
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9. Would you like to participate in the study? (Choice)
10. Would you like to refrain from participation? (Choice)

5.5 Challenges to the vignette approach
The purpose of the vignette approach is to provide a practical test for evaluating decisionmaking capacity that transcends the limitations of neuroimaging communication. In
principle, this approach can reveal some evidence of decision-making capacity. Yet, it is
reasonable to criticize this approach on the grounds that it produces weak and incomplete
evidence. I respond to these criticisms below.

5.5.1

The vignette approach produces weak evidence

It may be argued that the evidence produced by the vignette approach is too weak for the
attribution of decision-making capacity. It is true that the information elicited from
neuroimaging communication provides a very narrow view of the patient’s decisionmaking process, including understanding and appreciation of the medical disorder and
treatment options. The weakness of evidence is due to at least three factors. First, the
patient can only answer “yes” or “no” questions. Second, we can ask only ask 10
questions. Finally, the number or kind of questions a patient answers correctly may
influence the quality of the evidence.
Strength of evidence is a perpetual challenge in the assessment of decision-making
capacity in all clinical scenarios. At stake is a trade-off between patients’ liberty interests
and a clinician’s duty to protect patients. The attribution of decision-making capacity is
ultimately dependent on clinician judgment. In setting the “threshold” of evidence
required, the clinician can make two types of errors. A higher threshold will protect
patients but infringe on self-determination. A lower threshold will respect patient selfdetermination but may negatively affect patient welfare.
A common strategy for resolving this tension is to appeal to the stakes of medical
decisions (see also, chapter 2). The stakes of a medical decision are derived from the
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Table 10: Stakes of medical decisions
Stakes

Risk/Benefit
Ratio

Example

Relevant features

High

Substantially
worse than
alternatives

Participation in deep
brain stimulation
research

Invasive
Requires general anesthesia
Long-term benefits unclear

Medium

On par with
alternatives

Participation in
randomized trial of
amantadine

Non-invasive
Little to no known side-effects
Benefits unclear but may speed recovery

Low

Substantially
better than
alternatives

Choice of different
physiotherapy options

Therapeutic
No long-term difference between options

potential risks and benefits of treatment options. Low-stakes medical decisions involve a
choice with a risk-benefit ratio substantially better than alternatives. Medium-stakes
decisions involve a choice with a risk-benefit ratio on par with alternatives. High-stakes
decisions involve a choice with a risk-benefit ratio substantially worse than alternatives
(Buchanan and Brock, 1990: 53) (see table 10).
The threshold of evidence required for the attribution of decision-making capacity is a
function of these stakes. For high-stakes decisions, the potential for harm is high and the
requisite evidence must also be high. Requiring robust evidence ensures that the clinician
is adequately protecting the welfare of the patient, even if this infringes on patient selfdetermination. By contrast, low-stakes decisions carry a substantially lower probability of
harm and the evidence required may permissibly be lower. The fact that low-stakes
decisions will likely benefit the patient, no matter what choice she makes, allows for
greater decision- making freedom, even if evidence of capacity is not robust. This
balancing act is intended to harmonize the liberty interests of patients with protection of
patient welfare (Brock, 1993: 42).
Compared to other methods of assessment, such as the MacCAT-T, the vignette approach
produces weak evidence of decision-making capacity. Nonetheless, this evidence may
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suffice for some low to medium-stakes decisions. Combined with systematic assessment
of cognitive functions, the vignette approach arguably produces evidence that satisfies the
threshold for low- to medium-stakes medical decisions.

5.5.2

The vignette approach produces incomplete evidence

A second problem with the vignette approach is that it produces incomplete evidence of
decision-making capacity in the sense that some features of capacity captured by the
MacCAT-T cannot, in principle, be evaluated through the vignette approach. This is
particularly true of reasoning. The design of the MacCAT-T allows a patient to
demonstrate reasoning by explaining why a decision is right for her. The technical
limitations of neuroimaging communication do not allow for this. Thus, the vignette
approach is deficient—at least, currently—due to its inability to produce evidence of this
subcomponent.
Reasoning is a core feature of decision-making capacity. Without evidence of reasoning,
the motivations for a patient’s decisions may be misinterpre ted (cf. Fins and Schiff,
2010). Yet, the authors of the MacCAT-T acknowledge that:
Patients who are on respirators or impaired by strokes may still be able to
communicate using hand signals, letter boards, eye blinks, and the like. When
evaluators are dealing with such patients, the evaluators usually will need to
frame their questions in a “yes-no” or multiple-choice format. (Grisso and
Appelbaum, 1998: 86)
They argue further that, in cases in which evaluation is incomplete:
the usual rules for determining whether a patient has [decision- making capacity]
may have to be slightly modified. (Grisso and Appelbaum, 1998: 86)
The argument developed in this thesis hinges on the meaning of “slightly modified”.
Does the vignette approach fall within or outside the scope of slight modification? I
maintain that it falls within the scope of slight modifications. The structure of assessment
and evidence produced is, admittedly, different than that produced by instruments like the
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MacCAT-T. Yet, every effort has been made to preserve the theoretical features of
decision-making capacity that characterize standard methods of assessment (cf. Dunn et
al., 2006). The vignette approach seeks to investigate the subcomponents of capacity
identified in the MacCAT-T, it follows the general definition of subcomponents laid out
therein, and structures the disclosure of medical information according to the ethical
requirement of adequately informing the patient.
Skeptics, however, may argue that the vignette approach falls outside the scope of slight
modification. After all, reasoning is a subcomponent of decision-making capacity that the
vignette approach cannot evaluate given current technical limitations. On this view, the
modifications inherent in the vignette approach are simply too radical to produce
persuasive evidence of decision-making capacity. The vignette approach is sufficiently
different from the MacCAT-T to justify this skepticism even if assessment is restricted to
low- to medium-stakes medical decisions.
Like the problem of weak evidence, the problem of incomplete evidence might be
resolved by harmonizing patients’ liberty and welfare interests. Harmonizing these
interests may be achieved by determining the required strength of evidence as a function
of the stakes of the medical decision. High-stakes decisions will require robust evidence
of decision-making capacity, and robust evidence will inevitably be complete evidence in
the sense that all subcomponents of decision-making capacity are represented. Lowstakes decisions, by contrast, do not require robust evidence of decision- making capacity.
Additionally, as previously noted, basic reasoning functions can also be evaluated prior
to neuroimaging communication. In chapter 3, I described assessments of basic reasoning
functions amongst healthy participants (Kirschner et al., 2015) and one brain-injured
patient (Hampshire et al., 2013). These tests can provide compensatory informatio n when
the assessment of decision-making capacity is substantially incomplete. I chapter 6, I
propose a model of supported decision-making that will allow an individual with
knowledge of the patient’s background to support her through the decision-making
process by providing explanations on the patient’s behalf. Combined with assessment of
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basic reasoning functions, this may assuage concerns of incomplete evidence in certain
cases.

5.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, I have presented and defended the conceptual features of the vignette
approach—a practical test for decision-making capacity tailored to neuroimaging
communication. Coupled with evaluation of preserved cognitive functions, this approach
can, in principle, demonstrate evidence that warrants the attribution of decision- making
capacity for low- to medium-stakes medical decisions.
Full development of the vignette approach requires a number of empirical steps. These
steps are beyond the scope of this thesis, yet warrant brief acknowledgment here. First,
the vignette approach must be validated to ensure that it accurately picks out relevant
features of decision-making capacity. Validation of the vignette approach will be
challenging, as it is distinct from standard methods of assessment. An alternative method
of validation could incorporate the judgment of an expert panel, including clinicians,
clinical bioethicists, philosophers, and health lawyers, who could assist in the formulation
of vignette content and questions. The validity of the vignette approach would rest upon
consensus among such experts.
Second, the vignette approach must be piloted in neuroimaging. In principle, it is possible
to deploy the vignette approach in neuroimaging communication. Yet, in practice, it may
turn out that this approach raises unforeseen complications, including significant patient
fatigue, the burden of transporting the patient to an imaging unit, or other logistical
problems in the scanning procedure. Such practical complications suggest that allotting
limited scanning time to assessing decision-making capacity may have little benefit.
Alternative uses of neuroimaging communication, including allowing patients to interact
with family or assessing quality-of- life (Graham et al. 2015) may be important avenues to
explore.
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Chapter 6

6

Supported decision-making and severe brain injury

Evaluation of cognitive functions and the vignette approach can, in principle, shed light
on decision-making capacity in some severely brain-injured patients. This can warrant the
attribution of decision-making capacity for some low- to medium-stakes decisions. The
picture of decision-making capacity presented here differs from the rigorous model set
out in the MacCAT-T. This is due to modifications in the rules of assessment, which, as I
have argued, are permissible in cases of limited communication.
As noted above, however, there are several skeptical arguments that could be raised
against the vignette approach. It could be argued that the approach provides insufficient
evidence of decision-making capacity. Additionally, some could be concerned about how
this strategy unfolds in practice. In response to these concerns, I propose a supported
decision-making model involving medical trusteeship. The concept of medical trusteeship
has its origins in the philosophy of disability. A medical trustee is an individual—often a
close family member—who supports a cognitively or communicatively impaired person
by interpreting and relaying her wishes (Silvers and Francis 2009; Francis 2009). In the
following chapter, I adapt this model to neuroimaging communication with severely
brain-injured patients.

6.1

Criticisms revisited

As noted in the preceding chapters, efforts to use neuroimaging communication to assess
decision-making capacity in severely brain-injured patients are subject to a variety of
criticisms.
Critics contend that the proposed strategy does not adequately evaluate reasoning.
Autonomous decision-making requires a patient to explain why a particular medical
decision is right for her (Grisso and Appelbaun, 1998). The inability of brain-injured
patients to communicate on their own, coupled with the restriction of neuroimaging
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communication to yes/no responses, makes it extremely difficult to evaluate reasoning
within such a “narrow bandwidth” (Glannon, 2014: 2).
Critics further contend that the decision- making capacity of a severely brain-injured
patient is subject to fluctuation. This is a reasonable concern, as many aspects of
cognition are known to change throughout recovery. As Hardcastle and Stewart argue,
“depression, anxiety, fear, euphoria, even sleep disturbances” can change in brain-injured
patients on a daily basis (Hardcastle and Stewart, 2013: 22). Thus, while the vignette
approach demonstrates decision-making capacity in principle, practical limitations will
not permit longitudinal evaluation to account for fluctuations in capacity.
A third worry is that the limits of neuroimaging communication can both engender
misinterpretation and also prevent us from realizing that such misinterpretation has
occurred. There are two kinds of misinterpretation that can occur in neuroimaging
communication. As Fins and Schiff point out, they can occur in the interpretation of a
patient’s preference (Fins & Schiff, 2010: 22). Second, a misinterpretation can occur in
the analysis of neuroimaging data. For example, artifacts may bias the data toward “yes”
or “no” answers. So, even if the patient’s preferences are interpreted correctly,
misinterpretation at the data level can still suggest a “preference” that is inconsistent with
the patient’s wishes. Misinterpretations of both kinds can lead to potential harm.
I have responded to these criticisms throughout this thesis. However, I acknowledge that
some may be unconvinced by my arguments. To account for this, I propose a supported
decision-making model. Supported decision-making for severely brain-injured patients
can speak to these criticisms. In what follows, I expand upon the conceptual foundations
of supported decision- making, what this decision- making model would look like in
practice, and respond to several criticisms of this approach.

6.2 Medical trusteeship
Supported decision-making allows a patient with cognitive or communicative
impairments to make medical decisions in collaboration with a family member or trusted
individual. An ideal model of supported decision-making for severely brain-injured
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patients is that of medical trusteeship. Medical trusteeship appeals to ethical, rather than
legal, principles to determine who has decision-making authority and allows for a degree
of flexibility in decision-making roles. This flexibility of medical trusteeship can also
help accommodate the fluctuations in decision-making capacity that may occur
throughout the recovery process.
The medical trustee’s role is to assist the patient in the decision-making process.
“Assistance” means participation in the medical decision-making process, broadly
construed. This assistance can take the form of helping the patient interpret complex
medical information, identifying medical decisions that best realize the patient’s values,
or explaining on behalf of the patient why a particular medical decision is right for her.
The role of a medical trustee differs from other legally defined roles in medical decisionmaking. Unlike a surrogate decision maker or legally appointed guardian, the medical
trustee is meant to support the patient in making decisions for herself, not to make
medical decisions for her. In this sense, the concept of medical trusteeship may be in
conflict with the legally defined threshold of competence.21 According to the law a
patient either is or is not legally competent and the appointment of a surrogate decision
maker or guardian hinges upon this determination. Medical trusteeship, on the other
hand, involves the recognition that cognitive impairment is highly variable, particularly
in patients recovering from brain injury. Medical trusteeship allows for flexibility in these
situations and aims to empower patients with cognitive or communicative impairment.

6.2.1

Medical trusteeship and autonomy

Medical trusteeship originates from philosophical reflection on the role of cognitively
disabled persons in political life (cf. Silvers and Francis 2009; Francis and Silvers, 2007).
Cognitively disabled persons are often marginalized in political discourse because they
are believed to lack autonomy. The concept of autonomy is central to both political

Note that, on standard interpretations of decision-making capacity as a “threshold concept”,
medical trusteeship may also be in tension with the way capacity is attributed to patients in the
clinical context. See chapter 2 for detailed discussion.
21
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liberalism (cf. Rawls, 2009) and the doctrine of informed consent (Beauchamp and
Childress, 2012; Faden and Beauchamp, 1986). According to one definition, autonomous
decision-making involves,
[b]eing able to value, being able to reason, being able to resist impulses, being
able to imagine an ordered life, being able to order one’s life, being able to put
one’s plans into practice, being able to participate in moral deliberation of an
idealized kind, and being politically free. (Francis, 2009:202).
This definition may be challenged on a number of grounds. In the first place, individuals
seldom deliberate and choose purely as autonomous agents (cf. Francis, 2009). Most
individuals make decisions—whether political or medical—in consultation with experts
or a trusted network of family and friends. Patients ask others for advice, defer to the
expertise of clinicians, and trust that, if they are unable to choose for themselves, their
family will make decisions that respect their values and beliefs. Some patients will
require more support than others and dependence may increase in tandem with the
complexity of the patient’s situation. From an ethical standpoint, this suggests that
autonomy, like capacity, is not all or nothing, but comes in degrees (Francis, 2009:207).
The abrogation of some or all decision-making authority does not deprive patients of
autonomy. Kukla (2005), for instance, argues that deferring to others during medical
decisions may constitute a conscientious affirmation of autonomy. More broadly, Francis
and Silvers (2007:319) speak of “wide agency” in medical decision-making. A patient’s
autonomy is instantiated in representatives or technologies that support selfdetermination throughout the decision-making process. On these views, medical
decisions are embedded in complex relationships between the patient, family, and clinical
staff.
The above analysis gives reason to believe that a liberal notion of autonomy does not
accurately capture how medical decisions unfold in practice. Indeed, all individuals—
disabled or not—are dependent on others to some degree when making medical
decisions. Patients with profound disabilities, such as those in acute coma, are maximally
dependent on others. Even otherwise healthy adults may be dependent on others when
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seeking advice or asking for clarification of medical information. These varying degrees
of dependence give reason to believe that providing assistance to disabled persons in
decision-making does not violate the norms of autonomy.
To be sure, there is a relevant distinction between degrees and kinds of dependence.
Otherwise healthy individuals may depend on others when making medical decisions, but
this kind of dependence does not undermine autonomy. By contrast, some severely braininjured patients will clearly lack autonomy to make decisions for themselves. The kind of
dependence required by these patients is altogether different. The difference between
kinds and degrees of dependence elucidates how such patients can reasonably participate
in medical decision-making. The medical trusteeship model is thus intended to facilitate
an alternative kind of participation in medical decision-making that acknowledges the
autonomy one may have, or recover, in the face of disability.22

6.2.2

Ethical and legal support for medical trusteeship

From an ethical perspective, the duty to respect patient self-determination obligates
clinicians to involve patients in medical decision-making to whatever extent possible.
Children, for instance, are generally believed to lack the mental maturity needed to
participate in most medical decisions. Very young children have not yet achieved key
developmental milestones and may lack certain rational capacities associated with
autonomy. Nevertheless, some children, particularly those on the cusp of legal adulthood,
may have the mental maturity to participate in some medical decisions. The duty to
respect self-determination suggests these children should have some say in decisions that
affect their bodies and their medical care (cf. Leikin, 1993:1). Allowing children to have
a say in their medical care—with parental oversight—respects their nascent autonomy.

22

A key challenge is determining what kinds of dependence trigger medical trusteeship. It is
plausible that, as in the case of varying thresholds of decision-making capacity, kinds of
dependence will covary with the stakes of a medical decision. High-stakes decisions will require
a kind of dependence that maximally protects the patient, such as the appointment of a surrogate
decision maker. By contrast, low-stakes decisions may require a different kind of dependence that
gives the patient more voice in the decision-making process, such as the appointment of a medical
trustee.

104

Arguably, there is a clear distinction between decision-making by assent and medical
trusteeship. In the assent model a child’s preference can be overruled by a parent, while,
in the trusteeship model, the role of the trustee is to support the patient in making a
decision.23 Apart from these structural differences, the general spirit is the same. Children
and disabled persons do not possess the same kind of autonomy as otherwise healthy
adults. Yet, it does not follow that they lack autonomy. Both models recognize this fact
and seek to allow children and disabled persons to participate in the decision- making
process to whatever extent possible.
From a legal perspective, there is also precedent to involve disabled persons in medical
decision making. Article 15 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms states that
“Every individual…has the right to equal protection and equal benefit of the law without
discrimination” (Canadian Charter, 1982). This stipulation suggests that disabled persons
should be afforded every opportunity to participate in medical decision- making. Section
12132 of The Americans with Disabilities Act (1990), meanwhile, states that “no
qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from
participation in or be denied the benefits of services, programs, or activities of a public
entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity” (ADA, 1990). Finally, article
12.1 of the United Nations Convention of the Rights of Persons with Disabilities states
that “persons with disabilities have the right to recognition everywhere as persons before
the law” (United Nations, 2007). This final assertion carries moral weight, and grounds
the duties to respect self-determination, and to seriously consider the welfare of disabled
persons if they are unable to advocate for themselves (cf. Graham et al., 2015).
The forgoing consensus documents motivate a legal duty of reasonable accommodation.
An accommodation is a mechanism that facilitates equal access to public goods or
services where access would otherwise be precluded due to disability. An
accommodation is reasonable if it does not cause undue hardship to the agent that
provides the accommodation (cf. ADA, 1990; Canadian Charter, 1982). Reasonable

23

Whether a trustee can step in to overrule the decision of a capable patient is a matter of debate.
Strictly speaking, this is not the role of a medical trustee.
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accommodations are applicable to disabled persons seeking goods or services from health
care institutions. Reasonable accommodations extend to equal access, as well as the
ability to make medical decisions. Mobility aids, technological devices, or use of a
medical trustee are different forms of reasonable accommodation in the health care
setting (cf. Silvers and Francis, 2009).24
The legal and ethical views outlined above provide context for medical trusteeship. On
these views, medical decision-making is not a bargaining process between rational
agents. Rather, it is a trust-building exercise between the patient, family, and health care
team (Francis, 2009: 209-10). The medical trustee can paly a communicative role by
helping the patient interpret her notion of the good—including wishes, hopes, fears, and
life plans—and communicating this to other parties. The trustee can also play a
deliberative role by helping the patient reflect on her notion of the good. The trustee is
distinct from a surrogate in that she represents the current wishes of the patient to the
extent to which she can faithfully interpret them.25

6.2.3

Hypothetical examples of medical trusteeship

How would medical trusteeship unfold in the context of severely brain-injured patients
who can only communicate through neuroimaging? In what follows, I provide three
scenarios to outline the different ways a trustee might support a patient in this context,
namely, as an explainer, as an interpreter, and as a decision maker.

6.2.3.1

Scenario 1: Medical trustee as explainer

Consider the following example:

24

See also, the British Columbia Representation Agreement Act (1996), for further legal analysis.

The term “faithfully” is used to distinguish medical trusteeship from facilitated communication.
Facilitated communication is a method of communicating (speaking, writing, inter alia) for
another based on a subjective interpretation of the individual’s wishes. By contrast, a medical
trustee is required to faithfully express the patients wish according to objective features of the
individual’s communicated preferences (or attempts at communication).
25
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A brain-injured patient visits the Owen Lab and the strategy proposed in chapters
3 through 5 is applied. The patient performs well on all neuroimaging tasks,
which reveal relevant cognitive functions underlying decision-making capacity.
The patient additionally satisfies a vignette assessment.
The vignette applied involves the following decision: of two long-term care
facilities, which would you like to move to? The first is a secular facility with a
good reputation among clinical staff, while the other is a religious facility with a
less favorable reputation. Clinical staff may intuit that the secular facility is a
better choice because of its reputation, yet the patient chooses the opposite.
Should the patient’s decision be respected? The patient satisfied the proposed assessment
strategy, and is deemed to possess decision-making capacity for a low-stakes decision of
this kind. Yet some clinical staff worry that the decision is incompetent, as it is
inconsistent with the decision they would have made. If the patient could easily
communicate, a clinician could ask her why she has chosen the religious facility. Yet the
limitations of neuroimaging communication preclude this.
A medical trustee can assist in this context by helping the patient express the reasons for
her decision. Suppose the medical trustee is the patient’s mother. Having known the
patient intimately before her injury, she will be well acquainted with the patient’s values.
The trustee is thus in the best position to generate trustworthy explanations of the
patient’s decision. The trustee may know, for example, that the patient is deeply
religious, and while moving to the secular facility is a better decision from a medical
perspective, moving to the religious facility reflects the patient’s values. The medical
trustee’s explanation can therefore help medical staff understand the patient’s choice in
the absence of standard methods of assessing decision-making capacity.
It may be argued that the medical trustee can misinterpret the patient’s wishes. After all, a
patient’s values may change after injury or the medical trustee may have a distorted
understanding of the patient’s wishes (I return to these concerns below). Nonetheless, the
medical trustee’s explanations can guide follow-up questioning if clinical staff are not
confident with the assessment. For example, in a follow-up session, the patient could be
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asked “did you choose the religious long-term care facility because of your religious
values?” An affirmative response could instill confidence in the patient’s capacity to
make this particular decision. The limitations of neuroimaging communication engender
reasonable skepticism about incomplete evidence. Yet, in this case, the medical trustee
can fill gaps in evidence with trustworthy explanations of the patient’s rationale.

6.2.3.2

Scenario 2: Medical trustee as interpreter

Suppose, now, that the same patient successfully answered a majority of questions in the
medical vignette, yet did not correctly answer a sufficient number or the right kind of
questions to satisfy the clinical staff. As it turns out, the decision between long-term care
facilities is not urgent, and the clinical staff agree the patient can be re-evaluated the
following week.
During this time, the medical trustee can serve as an interpreter. In this role, the medical
trustee can arrange information in a way that enhances patient understanding. For
example, it may be that the patient did not fully understand or appreciate the medical
decision in question, which led to difficulty in answering. During the interval between
evaluations, the medical trustee could speak with patient about the medical decision, help
the patient interpret the nuances of the decision, and identify which decision might best
realize the patient’s values. The trustee is likely to have continued access to the patient
during this time (e.g., if the trustee is a family member). This continued access could help
to improve the patient’s performance on the second evaluation.

6.2.3.3

Scenario 3: Medical trustee as decision maker

Suppose, now, that the patient does not answer any questions, or does not provide a
response to the final decision questions of the vignette. Suppose further that the decision
is urgent and that there is no opportunity to re-evaluate the patient before a decision
needs to be made.
In this scenario, the medical trustee can function as a decision maker. The medical trustee
can step in and make a decision for the patient based on her previously expressed wishes
or best interests. This is not generally the role of a medical trustee. On the contrary, it is
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properly the role of a surrogate decision maker. Yet, as this scenario suggests, the trustee
may, in certain circumstances, be entrusted with making decisions that normally lie
within the purview of the surrogate decision maker. I return to this in greater detail
below.
To be sure, this scenario is unique in that the patient has not communicated a decision.
The medical trustee is thus not overriding the patient’s decision. Yet, in other cases it is
conceivable that a trustee could feel compelled to step in because she believes the patient
made the wrong decision. Is the medical trustee warranted in overriding the decision of
the patient in such situations? Strictly speaking, this is impermissible if it has been
established that the patient has decision-making capacity. To prevent this from
happening, it is important for clinical staff and the medical trustee to have clear
expectations about decision-making authority before the patient is evaluated. Likewise,
the clinical staff and medical trustee must work together to identify which medical
decisions are appropriate for the patient to make.
Medical trusteeship adds yet another layer of complexity to caring for severely braininjured patients and, as the scenarios described above demonstrate, there are ways in
which medical trustees can go astray: the trustee’s explanations might not be
corroborated; the trustee might bias the patient’s preferences; or the trustee may be
inclined to override the patient’s decision. Ideally, a medical trustee should enrich the
clinical staff’s understanding of the patient’s decision-making process. In certain
circumstances, the trustee can help allay worries regarding misinterpretation of
information or questions of capacity. In cases of conflict, however, family and clinical
staff may be required to revert to a legally defined decision-making model. While this is
not ideal for respecting patient self-determination, it may be necessary to protect the
patient if it is believed the decision could result in harm.

6.3

Medical trusteeship is beneficial due to its flexibility

A patient’s dependence during medical decision-making is contingent on a number of
factors. Patients with different kinds of impairment will require different kinds of support
or protection, including surrogate or supported decision-making. Likewise, patients will
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require different degrees of support or protection at different times throughout the course
of their disease. Patients with neurodegenerative diseases may require gradually
increasing protection as their condition worsens, while brain-injured patients may need
progressively less support as they recover.
Medical trusteeship is ideal for these situations because of its flexibility. Medical
trusteeship is an ethically motivated model of supported decision-making, and thus is not
hindered by strict, regulatory guidelines. By contrast, legally defined roles, such as that of
surrogate decision maker, hinge on a clear distinction between competence and
incompetence. This distinction allows legal mechanisms inherent in medical decisionmaking to operate efficiently. Yet, such mechanisms do not always accurately track the
complex ways in which patients can be deficient in decision-making capacity, nor how a
surrogate decision maker should comport herself toward a patient as she recovers.
The relationship between trustee and beneficiary can manifest itself in various ways. This
is because the focus of medical trusteeship is the trusting bond between trustee and
beneficiary. Medical trusteeship, as discussed in the philosophy of disability, focuses on
supporting decision- making by individuals with congenital cognitive or communicative
impairments. In these cases, the role of the medical trustee is largely static (cf. Francis,
2009; Silvers and Francis, 2009). However, the role of the medical trustee for a patient
recovering from severe brain injury could be quite different. At first, a severely braininjured patient will require the protection of a surrogate decision maker. Yet, over time,
the patient may regain the capacity to make some low- to medium-stakes medical
decisions. The role of the surrogate may therefore evolve into that of medical trustee.
The role of a medical trustee may also shift according to the stakes of the decision. If a
patient requires protection from the harmful outcomes of high-stakes decisions, the
medical trustee could become a surrogate decision-maker. If a low- to medium-stakes
decision calls for a more supportive role, the medical trustee can yield decision-making
authority to the patient, provided that the patient has already demonstrated decisionmaking capacity for the decision in question. The fluidity of the medical trustee’s role
thus complements the dynamic nature of brain recovery. The medical trustee can support
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decision-making when the patient is highly lucid, yet step in to protect the patient when
she is not. This can help resolve concerns regarding changes in decision-making capacity
over time.
Despite this beneficial feature of medical trusteeship, flexibility can be problematic.
From a legal point of view, a patient either has or does not have decision-making
authority. Models of supported decision-making—especially those that allow fluid
transition between protective and supportive roles—can obscure decision-making
authority. Nonetheless, medical trusteeship—from an ethical perspective, at least—is
useful in the initial stages of recovery from severe brain injury. Thereafter, examination
of the patient’s decision-making capacity will be required to determine whether her
interests are better served by continued use of a medical trustee or the appointment of a
surrogate decision maker.

6.4 Problems with medical trusteeship
6.4.1

Who is the medical trustee supporting?

I have argued that one role of the medical trustee is to provide trustworthy explanations
of the patient’s rationale for medical decisions. This can be helpful in filling in the
inferential gaps caused by the limitations of neuroimaging communication, particularly
with respect to assessing patient values. Yet medical trusteeship raises a difficult
question, namely, whose values does the trustee represent? The person that emerges from
severe brain injury is likely to be different than the person she was before; and her values
are also likely to be different (Albrecht and Devlieger, 1999; Cantor, 1993). This could
complicate efforts to explain the patient’s decision. If the trustee relies on values held by
the patient before injury the trustee may fail to accurately represent decisions motivated
by values formed after injury. Further, limitations in neuroimaging communication may
prevent family and clinical staff from accurately detecting this value shift.
Ideally, clinical staff and family should attend to the patient’s current values. This is
consistent with the view that decision-making capacity is the ability to make a particular
decision at a particular time. As neuroimaging technology evolves, communication may
become more fluid. This may allow clinical staff and family to adequately identify
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transformations in values, and to attend to them. In the meanwhile, clinical staff and
medical trustees should consider whether a shift in values is a plausible explanation when
the patient’s response is unanticipated.

6.4.2

The mistaken medical trustee

A second, related criticism is that a medical trustee may not faithfully represent a
patient’s authentic wishes. For example, a patient may express a wish for X, while the
trustee recommends not X. The trustee’s recommendation may be due to
misinterpretation of the patient’s wishes or bias (Silvers and Francis, 2009: 492).
Unfortunately, it is difficult to check the accuracy of the trustee’s recommendation. In
patients for whom communication is already limited, it is difficult to find an objective
vantage point from which inauthentic recommendations can be reliably identified.
Proponents of medical trusteeship offer several rebuttals. First, it is possible that the
interests of the trustee are “encapsulated” within the interests of the patient (Francis and
Silvers, 2009: 327). For example, it is reasonable to assume that a patient’s interest in
living pain-free likely encapsulates the interest of her trustee who does not wish her loved
one to live in pain. To the extent that the trustee’s interests are encapsulated within the
interests of the patient, errors in interpretation are unlikely.
Second, an individual fills the role of a trustee on the basis of having “the deepest caring
relationship with the beneficiar[y] and thus may be expected to know them well and care
about them…” (Francis and Silvers, 2009: 327). The presumption of intimate knowledge
suggests the trustee is in the best position to interpret the patient’s wishes and is likely to
continue caring for her throughout recovery. An analogy is the caring relationship
between a mother and child. A mother and child share a caring bond that evolves and
strengthens throughout their lives. Indeed, in many cases, it is a mother (or parent) who
knows her child best and will continue caring for him or her regardless of the child’s state
in life. The same can be said for the individual fulfilling the role of medical trustee. The
inertia of the relationship between trustee and beneficiary gives strong reason to believe
that care and trust between the two will continue in spite of the patient’s disabilities.
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It is, of course, still possible that the trustee could fail to accurately represent the patient’s
wishes. When a trustee’s judgment is questioned, family and clinical staff have recourse
to legal intervention. The trustee’s views can be assessed according to various legal
standards (Francis and Silvers, 2009: 327). For example, if there is conflict between a
patient’s medical choice and the trustee’s account, evidence of the patient’s previously
expressed wishes may be used to verify whether the trustee’s representation is faithful. If
the trustee’s representation fails this evidentiary standard, her interpretation of the
patient’s wishes can be overridden.

6.4.3

Medical Trusteeship and The Law

A third criticism of medical trusteeship is that it is inconsistent with the law. Medical
trusteeship is highly flexible and complements the dynamic nature of brain recovery. Yet,
because of its flexibility, medical trusteeship can conflict with legally defined roles. As
Fins and Pohl argue:
Guardianships, by their nature as a product of the law, have the virtue of stability,
what is described as stare decisis, which stresses the precedence of stasis. This is
necessary for the enduring and efficient practice of guardianship. After all, we
can't have shifting guardians with differing decisions all attempting to stabilize
the shattered world of a patient with brain injury. (Fins and Pohl, 2016: 250)
Additionally, a clear attribution of decision-making authority is grounded in liberal
notions of autonomy. On this view, an individual is autonomous if she can be held solely
responsible for her medical decisions. Responsibility, just like decision-making authority,
cannot be divided between patient and medical trustee (but see Francis, 2007, for
rebuttal).
The ethical notion of capacity and the legal notion of competence, while generally
consistent, come into conflict in such circumstances. Patients who are recovering from
severe brain injury may have their wishes interpreted and cultivated within the ethical
framework of decision-making capacity (as done in this thesis), but this may be
insufficient for the attribution of legal competence. Although patients recovering from
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severe brain injury “may make ‘authentic choices,’ their deviation from global legal
norms can render them wholly incompetent in the eyes of civil society and the law.”
(Banja and Fins, 2013: 1376; Fins and Pohl, 2016: 251)
Despite this conflict, some argue that there is a need to reconsider how supported
decision-making can be integrated into legal frameworks. Fins and Pohl argue that:
In directing care, guardians should not only respect the patient’s prior voice but
also be responsive to his re-emerging one. This approach is sensitive to the
injured brain’s potential to recover, encouraging guardians to uncover means to
functionally communicate and to continually assess decision-making capacity.
When patients are able to communicate…guardians should weigh their present
preferences against those expressed in the past and current safety concerns and
best interests. (Fins and Pohl 2016: 255-6)
So, while medical trusteeship can conflict with the law, the role of a legally appointed
guardian may come to resemble that of a medical trustee when considering how
supported decision-making can be used to empower the voice of severely brain-injured
patients. More broadly, medical trusteeship provides a framework for thinking about
medical decision-making before the law is invoked. Conflicts will inevitably arise and
require recourse to legally defined roles. Yet, in most cases, family and clinical staff can
reasonably work together to enhance the self-determination of a brain-injured patient in
day-to-day health care decisions. Medical trusteeship is thus an ideal framework for
guiding practical judgments about how to incorporate brain-injured patients in the
decision-making process.

6.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, I have proposed using medical trusteeship to address concerns raised by
the strategy developed in chapters 3 through 5, and to explain how this strategy would
unfold in practice. By virtue of her relationship with the patient, the medical trustee can
generate trustworthy explanations of a patient’s medical decisions, help the patient
interpret medical information, or make decisions for the patient if the patient fails to
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communicate a preference. Additionally, the flexibility of the medical trustee’s role
allows her to be both protective and supportive. This prevents incapable patients from
making harmful decisions, yet creates avenues to efficiently yield decision-making
authority to the patient as she recovers.
The use of a medical trustee thus rounds out the strategy proposed in this thesis. First, as
a heuristic, we start with evaluation of cognitive functions to determine if the cognitive
machinery underlying decision-making capacity is intact. Once this is determined, we
move on to an application of the vignette approach to evaluate decision-making capacity.
Finally, we integrate the medical trustee to ensure the patient is protected in the event that
the evidence produced by the vignette approach is weak or incomplete. If applied in
practice, this strategy would empower severely brain-injured patients to express their
wishes, yet ensure that their welfare interests are protected as the decision-making
process unfolds.
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Conclusion

7

Conclusion

In this thesis, I have presented a strategy for assessing decision-making capacity in
severely brain-injured patients who can only communicate through neuroimaging. In
chapter 1, I reviewed the relevant scientific literature. In chapter 2, I outlined the
conceptual foundations of decision-making capacity and responded to criticism of efforts
to evaluate decision-making capacity through neuroimaging communication. In chapters
3 and 4, I provided a systematic task analysis of key neuroimaging and EEG-based
paradigms deployed in the Owen Lab and mapped the relationships between cognitive
functions recruited by these paradigms and decision-making capacity. In chapter 5, I
presented a practical test for decision- making capacity tailored to neuroimaging
communication, namely, the vignette approach. In chapter 6, I proposed a model of
supported decision-making for severely brain-injured patients, namely, medical
trusteeship.
The strategy proposed in this thesis was motivated by the following question: is it
permissible to allow severely brain-injured patients, who can only communicate through
neuroimaging, to participate in making medical decisions? I have argued that the strategy
proposed in this thesis offers the ethical grounds for the attribution of decision-making
capacity to some severely brain-injured patients for low- to medium-stakes medical
decisions. It follows that patients to whom such decision-making capacity has been
attributed should be allowed to participate in making low- to medium-stakes medical
decisions.

7.1 Recommendations and future directions
Beyond the argument outlined above, this thesis sheds light on several other conceptual
and empirical issues, including the nature of decision-making capacity, our obligations to
other patient populations, and the nature of consciousness itself. Attending to these
questions can help elucidate our obligations to severely brain injured patients. Further
philosophical and scientific research offers hope to these patients, their families, and the
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clinicians who care for them. Below, I briefly outline three recommendations and three
avenues of future research.

7.1.1

Recommendation 1: Increase communication bandwidth

Technical innovation can help resolve the problem of assessing decision- making capacity
through neuroimaging communication. Such innovations involve an increase in
communication bandwidth. As indicated in chapter 5, increasing bandwidth can help to
increase the number of questions that can be posed in a single scanning session, the
accessibility of neuroimaging communication itself, and the possibility of communicating
in real-time. It is recommended that future efforts to refine neuroimaging communication
should focus on increasing communication bandwidth.

7.1.2

Recommendation 2: Explore quality-of-life

Medical decision- making is only one of the potential uses of neuroimaging
communication. Patients have welfare interests, clinicians have a duty to attend to these
welfare interests and a theory of welfare that helps protect severely brain-injured patients
should be developed. Ideally, a theory of welfare designed to protect this patient
population would involve the development of a quality-of- life instrument that can be
deployed through neuroimaging communication.

7.1.3

Recommendation 3: Modify autonomy to accommodate
disabled persons

The standard view of autonomy does not extend to disabled persons. However, it is clear
that some disabled persons are capable of participating in making some medical decisions
provided they are supported in appropriate ways. In chapter 6, I described alternative
forms of autonomy. Further efforts should be made to clarify these forms of autonomy to
accommodate individuals with cognitive or communicative impairments.

7.1.4

Future direction 1: Decision-making capacity in other
populations

How might this research bear on the assessment of decision-making capacity in other
patient populations? Severely aphasic patients, for example, also have great difficulty
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communicating. The inability of both brain-injured and aphasic patients to communicate
may compromise their individual autonomy. Assessment of decision-making capacity in
severely brain-injured patients through neuroimaging communication may therefore have
profound implications for other patient populations with similar communication
impairments.

7.1.5

Future direction 2: Decision-making capacity and cognitive
functions

What is the relationship between cognitive functions and decision-making capacity?
Standard methods of assessment do not attend to cognitive functions. Yet, as
demonstrated in this thesis, particular cognitive functions are differentially important to
decision-making capacity, particularly understanding and appreciation. Attending to
cognitive functions may be beneficial for a number of reasons. First, cognitive functions
may provide a more objective means of attributing decision-making capacity. Second,
attending to cognitive functions may allow for the development of more sensitive
instruments for assessing decision-making capacity. Finally, focusing on cognitive
functions may help identify mechanisms that allow us to repair or enhance decisionmaking capacity. This may be particularly beneficial in aging populations or those with
mild to moderate brain injury.

7.1.6

Future direction 3: Consciousness

How does this research bear on the science of consciousness? In this thesis, I have
focused on assessment of decision-making capacity. Yet, neuroimaging in severely braininjured patients raises a host of conceptual problems related to the attribution of
consciousness in general. As noted above, assessment of cognitive functions can provide
nonstandard evidence of decision- making capacity in individuals with cognitive and
communicative impairments. Increased focus on cognitive functions could allow for
useful revisions of diagnostic categories as well as the identification of signposts
indicative of functional recovery.
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